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Combinatorial Auction

Combinatorial Auction. f(t) : the set X  F with the highest total value. Conbinatorial auction. t 1 =20. v 1 =20. t 2 =15. v 2 =16. t 3 =6. v 3 =7. the mechanism decides the set of winners and the corresponding payments. Each player wants a bundle of objects

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Combinatorial Auction

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  1. Combinatorial Auction

  2. f(t): the set XF with the highest total value Conbinatorial auction t1 =20 v1=20 t2=15 v2=16 t3=6 v3=7 the mechanism decides the set of winners and the corresponding payments Each player wants a bundle of objects ti: value player i is willing to pay for its bundle F={ X{1,…,N} : winners in X are compatible} if player i gets the bundle at price p his utility is ui=ti-p

  3. Combinatorial Auction (CA) problem – single-minded case • Input: • n buyers, m indivisible objects • each buyer i: • Wants a subset Si of the objects • has a value ti for Si • Solution: • X{1,…,n}, such that for every i,jX, with ij, SiSj= • Measure (to maximize): • Total value of X: iX ti

  4. CA game • each buyer i is selfish • Only buyer i knows ti (while Si is public) • We want to compute a “good” solution w.r.t. the true values • We do it by designing a mechanism • Our mechanism: • Asks each buyer to report its value vi • Computes a solution using an output algorithm g(٠) • takes payments pifrom buyer i using some payment function p

  5. More formally • Type of agent buyer i: • ti: value of Si • Intuition: ti is the maximum value buyer i is willing to pay for Si • Buyer i’s valuation of XF: • vi(ti,X)= ti if iX, 0 otherwise • SCF: a good allocation of the objects w.r.t. the true values

  6. How to design a truthful mechanism for the problem? Notice that: the (true) total value of a feasible X is: i vi(ti,X) the problem is utilitarian! …VCG mechanisms apply

  7. VCG mechanism • M= <g(r), p(x)>: • g(r): arg maxxFj vj(rj,x) • pi(x): for each i: pi (x)=j≠i vj(rj,g(r-i)) -j≠i vj(rj,x) g(r)has to compute an optimal solution… …can we do that?

  8. Theorem Approximating CA problem within a factor better than m1/2- is NP-hard, for any fixed >0. proof Reduction from independent set problem

  9. Maximum Independent Set (IS) problem • Input: • a graph G=(V,E) • Solution: • UV, such that no two verteces in U are jointed by an edge • Measure: • Cardinality of U Theorem Approximating IS problem within a factor better than n1- is NP-hard, for any fixed >0.

  10. the reduction each edge is an object each node i is a buyer with: Si: set of edges incident to i ti=1 G=(V,E) CA instance has a solution of total value  k if and only if there is an IS of size  k …since m  n2…

  11. How to design a truthful mechanism for the problem? Notice that: the (true) total value of a feasible X is: i vi(ti,X) the problem is utilitarian! …but a VCG mechanism is not computable in polynomial time! what can we do? …fortunately, our problem is one parameter!

  12. A problem is binary demand (BD) if • ai‘s type is a single parameter ti • ai‘s valuation is of the form: vi(ti,o)= ti wi(o), wi(o){0,1}work load for ai in o whenwi(o)=1 we’ll say that ai is selected in o

  13. Definition An algorithm g() for a maximization BD problem is monotone if  agent ai, and for every r-i=(r1,…,ri-1,ri+1,…,rN), wi(g(r-i,ri)) is of the form: 1 ri Өi(r-i) Өi(r-i){+}: threshold payment from ai is: pi(r)= Өi(r-i)

  14. Our goal: to design a mechanism satisfying: • g(٠) is monotone • Solution returned by g(٠) is a “good” solution, i.e. an approximated solution • g(٠) and p(٠) computable in polynomial time

  15. A greedy m-approximation algorithm • reorder (and rename) the bids such that • W ; X  • for i=1 to n do • if SiX= then W W{i}; X X{Si} • return W v1/|S1|  v2/|S2|  …  vn/|Sn|

  16. Lemma The algorithm g( ) is monotone proof It suffices to prove that, for any selected agent i, we have that i is still selected when it raises its bid Increasing vi can only move bidder i up in the greedy order, making it easier to win

  17. Computing the payments …we have to compute for each selected bidder i its threshold value How much can bidder i decrease its bid before being non-selected?

  18. Computing payment pi Consider the greedy order without i v1/|S1|  …  vi/|Si|  …  vn/|Sn| index j Use the greedy algorithm to find the smallest index j (if any) such that: 1. j is selected 2. SjSi pi= vj |Si|/|Sj| pi= 0 if j doen’t exist

  19. Lemma Let OPT be an optimal solution for CA problem, and let W be the solution computed by the algorithm, then iOPT vi  m iW vi proof iW OPTi={jOPT : j i and SjSi} since  vj  m vi iW OPTi=OPT iW it suffices to prove: jOPTi crucial observation for greedy order we have vi |Sj| jOPTi vj  |Si|

  20. proof iW   vi |Sj| vj   m vi |Si| jOPTi jOPTi Cauchy–Schwarz inequality we can bound   |Sj| |Sj|  |OPTi|  |Si|m jOPTi jOPTi ≤|Si| ≤ m

  21. Cauchy–Schwarz inequality 1/2 1/2 …in our case… xj=1 n= |OPTi| for j=1,…,|OPTi| yj=|Sj|

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