GOVT 2301. Federalist #10 and the Republicanism. In the previous section we looked over the nature of Constitutions and analyzed the broad design of the United States and Texas Constitutions, as well as the alleged failures of the Articles of Confederation. .
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In the previous section we looked over the nature of Constitutions and analyzed the broad design of the United States and Texas Constitutions, as well as the alleged failures of the Articles of Confederation.
More specifically, it means that the preferences of the general population are filtered through representative institutions.Try to memorize the “filter” as an analogy. In brief, a republic attempts to filter out short-term, unstable, radical ideas in order to ensure that the actions of government reflect long term, stable concerns.
As we will see, the principle concern by the framers of the Constitution was that powerful, permanent majorities would be able to control all aspects of governing power, become tyrannical, and disregard the rights of the majority.In short: a republic is argued to be better able to prevent the tyranny of the majority.
We will consider this topic by reading through Federalist #10 which argues that the Constitution successfully limit the dangers posed by factions motivated by personal, narrow interests, not the overall interests of the nation. It does so by filtering their preferences through a legislative system that will break apart majority factions.
A faction, as the term was used by Madison, is similar to what we would call today interest (or advocacy) groups.As we will see, the Constitution is designed in part to impact how groups form in the nation and how capable those groups are to creating instability.
Classical authors argued that democracies inevitably turned chaotic and out the chaos emerged a tyranny that would keep the peace. Read criticism of the Athenian democracy here. The Framers of the Constitution were aware of these arguments.
The real problem, as they saw it, lied in human nature. As we will see later, Madison thought we far more likely to “vex and oppress” each other than to cooperate. This would be fatal in a direct democracy, but manageable in an indirect democracy.
Democracies, which naturally require a degree of individual freedom, allow these divisions to take center stage and lead to conflict. Utter chaos – civil wars – can lead some to conclude that a tyrannical leader is preferable to random violence.
Obviously we can question whether the U.S. qualified as a democracy at that point given restrictions on suffrage.We discuss these in the section on elections. For now it is important to know that restricted suffrage was a deliberate choice by the framers.
From the Constitutional Convention: Mr. HAMILTON. This question has already been considered in several points of view. We are now forming a republican government. Real liberty is neither found in despotism nor the extremes of democracy, but in moderate governments.
Each institution is put in office through a separate process, which insulates them in different ways from the national electorateHouse – the peopleSenate – the statesPresident – the electoral collegeCourts - appointment