Hezbollah

1. P R O F I L E Hezbollah

2. Hezbollah Table of Contents Organization Profile The Second Lebanon War Hezbollah Today Hezbollah Arsenal Operational Concept Smuggling International Assistance

3. Hezbollah Organization Profile

4. Organization Profile • Founded in 1982, after the PLO and Fatah were driven out of South Lebanon, Hezbollah is a radical Shiite organization which represents a major political and military force in the region, particularly evident when compared to other weak regional players. The organization functions as a front-line Iranian proxy, relying on both Iranian and Syrian support. Hezbollah strength stems from a number of sources: Military Political Socio-Economic Professional and well-trained army Modus Vivendi with the government Operates primarily in Shiite regions Guerilla warfare techniques and civilian shield Increased influence following governmental recognition Ideological indoctrination Largely backed by Iran Strategic force (UAV’s, missiles, etc) “Blocking third” veto right Terror component

5. Hezbollah Establishment • Hezbollah was founded in 1982 by Lebanese Shi’ite Muslims, assisted by 1,500 Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The party’s platform is based on the teachings of Ayatollah Khmonenu and inspired by the Iranian Revolution. It calls for the “liberation” of Jerusalem and the complete elimination of Israel, as well as the establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon. Hezbollah has played an active role in Lebanese politics since 1992, guided by the Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, and the group’s governing, the Majlis al-Shura. The organization still functions as an Iranian proxy, receiving millions of dollars in aid, massive shipments of weapons and training. Syria plays an active role in conveying the support and in supporting the organization.

6. Hezbollah The Second Lebanon War

7. Weapon Capabilities • Despite its position as a non-state actor instructed to disband in multiple UN resolutions, Hezbollah possessed an arsenal comparable to that of a full-fledged army prior to the Second Lebanon War, including: Long-Range Rockets (+250km) Guerilla Ground Force (ATGMs and MANPADs) Short-Range Rockets UAV and Naval Unit 15,000 (10,000 south of the Litani River) Including coastal missiles Over 1000 Approx. 8,000 Beyond Hezbollah’s extensive arsenal, the organization also relied upon a strict military hierarchy, as well as pre-determined military operational concepts. This included 14,000 activists, of which 5,000 remained south of the Litani River.

8. Infrastructure • Hezbollah constructed a massive web of tunnels and underground storage depots throughout southern Lebanon. In addition, C2 headquarters, firing positions and storage centers were concealed deep within civilian populations. Entrance Room Entrance Room Weapons Room

9. International Law • Beyond concealing itself within the civilian population, Hezbollah systematically targeted Israeli civilians throughout northern Israel. During the course of the war, over 4,000 rockets were launched, killing 41 civilians and wounding over 600. MAJOR CITIES TARGETED BY HEZBOLLAH ROCKET LAUNCHING FROM URBAN AREA Hezbollah also operated in close proximity to UN outposts, deliberately endangering the international force in effort to reduce Israeli capacity to retaliate.

10. UNSCR 1701 An attempt to change reality in Southern Lebanon • Arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including “the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL”. • Implementation of relevant provisions (UNSCR 1559 and 1680) requiring the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon (other than LAF). • No foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government. • No sales or supply of arms to Lebanon, except as authorized by the government.

11. Hezbollah Hezbollah Today

12. Hezbollah Today • Following the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah immediately began to take measures in order to contend with the challenges it had faced. This takes place in a number of arenas: Military Training Drills Smuggling Infrastructure Personnel Arsenal Social Indoctrination Socio-economic activities Political Unspoken cooperation with the LAF Blocking Third Legitimacy in government

13. We shall not surrender, we shall not come to terms with Israel…and we will continue to believe and proclaim that Israel…must be erased from existence • Hassan Nasrallah • Hezbollah Secretary-General • 18/09/2009

14. Hezbollah Today Arsenal Infrastructure UN Infractions Smuggling

15. Arsenal About two thirds of Hezbollah’s long-range capabilities were destroyed by the IDF in the Second Lebanon War, many within the first few hours of the operation. However, since the conclusion of the war, the organization has invested significant efforts in rebuilding its capabilities, in terms of quantity and quality, through massive arms transferring relying on Iran and Syrian. 2006 2010 Rockets 15,000 40,000 Rockets in South Lebanon 10,000 30,000

16. Weapons Kiryat Shemona • Hezbollah modus operendi uses advanced conventional weapons with guerilla terrorist techniques. To this effect, it has amassed anti-tank missiles, IEDs, UAVs as well as thousands of rockets and missiles. Nahariya Tibereas Haifa • 107 mm cannon – 8.3km • Falak 1,2 – 10, 10.8km • 122 mm cannon – 11km • Improved 122 – 20.4km • Arash (Malak) – 29km • Fager 3 – 43km • Syrian Rocket – 50km • 220 mm cannon – 70km • Fager 5 – 75km • 302 mm cannon – 100km • 302 mm cannon – 150km • M600 – 300km • SCUDD – 700km Afula Beit Shean Hadera Netanya Tel-Aviv Ashdod Jerusalem Ashkelon

17. Advanced Weapons • In addition, Hezbollah possess dozens of UAVs, as used in the Second Lebanon War, coastal missiles, anti-aircraft guns and more. This is backed by the Scud and M600 rockets, which allow Hezbollah to target the Israeli front from far within the Lebanese strategic depth. THE ZILZAL C802 COASTAL MISSILE THE IRANIAN-MADE ABABIL UAV SYRIAN 220M ROCKET LAUNCHER SAGGER ATGM MISSILES

18. Hezbollah Operational Concept

19. Infrastructure 2006 2010 Rural Villages • CMZ (Closed Military Zones) HEZBOLLAH STRONGHOLDS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON

20. Hezbollah Deployment Overview Hezbollah routinely deploys within the rural environment in Southern Lebanon. This serves as the backbone of war-time operations. Southern Lebanon Deployment 5,000 Activists ≈30,000 SSRs Northern Unit Command Each village area includes dozens of activists and 200 SSRs Central Unit Western Unit Unit Sector Village Integrated, all-arms battle Continued indiscriminate fire on Israeli national, civilian and military targets Ground combat against IDF troops in Southern Lebanon Concept of Operation

21. ORBAT AOR C2 CONOPS The Village as a Military Unit Close-combat fortified position which includes three battle zones (village, outskirts and open areas). Includes AT weapons, IEDs and light arms Village commander subordinate to sector commander, and commanding officers and squad commanders The village, village outskirts and dense surrounding vegetation Projected IDF Access Route Infantry Platoon/ Company, armed with ATs, IEDs and light arms Fortified vegetation 2 km village Open fortified area outskirts 3 km 22

22. Open area and village periphery along IDF approach Village limits IED Weapon storage facility Infantry unit Observation post Extra light mortar Light mortar Light rocker launcher Command post Schematic Deployment 23

23. El-Khiam – Information Population: 22,930 Distance from Blue Line: 4 km Range of rockets: 20km Shi’ite village surrounded by Sunni, Druze and Christian villages. Extensive Hezbollah activity prior to and during Second Lebanon War Active Hezbollah arena between 2000 and 2006, with IEDs, a UAV launch, abductions and more. LAF presence (20 tanks, 7 cannons, 50 APCs) failed to respond to events (crossing of Blue Line – 7/09, AT team in mosque – 4/10). El-Khiam Neve Atib Metula Kirya’at Shemona SSR in Second Lebanon War

24. Bunker Weapon Storage Facility (22) Headquarters (13) C2 Observation Post (2) School UNIFIL position U Hospital H Mosque El-Khiam – Arms Deployment 1 457m 2 Mizra’at Sarda 250m 14

25. Bunker Weapon Storage Facility (22) Headquarters (13) C2 Observation Post (2) School UNIFIL position U Hospital H Mosque El-Khiam - City Center

26. Position Deployment Command and Control Position Located less than half a kilometer from the village hospital. Generally located near civilian sites (mosques, medical sites, schools) and on high ground. Combat Observation Post Within 250 meters of a UN post Overlooks village access routes, in C2 line of sight and reports via tactical radio. Can contain thermal cameras and more.

27. Weapons in El-Khiam Village Activists Approximately 90, including special forces Artillery ≈600 8km range mortar shells FAGOT AT Rockets ≈200 40km SSRs Engineers Explosive pits, IEDs, Claymore & shrapnel RPG29 (AT) Anti-Tank AT-14, AT-5, AT-4 and TOW missiles Intelligence 5 OPs + emergency monitoring center IEDs Hidden in Crates Weapon Storage Facilities 22 locations within residential areas and in the vicinity ofthe mosque, the school and medical institutes.

28. Infrastructure – Arms Depots • The dangers to the local population this conduct poses was reflected in a explosion at a Hezbollah arms depot in the Khirbit Salim (July 14th, 2009). The depot, which contained 122mm rockets, 155mm rockets, mortars, grenades and more, was cleared by Hezbollah operatives, as the LAF prevented UNIFIL access. KHIRBIT SALIM A similar incident occurred on October 12th, when an arms depot in Tayr Falsi exploded. Hezbollah removed the arms, transferring them to an arms depot in the nearby village of Dir Kanoon a-Nahar. TRUCKS REMOVING WEAPONS FROM TAYR FALSI TO DIR KANOON A-NAHAR

29. Marawhain One example of the local population rejecting Hezbollah attempts to establish bases of operation within their villages occurred in Marawhain on August 23rd. After Hezbollah operatives attempted to establish a position, the civilians, who were well aware of the dangers this presents, protested, forcing a Hezbollah retreat

30. Hezbollah Smuggling

31. Smuggling Model Functioning as a front-line proxy of Iran in the region, Hezbollah relies upon the massive weapon transfers as a lifeline for its operations. The smuggling takes place by air, land and sea, relying on pivotal Syrian support as well. Syria Hezbollah Storage Iran IRGC Syria Swap Zones Depot Lebanon Beka’a Valley Beirut South of the Litani

32. South Lebanon Transfer Routes 1 Lebanon 2 Beqa’a Valley 3 Beirut Syria 4 Damascus Sayda Nabatiya Tyre Kiham Weapons within Lebanon Weapons smuggled into Lebanon (1) are stored at temporary storages locations until they can be transferred further on (2). After being stored in arms depots in Beirut (3), they are transferred throughout the country, to arms depots both north and south of the Litani river (4). Despite the explicit prohibition for non-governmental weapons in South Lebanon (UNSCR 1701), many weapons are then sent on to Southern Lebanon.

33. Weapon Transfers - Examples "Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer…any arms or related material…all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft“ (UNSCR 1747, Paragraph 5) • One example of the massive weapon transfers which took place from Iran is the Francop, a cargo ship which, following intelligence reports, was bordered by Israeli troops. On board were 36 containers containing 300 tons of illegal weapons. This directly contradicted UNSCR 1747, which prohibits arms shipments out of Iran: Numerous other examples of weapon transfers have been discovered, including a train of Iranian arms discovered in Turkey (5/07) and an aerial train through Syria to Hezbollah, in the guise of humanitarian assistance (12/03-1/04)

34. Hezbollah International Assistance

35. Training Iranian Intervention • Iranian meddling in the region well exceeds only weapon transfers. Iran continue to plays an active role in training and bankrolling Hezbollah organization, as well as providing assistance for its political activity, which has already seen dividends. In 2006, members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards were in Lebanon in order to help train Hezbollah operatives, training as many as 1,200. This was preceded by the training of nearly 12,000 operatives in camps in Iran, Sudan and Lebanon. IRANIAN WEAPON FOUND IN LEBANON

36. ’07-’08 09/’06 2004 Iranian Meddling • Iranian efforts are complemented by massive economic support to Hezbollah. The Iranian Quds organization alone contributes between 100-200 million dollars annually to Hezbollah, much which funds weapons. Following the Second Lebanon War, Iran invested approximately 400 million dollars in rehabilitating Hezbollah’s strength. The US Treasury determined that the central Iran bank had sent millions of dollars in air to Hezbollah and the Hamas. Iran and Hezbollah cooperated in a join effort to counterfeit US currency in order to bankroll Hezbollah activates and disrupt US commerce.

37. EMDAD 2009 2006 Social/Political Intervention Iranian Intervention The EMDAD fund, created by Imam Khomeini in 1979, relies on governmental funds as well as donations. The fund offers widows and children guidance, medical assistance and schooling. There are five active schools run by the fund in Lebanon which propagate hatred and Hezbollah indoctrination. Iran transferred about 600 million dollars to Hezbollah prior to the July, 2009 elections. This money was transferred via the Syrian embassy in Lebanon. After the Second Lebanon War, an Iranian organization was created to aid Lebanese rehabilitation. By 2008, 4,000 projects had been completed, including education institutes exploited to forward Hezbollah’s radical doctrine.

38. Conclusion Since the conclusion of the Second Lebanon War and despite UNSCR 1701, Hezbollah has continued to expand its military capabilities, increased the scope of its infrastructure and has gained political recognition as a inherent member of the government. Hezbollah’s abilities now surpass its pre-war levels. International acceptance of this trend has left it confident in its power and the right to use it, despite its status as an illegal non-state terrorist entity.

39. I, Hassan Nasrallah, tell the Security Council - denounce me and receive the following statement: we possess, and will continue to possess, rockets and missiles which can hit any target in conquered Israel • Hassan Nasrallah • Hezbollah Secretary-General • 28/7/2007