Today’s lecture covers: AICs rules that shaped global neoliberalism

1. Today’s lecture covers: AICs rules that shaped global neoliberalism The resulting capitalist crisis: The Financial crisis of 2008

2. WTO: AICs commercial interests are embodied in the rules global trade, aid and loan imposed on the LDCs : • WTO works on power-based bargaining • Neoliberal policies • Washington consensus • SAP • Conditionality • MFN

3. How does Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) affect the Developing countries? • Impact: • Balancing the government budget • Weakening the Labour • Deregulating the economy • Reducing the State • BLeeDS • In the past, IMF’s imposition of SAP on South Asian countries (e.g., S.Korea, Indonesia, Thailand) created a financial crisis of economic contraction and depression.

4. Continued from Lec 4: • WTO: AICs commercial interests are embodied in the rules global trade, aid and loan imposed on the LDCs: • WTO works on power-based bargaining • Neoliberal policies • Washington consensus • SAP • Conditionality • MFN

5. What are the Neoliberal policies? DOPE LD • Liberalize trade • Deregulate finance/currency • Open up for foreign investment, • Privatize economy • Deregulate commercial activity • Ensure property protection

6. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XIUWZnnHz2g&feature=related neolib as a water balloon 12 min

7. WTO: AICs commercial interests are embodied in the rules global trade, aid and loan imposed on the LDCs : • WTO works on power-based bargaining • Neoliberal policies • Washington consensus • SAP • Conditionality • MFN

8. WASHINGTON CONSENSUS (1989) • Liberalization • Austerity • Privatization • De-regulation • LAPDog

9. WTO: AICs commercial interests are embodied in the rules global trade, aid and loan imposed on the LDCs : • WTO works on power-based bargaining • Neoliberal policies • Washington consensus • SAP • Conditionality • MFN

10. Conditionality: • Conditions placed on loans to LDCs • Conditions imposed to make aid effective in a recipient country – in reality could hurt the country’s economy or the country’s political stability

11. WTO: AICs commercial interests are embodied in the rules global trade, aid and loan imposed on the LDCs : • WTO works on power-based bargaining • Neoliberal policies • Washington consensus • SAP • Conditionality • MFN

12. Most favored nation status (MFN) • An agreement between two nations to levy tariffs on each other at rates as low as those levied on any other country. • If one of these nations reduces tariffs on a third country, all of that nation's MFN partners also receive that lower tariff rate.

13. Global Capitalism, Financial Crisis & Developing Countries • Origins of the Crisis: USA • Impact of the Crisis: Global Source: Valpy FitzGerald hdr.undp.org/en/media/FitzGerald_Global_Financial_Crisis_edit.ppt

14. What caused the US/EU financial system to fail in 2007-9 that led to a shock to global production and trade? What has been the impact of this crisis on the DW? Why has the impact on the Developing World been less than on the AICs? Why has the recovery been quicker in the Developing countries?

15. What caused the crisis? • Market failure? • Policy failure?

16. Causes of Market failures • Lack Information: Markets do not know how to price systemic risk (hidden by derivatives) and investors “herd” (risk aversion) • The Principle-agent: Incentives to traders to take risks; securitization of loans by banks removes monitoring • Deregulations led to Moral hazard/market distortion: banks “too big to fail” and government underwriting assumed

18. Security • An instrument representing ownership (stocks), a debt agreement (bonds) or the rights to ownership (derivatives). • A security is a negotiable instrument representing financial value. The company or other entity issuing the security is called the issuer • A country's regulatory structure determines what qualifies as a security. For example, private investment pools may have some features of securities, but they may not be registered or regulated as such if they meet various restrictions.

19. Derivatives • A derivative is an agreement between two parties that is contingent on a future outcome. • In finance, a derivative is a financial contract with a value linked to the expected future price movements of the asset it is linked to - such as a share, currency, commodity or even the weather. • Derivatives allow risk about the price of the underlying asset to be transferred from one party to another. Options, futures and swaps, including credit default swaps, are types of derivatives. • A common misconception is to refer to derivatives as assets. This is erroneous, since a derivative is incapable of having value of its own as its value is derived from another asset. 

20. SayItVisually--US Financial Crisis http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h4Ns4ltUvfw Derek Banas fin instruments - deregulation http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S3AXHQcXYMk

22. Equity A stock or any other security representing an ownership interest. In finance, equity is ownership in any asset after all debts associated with that asset are paid off, e.g., a car or house with no outstanding debt is the owner's equity because he or she can readily sell the item for cash. Stocks are equity because they represent ownership in a company. Interest Rate Swap financing involves two parties (MNCs) who agree to exchange loan payments (cash flows), results in benefits for both parties.  Currency Swap - One party swaps the interest payments of debt (bonds) denominated in one currency (USD) for the interest payment of debt (bonds) denominated in another currency (BP),   Currency swap is used for cost savings on debt, or for hedging long term currency risk.

23. CDS: The buyer of a Credit Default Swap receives credit protection, whereas the seller of the swap guarantees the credit worthiness of the product. By doing this, the risk of default is transferred from the holder of the fixed income security to the seller of the swap. For example, the buyer of a credit swap will be entitled to the par value of the bond by the seller of the swap, should the bond default in its coupon payments.

24. Subprime Subprime is a classification of borrowers with a tarnished or limited credit history. Lenders will use a credit scoring system to determine which loans a borrower may qualify for. Subprime loans are usually classified as those where the borrower has a credit score below 640. Subprime loans carry more credit risk, and as such, will carry higher interest rates as well. Approximately 25% of mortgage originations in US are classified as subprime. Subprime lending encompasses a variety of credit types, including mortgages, auto loans, and credit cards.

25. Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) • CDOs are a type of structured asset-backed security whose value and payments are derived from a portfolio of fixed-income underlying assets. • CDOs are split into different risk classes, or tranches, whereby "senior" tranches are considered the safest securities. Interest and principal payments are made in order of seniority, so that junior tranches offer higher coupon payments (and interest rates) or lower prices to compensate for additional default risk. • Note: • Each CDO is made up of hundreds of individual residential mortgages. • CDOs that contained subprime mortgages or mortgages underwritten because of predatory lending were at greatest risk of default. • They are blamed for precipitating the global crisis and have been called WMD “weapons of mass destruction.”

26. Credit Default Swap (CDS) A CDS is an insurance contract in which the buyer of the CDS makes a series of payments to the protection seller and, in exchange, receives a payoff if a security (typically a bond or loan or a collection of loans such as a CDO) goes into default. NOTE: CDOs are widely thought to have exacerbated the financial crisis, by allowing investors who did not own a security to purchase insurance in case of its (CDOs they did not own) default. AIG (American International Group of insurers) almost collapsed because of these bets, as it was left on the hook for tens of billions of dollars in collateral payouts to some of the biggest U.S. and European financial institutions. AIG paid Goldman Sachs $13 billion in taxpayer money as a result of the CDSs it sold to Goldman Sachs.

27. What caused the crisis? • Market failure? • Policy failure?

28. Policy failure • US and EU government “populism” over-indebts lower-income groups • US and EU fiscal low-interest policies fuelled asset bubble (including commodities) • Global imbalances generated growing and unsustainable debts of US, EU, and Japan (G3)

29. Origins of current financial crisis • Since 1990s deregulation of financial markets: risk pricing replaces prudential supervision. Rise of derivative “assets” with opaque markets and few players. Bank loans replaced by bonds, etc. • Huge US fiscal deficit, monetary expansion (“Greenspan put”), low savings led to a US mortgage boom/bust (non traded sector) and a huge current account deficit (traded sector). • Mortgage bubbles (e.g. 1992 in UK) are familiar with obvious political costs; join recurrent bubbles in past decade (dotcoms, LTCM, Tequila etc); • But this is by far the most serious systemically because it threatens the global banking system itself as creditor, and whole US electorate as debtor.

30. Sub-prime lending By 2005, one in five mortgages were sub-prime, and they were particularly popular among recent immigrants trying to buy a home for the first time, and the poor.

32. Subprime • Repossessions of houses in America as many of these mortgages reset to higher rates. • By late 2007, one in ten homes in Cleveland had been repossessed • Two million families will be evicted from their homes as their cases make their way through the courts.

34. Scale and Spread • Collapse of the government backed mortgage system in the USA (Fannie and Freddie) followed by meltdown of major investment banks (Lehman, Bear, Merrill) exposed to mortgage market • Mark-to-market asset pricing effects on balance sheets and cumulative liquidity retraction due to rising risk aversion • Affecting insurance, e.g., American International Group, Inc. (AIG) ; and pensions funds

35. Global mortgage boom and bust

36. The end of the stock market boom2008

37. Financial Times, 20 Sept 2008 • “…bank boards and bank executives have failed to understand complex mortgage-backed banking products, as have central bankers, regulators and credit rating agencies.” • “…a reward system that has granted huge bonuses to those who peddled toxic mortgage-related products….” • “Almost as absurd has been the degree of leverage racked up by investment banks.”

38. Policy reactions • Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (re)nationalised; Merrill sold to BankAmerica; Lehman to Barclays; Goldman and Morgan become banks again; US govt $700bn purchase of bad debt; G3 central banks support world banking. • Expansionary monetary policy (to avoid recession like 1930s) and scale of US Govt (and G3) bailouts will have large repercussions, yet to be evaluated [lessons of Mexico etc?]

39. Scale of the potential bailout in Billions (2008)

40. Despite massive trade shock from G3 economies (US, Euro area & Japan) decline, developing economies declined less and recovered better

41. Developing Countries pursued autonomous policies not dependent on those of IMF strictures: • Reserve accumulation to insure themselves after learning form 1990s crises • Counter-cyclical macro-policies (fiscal, monetary and exch-rate) to stabilize their output • More extensive safety nets (universal rather than targeted) to sustain demand

42. World International Reserves (USD million) http://www.nber.org/public_html/confer/2011/GFC11/Dominguez_Hashimoto_Ito.pdf

43. Pre-crisis accumulation of Financial Reserves in Billions acts as buffer

44. Real devaluations of own currencies to accommodate the shock rebalanced their finances

45. India in 2009 • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W5xMujBRvmU • However, income distribution has worsened and poverty risen in the DW • • Managed exchange rates maintain output/employment rather than wages/incomes in the formal sector. • • The burden falls on the informal sector – lower wages and spending by the poor. • Remittances from abroad declined. • • World Bank estimates poverty rising due to deceleration in • growth • Decline in job creation while labour force continues to grow

46. In AICs employment growth is negative (i.e. unemployment rises), but not in Emerging economies

47. Debt Crisis in AICs: Sudden end to a decade-long US and EU household and corporate credit boom http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2010/06/indebtedness_after_financial_crisis

48. Increasing trend in G7 sovereign debt has accelerated

49. Lenders were scared when loan defaults began to rise from 2007 on: Securitized mortgages the most “toxic”

50. lending to banks in turn became Risky- Total bank losses exceed $2 trillion: 25% of US & EU securitized mortgages written off