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Cryptanalysis on Du-Wen Certificateless Short Signature Scheme

Cryptanalysis on Du-Wen Certificateless Short Signature Scheme. C.I. Fan, R.H. Hsu, and P.H. Ho Joint Workshop on Information Security Presenter: Yu-Chi Chen. Outline. Review of Hu et al.’s paper Review of Du and Wen’s CLS scheme Fan et al.’s improved CLS scheme Conclusion.

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Cryptanalysis on Du-Wen Certificateless Short Signature Scheme

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  1. Cryptanalysis on Du-Wen Certificateless Short Signature Scheme C.I. Fan, R.H. Hsu, and P.H. Ho Joint Workshop on Information Security Presenter: Yu-Chi Chen

  2. Outline. • Review of Hu et al.’s paper • Review of Du and Wen’s CLS scheme • Fan et al.’s improved CLS scheme • Conclusion

  3. Review of Hu et al’s paper • Hu et al.’s remedy: • The public key is inserted into the partial-private-key.

  4. Hu et al.’s remedy: • Achieving level-3 security. • KGC does not know any user's secret value and cannot act as any user by generating a false partial private key without being detected.

  5. Outline. • Review of Hu et al.’s paper • Review of Du and Wen’s CLS scheme • Fan et al.’s improved CLS scheme • Conclusion

  6. Review of DW CLS scheme • This scheme is presented by Chun-Yen Lee in 2009/12/29. • Title: Efficient and provably-secure certificateless short signature scheme from bilinear pairings • From: Computer Standards & Interfaces (IF:1.074 42/86) • Author: Hongzhen Du, Qiaoyan Wen

  7. An efficient CLS scheme (1/9) • This scheme • Setup: • Partial-Private-Key-Extract: • Set-Secret-Value: • Set-Private-Key: • Set-Public-Key: • CL-Sign: • CL-Verify:

  8. An efficient CLS scheme (2/9) • Setup: KGC • security parameter l • G1 and G2 (same prime order q>2l) • P is a generator of groupG1 • g = e(P,P) • H1:{0, 1}*→Z*q, H2:{0, 1}*×G1 → Z*q

  9. An efficient CLS scheme (3/9) • s∈ Z*q (system master key) • Computes public key Ppub=sP ∈G1 • KGC publishes the system list params: {l, G1, G2 ,e, q, P, g, Ppub , H1, H2}

  10. user An efficient CLS scheme (4/9) • Partial-Private-Key-Extract: KGC dID Secure channel

  11. An efficient CLS scheme (5/9) • Set-Secret-Value: • r∈ Z*q (secret value) • Set-Private-Key: • (dID, r) (private key) • Set-Public-Key: • pkID = r(Ppub+QIDP) = rT

  12. An efficient CLS scheme (6/9) • CL-Sign: • m ∈ (0, 1)* • Sets h=H2(m, pkID) • Computes

  13. An efficient CLS scheme(7/9) • CL-Verify: • Computes h = H2(m, pkID)

  14. An efficient CLS scheme(9/9)

  15. Outline. • Review of Hu et al.’s paper • Review of Du and Wen’s CLS scheme • Fan et al.’s improved CLS scheme • Conclusion

  16. Fan et al.’s improved CLS scheme • Fan et al. base on DW scheme to propose an improved CLS scheme. • This scheme does not require more computing than DW scheme, but it needs two components of the public key [pk, pk’].

  17. FHH scheme (1/9) • This scheme as DW scheme • Setup: • Partial-Private-Key-Extract: • Set-Secret-Value: • Set-Private-Key: • Set-Public-Key: • CL-Sign: • CL-Verify:

  18. FHH scheme (2/9) • Setup: KGC • security parameter l • G1 and G2 (same prime order q>2l) • P is a generator of groupG1 • g = e(P,P) • H1:{0, 1}*→Z*q, H2:{0, 1}*×G1 → Z*q

  19. FHH scheme(3/9) • s∈ Z*q (system master key) • Computes public key Ppub=sP ∈G1 • KGC publishes the system list params: {l, G1, G2 ,e, q, P, g, Ppub , H1, H2}

  20. user FHH scheme (4/9) • Partial-Private-Key-Extract: KGC dID Secure channel

  21. FHH scheme (5/9) • Set-Secret-Value: • r∈ Z*q (secret value) • Set-Private-Key: • (dID, r) (private key) • Set-Public-Key: • pkID = r(Ppub+QIDP) = rT, pk’ID = rP

  22. FHH scheme (6/9) • CL-Sign: • m ∈ (0, 1)* • Sets h=H2(m, pkID) • Computes

  23. FHH scheme (7/9) • CL-Verify: • Computes h = H2(m, pkID)

  24. Outline. • Review of Hu et al.’s paper • Review of Du and Wen’s CLS scheme • Fan et al.’s improved CLS scheme • Conclusion

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