
Fishing is an Economic Activity The society exploited the Fisheries to obtain goods as minimal cost as possible, as in other activities The estimation of the Profit is the same: Profit = Incomes - Cost, but: • Is based in a Natural Renewable Resource • Under an intensive use this Resource can be extinguished • This resource can produce Rent • This Rent incentive additional activity
The biological dynamic is under the economic dinamic • Unlike the industrial production can not increase indefinitely inputs: the capacity of fish reproduction is limited • It is known from s. XVII quite well the biological behavior. • Natural resources can not be detached from biology economy, but has been ignored until the mid-century XX
Verhoulst function 1804-49 Verhulst's Law states that at some point the growth rate per capita of a population is directly and immediately limited by its own density, through the process of intra-specific competition
Stabilization BiomassGrowth of a forest from a seed Maximum load Zero Population
Biomass destruction Exhaustion of a living resource stock Initial Situation Biomass Exhaustion Extraction level (logging, hunting, fishing)
The Verhulst y Pearl reproductive function Growth Volume Biomass Effects of Changes in r r is the Growth rate
MSY Catch Effort E MSY The static equilibrium points of the extraction of biomass Extraction Possibility frontier
From the biology to the economy • The Biology measures Biomass in (kilos), the economy, cash • The biological curve extraction border, is the border economic curve of production (Potential Gross Income), simply multiply the weight by its market price • We must select a currency (€). But remember that the processes subject to inflation and is not universal
From the biology to the economy • For the economy the objective is not to maximize the product (the amount of biomass removed) but profit. • If Profit = Revenue - Costs, then we must also consider the costs. • We consider that the costs are proportional to the effort: the more ships or more days, more expensive is fishing. • We can assume an economic cost curve of production (costs) linear, simply by multiplying the effort, the unit cost in the market (money that does a boat or go fishing one day.) • We must select a currency (€) but remember that the processes subject to inflation and is not universal
The economics of fisheries exploitation. Incentives and possible equilibria (theory) Gordon Sheafer Model: From Kg to €
The economic equilibrium • A company with revenues and costs, in theoretical economics is considered to be in balance the benefit should be zero • The costs are considered within the cost, the normal business benefit and is called opportunity cost plus a risk premium • If the benefit is negative, the company abandoned the activity and if higher, the sector attracts investment and joint until it approaches zero
Gordon-Scheafer Model Equations • IT: Total IncomeCT: Total Costs • pe: price per unit of fishing effort pc: price per unit of the catch • a,b: structural parameters of the equation . E: Fishing effort • a) Open Acces Equilibrium, in the figure. CT=IT • pe.E = pc.(a.E.(b-E)) • pe.E = E.(pc.a.(b-E)) • pe = pc.a.(b-E) • b) Biological maximum sustainable or Maximum Sustainable Income, in the figure. IT'=0 • IT = pc.a.E.(b-E) • IT = E.pc.a.b - pc.a.E2 • (E.pc.a.b - pc.a.E2)' = 0 • pc.a.b - 2.pc.a.E = 0 • pc.a. (b - 2.E) = 0 • c) Equilibrium under controlled access or property assigned, in the figure. • CT' = IT' • pc.a.(b-2.E) = pe
The Rent problem • In certain conditions can produce income overfishing • These rents are not assigned to one initially, but they are often appropriated by fishermen or fish traders.
1. Limiting the Effort • Effective • Pressure to entry in the business
2. Reduce Production • Effective, but difficult to control • Aging investment
3. Technical limitations • Effective on the most profitable • If not for biological reasons, it becomes less able to compete
4. Permanent withdrawal of vessels • Effective, but less because they come out the worst • Pressure to come
5. Subsidizing capital costs • Retrieves returns in the short, but increases overfishing
6. Subsidizing variable costs • Retrieves returns in the short, but increases overfishing
7. Subsidizing sale prices • Retrieves returns in the short, but increases overfishing
A solution is possible • Derive income to the owner of the resource: State tax
So far we have seen final equilibrium situations • But the path from one point to another is more complicated than was initially sensed • Surprisingly, it is possible to catch more than mark the boundary of possibilities
Effects of economic growth: visualization by a model (MECON) • One thing are the points of balance and other ways to balance • In practical life is this way longer in balance • Given the speed of technological change would normally be permanently out of balance MECON demostration
The perverse incentives • If you put your hand in the fire, it hurts us and the retired -> Pain is a right incentive to help them survive • If we take an addictive and destructive drug, we feel pleasure and encouragement to consume more -> are incorrect stimuli that lead us into a spiral of self-destruction.
Incentives for increasing fisheries exploitation • Are diverse (cultural, political, economic, etc.) Only consider the economic. • A virgin estoc time offers the possibility of exceeding the boundary of the Verhulst equation • The reason is that the thrust of biomass is not reduced automatically, operating a single operation
Example: Heir wasteful • He receives an inheritance of € 1 million • Suppose it is possible to obtain a 5% interest, so that the saver can charge € 50,000 a year, permanently leaving the Capital and therefore "eternal" that income • But it may also conduct "wasteful" and reach out € 100,000 per year in the short term
Evolution of the capital of an estate with a sustainable or wasteful consumption The saver gets 50,000 a year, waste out 100 000 In 16 years away the legacy of wasteful During that time he will have consumed twice
Expansion While biomass is greater than the equilibrium: • It extracts more fish than will ultimately be possible • The yield is higher • The investments are recovered in less time • Wages are higher • The incentive to invest is high
Contraction • While biomass is below the equilibrium:It draws less fish than will ultimately be possible: • The yield is lower than normal • The investments do not recover • Wages and employment fall
Added problems • The administration period is much shorter than the biological • The period of execution of the investment is long: can you order a boat at a time of high expectations and time receive a decline of biomass • The incentive to over-exploit the resource is high to keep profits and wages
The management options • Free access (theoretical concept that does not happen in practice) • Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURF) • Technical Limits (TL) • Market Rights (MR): • Effort (licenses) • Catch (ITQ)
Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURF). Their efficiency depend as • The character of the resources. Efficient if sedentary, no efficient if resources are migratory. • The number of users. If number is reduced more efficient is the system. • The spatial distribution of the fishing grounds • The Unemployment rate. If the Unemployment is high, the social pressure to fish can be difficult to avoid. Without employment alternatives appears difficulties to assure the effectiveness of the system. • The degree of association (cooperative, association, guild, etc.) • The pace of technological progress.
Technical Limits (TL) • Comprises: Protected areas, mesh dimensions, temporary closures, gears exclusion, etc. • Introduced when TURF not running well. • Their efficiency depend as • The capacity of control • The economic incentives • The pace of technological progress.
Potential & limits of each option • TURF is adequated only in littoral fisheries • TL: expensive, but efficient in short term. Not solve the existence of economic incentives to overexploitation • MR: efficient, but: • Tendencies to privatization of public resource • Social inequality • Coherent with Common Market, but without subsidies
The role of the Administration • Solutions need a intelligent combination of tree options • From the local level to Europe • Preserve the public property of resources: the fishermen can manage or pay the use of the resources, not are the owners of the resources • Introduce the pay for use, to reduce the economic pressure and to contribute to maintain the cost of control • Any solution must be periodically reviewed (adaptive management)
Reference • Immediate maximum economic yield; a realistic fisheries economic reference point Jordi Lleonart & Gorka Merino, ICES 2009, Oxford Journals