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European foreign, security and defence policy Dr. Maria Strömvik, Lund University 2011-07-01

European foreign, security and defence policy Dr. Maria Strömvik, Lund University 2011-07-01. Against all odds. The heart of the principle of sovereignty - vital task to safeguard national interests

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European foreign, security and defence policy Dr. Maria Strömvik, Lund University 2011-07-01

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  1. European foreign, security and defence policy Dr. Maria Strömvik, Lund University 2011-07-01

  2. Against all odds • The heart of the principle of sovereignty - vital task to safeguard national interests • Different European states with different and strong historical ties to other parts of the world • Foreign policy is largely demand-driven – requires immediate decisions on unexpected events • Unwieldy decision-making procedures • Minimal resources • International prestige

  3. European Political Cooperation • Luxembourg report 1970 • Attempt to identify foreign policy issues of common interest • Ambition to possibly act in common (by diplomacy) if ”feasible and desirable” • Foreign Ministers’ meetings every six months • Political Committee (PoCo) to meet every 3 months • Presidency to coordinate the work

  4. European Political Cooperation • No meetings in Brussels • Not ”security and defence” • Not EC but ”the Six” • No secretariat • No common budget • No involvement of EC Commission • No mentioning in the treaties • No expectations to agree

  5. CFSP today • Almost all meetings in Brussels • All issues of foreign and security policy • In the name of the EU • Strong Council Secretariat (and new EAS!) • Full involvement of the Commission • Several pages in the Lisbon Treaty • Quite high expectations to agree

  6. CFSP instruments • Common statements, positions and joint actions • Common positions in international organisations • Special representatives • Political dialogues between EU and other countries and organisations

  7. CFSP instruments • Démarches in third states • Participation in peace negotiations • Political, diplomatic, economic, and financial carrots and sticks • Civilian and military peace support operations (ESDP/CSDP)

  8. EUPM Bosnia- Herzegovina Operation Proxima Macedonia EUPAT Macedonia EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine EULEX Kosovo EUJUST Themis Georgia EUFOR Althea Bosnia- Herzegovina EUMM Georgia Operation Concordia Macedonia EU border support team Georgia EU-support for AU’s mission in Darfur, Sudan EUPOL Afghanistan EUFOR Tchad/RCA AMM Aceh, Indonesia EU SSR Guinea-Bissau EUJUST Lex (for) Iraq EUPOL RDC D. R. Congo EUTM Somalia EUBAM Rafah Gaza strip EUFOR RDC D. R. Congo EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories Operation Artémis D. R. Congo EUSEC RDC D. R. Congo Atalanta Somalia

  9. Consequences (international) • Demand for EU has increased dramatically • EU / CSDP has inspired others (notably AU) • EU has given the UN a new ”partner” • EU / CSDP has not generated any ”balancing behaviour”

  10. Consequences (EU level) • Council Secretariat’s role has increased dramatically • CSDP operations have in some cases brought MS closer together also politically • EU members and Commission discuss broader and more comprehensive foreign policy issues today than ever before • Treaty revisions

  11. Consequences (national) • Small countries ”forced” to broaden their ”foreign policy outlook” • Increased pressure on small foreign ministries • Increased pressure on inter-ministerial coordination • Increased demand for information and intelligence gathering • Revision and increased pressure on government agencies’ possibilities to provide civilian and military personnel • Markedly increased influence on international issues when EU agrees

  12. Opportunities • EU often perceived as more efficient and less ”corrupt” than UN • EU perceived as more ”neutral” and less self-interested than big nation states (EULEX Iraq?) • In some cases, EU has been the only accepted third party (AMM, Rafah) • In some areas, EU can go where NATO cannot (Georgia, Moldova) • EU seen as welcome addition to the US in the international arena

  13. Opportunities • EU can provide capacities that the UN cannot • In some cases UN even gets increased credibility from EU-UN cooperation • Gives (especially small) European states a greater say (compared to NATO and compared to bilateral activities) • Gives active small states a bigger say than in other EU policy areas, because of the flexible process with no COM and no EP involvement

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