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SUPPORT TO PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT REFORM IN GEORGIA

SUPPORT TO PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT REFORM IN GEORGIA. FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNT. 1. DESK PHASE. A desk review of documentation available up to the end of 2008; No interviews with participants; The purpose was to establish the main picture and identify questions for further investigation.

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SUPPORT TO PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT REFORM IN GEORGIA

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  1. SUPPORTTO PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENTREFORM IN GEORGIA FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNT

  2. 1. DESK PHASE • A desk review of documentation available up to the end of 2008; • No interviews with participants; • The purpose was to establish the main picture and identify questions for further investigation.

  3. 2. FIELD PHASE • The purpose was to verify and update findings during the desk phase; and • Make an overall assessment of the SPSP.

  4. Findings 1. • The 7 KAAs had not been fully assessed. • A PFM Reform policy existed, but no overall strategy had ever been formalised; • Too many separate “Partner Organisations” involved, not 1 as had been originally thought; • There was no centralised leadership of the PFM reform process; • Government-led donor & sector coordination systems did not exist; • A Government-led performance monitoring and evaluation system was expected to be in place only from 2012; • Government PFM HR development programmes required considerable further donor support.

  5. Findings 2. • Discrepancies between the TAPs and Policy Matrix; • Indicators did not always support results and sometimes were inconsistent; • TA was offered to the MoF to be used as it decided – but the Mof rejected it, and no alternative was proposed; • Minimal compliance with disbursement conditions but acceptance by EC; • Lack of sufficiently qualified personnel was a major weakness of the whole PFM Reform Process

  6. Lessons Learnt 1. • SPSP is an instrument with enormous potential; • Therefore its design should aim to maximise this potential; • Assessment of the 7 KAAs is crucial; • Without the Assessment the SPSP is “blind”.

  7. Lessons Learnt 2. • Thorough Assessment of the 7 KAAs helps to focus the design on priority areas where help is most needed; • Facilitates the development of relevant and realistic disbursement conditions; • TA should be used as a tool to enhance the effectiveness of the SPSP.

  8. Lessons Learnt 3. • Effective consultation with partners is vital; • Disbursement conditions must be developed so that they • respond to results actually achieved, • Are not an incentive to achieve results.

  9. Impact. • There appears to be a better understanding of the realities and benefits of PFM reform at all levels. • The SPSP helped MoF interact productively with other ministries and agencies, not only at senior level, but also at day-to-day working levels. • The shortage of donor resources (economic crisis) provides greater incentives to demonstrate achievement of results and transparency.

  10. CONCLUSION • SPSP is an instrument with enormous potential; • It did not make full use of its opportunities by directing TA to where it was most needed; • A thorough assessment of the seven KAAs might have significantly changed the design, and • led to a better policy matrix • with more appropriate conditions and indicators, and • a better targeted supporting TA component.

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