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SCOPE 2014 THE INTERDISCIPLINARY VOCATION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE(S)

SCOPE 2014 THE INTERDISCIPLINARY VOCATION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE(S). Bucharest, 27-29 June 2014. Challenges of political leadership in times of crisis: what strategies, what consequences?. Bringing in the “Experts”. Can Ministers without Political Background Perform Better in Times of Crisis?.

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SCOPE 2014 THE INTERDISCIPLINARY VOCATION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE(S)

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  1. SCOPE 2014THE INTERDISCIPLINARY VOCATION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE(S) Bucharest, 27-29 June 2014

  2. Challenges of political leadership in times of crisis: what strategies, what consequences?

  3. Bringing in the “Experts”. Can Ministers without Political Background Perform Better in Times of Crisis? Laurențiu Ștefan, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Bucharest

  4. The starting point • Presence of ”expert and politically non-affiliated” ministers in national cabinets • Observation: their numbers vary, from one cabinet to another, from one period to another, from one country to another • Main objective: theory building: under what circumstances “experts” are brought in the cabinet? • Secondary objectives: outlining their professional profile, investigating their post-recruitment political career

  5. Preliminary considerations • Background: political parties are the only major political actors vying for power and offices; they are also gate-keepers and selectors • Standard pattern: political parties are called to fill ministerial offices, they will select ministers from their ranks • Atypical process: political (and party) leaders favour at times non-political ministers • Why? General vs. more specific explanations

  6. General explanations/inquiries • Lack of party consolidation (weak parties, lack of party “professionals”, popular mood against parties) • Presidentialization of power (president / prime-minister have an upper hand over the selection process) • Left or right-wing parties more prone to selecting “experts”? • Single-party or coalition parties more prone to selecting “experts”?

  7. More specific explanations • Party membership is not an asset but a liability (the “political culture” explanation) • Government parties lack politicians with relevant expertise (the “personnel” explanation) • Cabinet business is not in the realm of politics, but in the realm of administration (the “administration of things” explanation) • Selectors could not reach agreement on political appointee (the “cohabitation” explanation) • Selectors (President, PM) mistrusts parties in cabinet and promote their advisors (the “control” explanation) • Holders of specific portfolios have a special mission and interact with international institutions (the “MCV” explanation) • Cabinet or governing party’s popularity is eroding (the “fresh blood” explanation)

  8. Major challenge: defining the “expert and non-partisan minister” • There is no consensus on a definition that may be used for comparative purposes. • “Independentsand individuals with a loose party affiliation who have not been active members of and have not held positions in the ruling bodies of the party organisation prior to their ministerial appointment.” • “They are selected to cabinet as ‘experts’ with managerial skills or specialised knowledge in a particular policy field.” • “Some of them have a technocratic profile, due to their academic background and professional training.” (Antonio Costa Pinto, Pedro Tavares de Almeida)

  9. Appointment of ministers (1) • Formation of a new cabinet (after elections) • President nominates candidate for PM; • Parliamentary majority and governing coalition are negotiated; • Candidate for PM in agreement with party leaders of the governing coalition (and with the President) selects holders of portfolios; • Candidates for ministers are vetted by parliamentary committees; • Parliament gives vote of confidence

  10. Appointment of ministers (2) • Major reshuffle • PM and leaders of the (new) governing coalition agree on a new structure of the cabinet and on new members of the cabinet • Parliamentary committees vet the new ministers • Parliament gives vote of confidence • Minor reshuffle • PM and relevant party leader(s) decide on replacing ministers • New name(s) sent to President who has the power to oppose the first nomination, has to accept the second

  11. Research Framework • Two threads: • Profile of Romanian Ministers (2009) Publication: Pathways to Cabinet: Selecting Ministers in Post-Communist Romania, Heft 32, SFB 580 Mitteilungen, University of Jena, March 2009 http://www.sfb580.uni-jena.de/typo3/uploads/media/Heft_08.pdf 2) Profile and Selection of Expert and Non-Partisan Ministers (2013-2014) Research Project coordinated by Antonio Costa Pinto, Pedro Tavares de Almeida Paper co-authored with Gabriella Ilonski: Variations in the expert ministerial framework in Hungary and Romania (second draft 2014) available by request

  12. Data collected • Information about all members of Romanian cabinets between December 1989 and March 2014 (for the “expert and non-partisan” ministers, data since June 1990 was analysed) • Fourteen cabinets (June 1990 – March 2014) • 313 ministerial positions • 280 persons appointed cabinet members • 428 instances of ministerial recruitment • 111 instances when “expert and non-partisan” ministers have been recruited

  13. Examples (1) • Tariceanu 2 cabinet (2007-2008) • Lazăr Comănescu, Dacian Cioloș, Cătălin Predoiu • Boc 1 cabinet (2008-2009) • Cătălin Predoiu • Boc 2 cabinet (2009-2012) • Mihai Șeitan, Mihai Dumitru, Teodor Baconschi, Cătălin Predoiu, Sebastian Vlădescu, Sebastian Lăzăroiu, Ladislau Ritli, Leonard Orban • Ungureanu cabinet (February – May2012) • Cătălin Predoiu, Ladislau Ritli, Leonard Orban, Cătălin Baba, Bogdan Drăgoi

  14. Examples (2) • Ponta 1 cabinet (May – December 2012) • Leonard Orban, Vasile Cepoi, Lucian Isar, Mona Pivniceru, Raed Arafat • Ponta 2 cabinet (2012 – March 2014) • Mona Pivniceru, Liviu Voinea, Remus Pricopie, Mihnea Costoiu, Robert Cazanciuc • Ponta 3 cabinet (current, not included) • Ioana Maria Petrescu, Alexandru Cotovelea, Răzvan Nicolescu, Florin Jianu, Gabriela Szabo, Bogdan Stanoevici,

  15. “Expert” ministers join PSD February 10, 2014. Mediafax news: • Miniştrii Robert Cazanciuc, Remus Pricopie şi Liviu Voinea s-au înscris, luni, [10 februarie, 2014] în PSD. Conform surselor citate, cei trei au depus adeziunile chiar în şedinţa BPN al PSD de luni, de la Palatul Parlamentului. • "Sigur, e bine să fii tehnocrat, dar la un moment dat inevitabil îţi asumi avantajele şi dezavantajele sprijinului politic", a spus Ponta, despre aderarea celor trei miniştri la PSD. • Robert Cazanciuc este ministrul Justiţiei, Remus Pricopie deţine portofoliul Educaţiei, iar Liviu Voinea este ministru delegat pentru Buget. Până acum, cei trei nu făceau parte din niciun partid politic.

  16. The “golden age” of experts in Romania • After the collapse of communism and until 1996. • Not a coincidence that this period overlaps entirely with the first two presidential terms of Ion Iliescu. • 40% of all the appointments of experts in Romanian cabinets between 1990 and 2014 have taken place in this period (of less than seven years).

  17. Role of Ion Iliescu (1) • Apromoter of “technocratic cabinets,” of consensual politics, where major (and opposing) political blocks would support solutions identified by bureaucrats or scientific personalities. • He believed that party structures and administration of the country should only minimally overlap. • Note: the first democratic cabinet was overwhelmingly made up of experts, in fact of ministers or deputy ministers serving in the last communist cabinets.

  18. Role of Ion Iliescu (2) • Roman 2 cabinet continued to be dominated by expert and non-partisan ministers. • In September 1991, Iliescu had the first opportunity to turn the cabinet to an “expert” (Theodor Stolojan) and to invite opposition parties in the cabinet (in an attempt to form a “national unity” government). • These parties brought their leaders on the cabinet benches, but FSN continued to select ministers from its pool of experts.

  19. Role of Ion Iliescu (3) • He imposed an “expert” and “outsider” as Prime Minister (NicolaeVacaroiu) in 1992. • The Vacaroiu cabinet (1992-1996) best embodies President Iliescu’s vision of consensual, non-political, „national unity” politics were party and cabinet dynamics do not interfere too much. • More than half of the Vacaroiu cabinet was made up of “experts.”

  20. “Experts” under Emil Constantinescu • Himself an “outsider” to party politics. • Picked Victor Ciorbea (initially, with no party affiliation) and later MugurIsarescu as PMs. • Astronger presence of political parties and of party politicians. • Although they have dropped dramatically, the rates of expert ministers remain high (probably an indication of a limited pool of specialists with a membership card in the right-wing parties): goes down to 23-27 percent. • The political society still struggles to find a balance between political and non-political elements of the government.

  21. Iliescu/Nastase regime • Iliescu attempted to counterbalance Nastase’s increasing power and influence and continued to force public personalities and persons loyal to him in the cabinet. • The party was heavily marked by Iliescu’s authority. • Nastasebrought in the cabinet experts loyal to him who have been later pushed to take leadership positions in the PSD (which led to an increase of the number of experts on the cabinet benches). • Promotion of “experts” in the cabinet to rejuvenate party leadership.

  22. Experts under TraianBasescu(2004-2009) • PM Tariceanu not inclined to take “experts” on board, he favoured party members. • It was President Basescu who forced some experts in the 2004-2008 cabinets (Monica Macovei, EneDinga), especially during the “cohabitaion” period after 2007 (Lazar Comanescu, DacianCiolos, CatalinPredoiu) • All-time low: the grand coalition cabinet of 2008-2009 (only CatalinPredoiu) • Note: an expert at the helm of the justice portfolio, with key responsibilities in the MCV

  23. Experts under TraianBasescu(2009-2012) • The economic crisis of 2009 might partially explain an increased number of expert and non-partisan ministers (their rate bounced back to the pre-2004 levels). Mihai Seitan, Mihai Dumitru • The right-wing cabinets of December 2009 – May 2012 featured a significant number of people with expertise in their fields but only loosely, if at all, attached to one of the coalition parties. • Ungureanu cabinet brings in “fresh blood”.

  24. Ponta opens up to experts • First Ponta cabinet turned the back to experts with only few exceptions. • The „politicisation” of the Ponta II cabinet reached its climax when three former experts with no political background were asked to join the major governing party in February 2014. • More experts called to sit on the cabinet benches after the major reshuffle of March 2014 (“fresh blood”)

  25. “Party institutionalization” explanation • First hypothesis about the impact of party institutionalization is only partially confirmed. • After the troubled first years of democratization when party formation was in its infancy and experts were “used” to strengthen the legitimacy of the new system, the stabilization of parties resulted in the diminishing number of experts, which increased again during the crisis years.

  26. The “presidentialization” explanation • The person who provided his or her expertise to the frontline politician is pushed in the spot light when offered a ministerial position. • A special category includes presidential advisors who have been recruited for their expertise but who develop political connections under leadership protection and therefore increase the likelihood of a ministerial promotion. • Many expert ministers have emerged from among the personal staff, advisers, or even friends of these high authorities(IoanTalpes, SerbanNicolae, TeodorBaconschi, Sebastian Lazaroiu).

  27. Portfolios “welcoming” expertsRomania vs. Hungary

  28. L= Left; R= Right; C=Centre * Dismissal/resignation before the end of the ministerial mandate. ** Percentages refer to all ministers appointed. *** Percentages refer to all ministers dismissed. Type of party and governing coalition willing to accommodate “experts”

  29. Profile of “expert” ministers

  30. Conclusion • No single pattern; no unique explanation for selection of “expert and non-partisan” ministers. • Various considerations / factors were prevalent at different periods of time. • Political culture turned against parties, weak party structures, lack of specialized personnel, personalization of selection in the first post-communist decade. • Leaders’ desire to promote personal loyalists from outside the party ranks • Political crises (cohabitation, unpopularity of cabinets), the economic crisis and special efforts to meet the MCV criteria brought other “experts” into the cabinet. • Some portfolios more than others seem to be open to “experts”

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