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Enhancing Email Security through Bounce Address Tag Validation (BATV)

This document discusses the Bounce Address Tag Validation (BATV) framework, aimed at improving email security by detecting forged MailFrom addresses. It covers key features such as digital signatures, key-based validation using the right-hand side (RHS) domain, and meta-syntax for local-part parameters. The approach permits multiple schemes and emphasizes monitoring bounce generation in real-time to enhance protocol security while addressing limitations such as hard limits on local-part size. The content is based on the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) discussions held in San Diego, 2004.

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Enhancing Email Security through Bounce Address Tag Validation (BATV)

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  1. Bounce Address Tag Validation (BATV) D. Crocker IETF J. Levine San Diego Sam Silberman 2004 Tony Finch MASS BOF

  2. mailbox@example.com  batv=mailbox/scheme/parms@example.com BATV – Detecting forged MailFrom • Digital signature • Key based on RHS domain • Permit multiple schemes (Sorry, but no choice) • Meta-syntax on LHS (local-part) for parameters • Permits finding mailbox without understanding sig • Hard limit of 64 bytes for total of local-part D. Crocker, Brandenburg InternetWorking BATV, IETF San Diego 2004

  3. Bounce Generation Bounce Receipt OriginalRelay Bounce Address Evaluation Venues MSA MDA MDA MTA MTA MTA MTA D. Crocker, Brandenburg InternetWorking BATV, IETF San Diego 2004

  4. Base Scheme – PSB0 • Private Signed Bounce zero • Detected invalid received bounces • Interpreted only by issuer • Limited replay protection sig-val = key-id encrypt (<addr-spec>, timestamp, random-string ) D. Crocker, Brandenburg InternetWorking BATV, IETF San Diego 2004

  5. Approach for Public Key Scheme • Detect at time of bounce generation, or earlier • Based on content standard, when available • Use all of the mechanism, but tune computation to MailFrom limitations • E.g., hash the signature into a short string. D. Crocker, Brandenburg InternetWorking BATV, IETF San Diego 2004

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