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Contests for Public Goods

Contests for Public Goods. PhD Defense Presentation By Florian Heine. 19 April 2017. Contests for Public Goods. Contests for Public Goods. Contests for Public Goods. Chapter 2. In the field, factual rents from a contest often depend on what the winning party makes of it Example:.

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Contests for Public Goods

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  1. Contests for Public Goods PhD Defense Presentation By Florian Heine 19 April 2017

  2. Contests for Public Goods

  3. Contests for Public Goods

  4. Contests for Public Goods

  5. Chapter 2 • In the field, factual rents from a contest often depend on what the winning party makes of itExample:

  6. Chapter 2 Individual endowment T=200 tokens100 for first stage, 100 for second stage

  7. Chapter 2 Individual endowment T=200 tokens100 for first stage, 100 for second stage

  8. Chapter 2 Second Stage

  9. Chapter 2 Second Stage

  10. Chapter 2 Second Stage

  11. Chapter 2 • Positive slope in the competition treatment • Sunk costs have a larger influence on contribution levels if they are borne out of a deliberate decision.

  12. Chapter 3 Anecdotal evidence: Imagine a football team employing only negative reciprocity towards teammates Newcastle United players Kieron Dyer and Lee Bowyer on April 2005 against Aston Villa.

  13. Chapter 3 Contest Environment • 15 periods in partner matching • Endowment E=100 tokens per period • Individual prize z=100 tokens for players in the winning group • Individuals get to know how much other group mates contribute

  14. Chapter 3 Non-Contest Environment • 15 periods in partner matching • Endowment E=100 tokens per period • Individual prize z=100 tokens for players in the winning group • Individuals get to know how much other group mates contribute

  15. Chapter 3 • Contest environment • Reward • Punish • Reward & Punishment • Baseline • Non-contest environment • Reward • Punish • Reward & Punishment • Baseline

  16. Chapter 3 • Contribution to the group project is higher in the reward treatment than in the punishment treatment.

  17. Chapter 3 • Contribution to the group project is higher in the reward treatment than in the punishment treatment. • Contribution in R&P contest treatment peaks out over all other.

  18. Chapter 3 • Contribution to the group project is higher in the reward treatment than in the punishment treatment. • Contribution in R&P contest treatment peaks out over all other. • Surprisingly high contribution in baseline contest environment.

  19. Chapter 3 • Rewarding seems slightly more extensively used, especially in the beginning.

  20. Chapter 3 • Rewarding seems slightly more extensively used, especially in the beginning. • Total response-giving in R&P treatments significantly higher. • Within environment, robust demand for use of reward and punishment

  21. Chapter 4 • Research on leadership repeatedly finds an efficiency enhancing effect of a leader in public goods games or group production both in the lab and in the field • Large class of situations where groups are not isolated, but in some form of competition • In a team contest, things might very well look different

  22. Chapter 4 • 15 periods in partner matching • Endowment E=120 tokens per period • Individual prize z=480 tokens for players of the winning group • Individuals get to know how much other group mates contribute

  23. Chapter 4

  24. Chapter 4

  25. Chapter 4

  26. Chapter 4

  27. Chapter 4

  28. Chapter 4 • Without between group communication, leaders prompt an increase in contest expenditures. • Allowing for communication between group leaders cushions this effect and results in a contest expenditure level which is comparable to the baseline.

  29. Chapter 4 Two fields of attrition: Contributeas Leader does Reallocate 480

  30. Contests for Public Goods • Grim picture of the role of simple institutions ingroup contest games. • What does this mean for the role of institutions in societyin general? • Institutions help groups coordinate towards what its members come to perceive as desirable • The crucial point of the matter is what determinesthe group's goal

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