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姓名 : 蕭詩穎 課程 : 財務管理專題研討

Executive Compensation and Corporate Acquisition Decisions SUDIP DATTA, MAI ISKANDAR-DATTA, and KARTIK RAMAN. 姓名 : 蕭詩穎 課程 : 財務管理專題研討. P2299. 摘要 併購對公司而言是重大的長期投資，且是可被外界觀察到的 經由併購的過程可能加重經理人和投資人間的利益衝突 ( 經理人不是因為能極大化股東財富進行併購而純粹是自利因素 )

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姓名 : 蕭詩穎 課程 : 財務管理專題研討

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  1. Executive Compensation and CorporateAcquisition DecisionsSUDIP DATTA, MAI ISKANDAR-DATTA, and KARTIK RAMAN 姓名:蕭詩穎 課程:財務管理專題研討

  2. P2299 摘要 • 併購對公司而言是重大的長期投資，且是可被外界觀察到的 • 經由併購的過程可能加重經理人和投資人間的利益衝突(經理人不是因為能極大化股東財富進行併購而純粹是自利因素) (mergers and acquisitions are major, externally observable, and discretionarylong-term investments. These transactions also present managers with opportunitiesthat can exacerbate the potential for conflicts of interest betweenmanagers and shareholders.)

  3. 假設經理人的報償契約(Executive compensation contracts) 可用來使經理人依股東的利益行事 • 財務學家認為經理人的報償結構會影響公司進行接收活動的決策 (Executive compensation contracts can be used to effectively align managerial interests with those of shareholders, and financial economists have recognized the potential influence of managerial compensation on corporate takeover decisions)

  4. P2300 先期研究: 報償結構和公司的縮減(清算、脫產)有關 研究主題: 經理人的報償結構如何影響經理人的投資決策 (examine how executive compensation determines managerial investmentdecisions) 1.主併公司在併購前的報償結構可否解釋主併者宣布併購案時所產生的股價反映 (先前無人探討) (whether the insignificant or negativeannouncement stock price response for bidding firms can be explained byacquiring managers’ compensation structure prior to the acquisition) 2.併購時付給被併者的溢價金和主併公司的報償結構(借代為經理人會依照股東利益行事的程度)的關係 (investigate the relation between the acquisition premium and the extent to which the interests of acquiring managers, measured by their compensation structure, are aligned with those of shareholders.)

  5. 3.用經理人的報償結構來衡量併購案的風險程度(被併者的成長機會、主併公司股票報酬的變異數的變化)3.用經理人的報償結構來衡量併購案的風險程度(被併者的成長機會、主併公司股票報酬的變異數的變化) (managerial compensation in acquiring firms is similarly linked to measures of acquisition-related risk, such as growth options of target firms and changes in bidding firm variance following takeovers.) 4.付給公司高階經理人的新的股權類的報償和併購後公司長期股價的關係(先前人有研究各種影響併購後股價的因素但沒研究到報償結構) (whether there is a systematic relation between new equity-based compensation (hereafter referred to as EBC) awarded to the top five acquiring firm executives and the long-run stock price performance following mergers and tender offers)

  6. P 2302,I 樣本描述: • 觀察期間: 1993/1/1~1998/12/31 這段期間內stock option-based executive&corporate takeovers有大幅成長 • 來源: Securities Data Company’s (SDC) on-line Mergers and CorporateTransactions database 共9674筆(9198mergers,476tender offers)資料 • 篩選: 1.有宣告日(announcement date) 及完成日(effective date) 2.投資活動 merger(merger or an acquisition of majority interest) tender offers(by SDC) 3.主併公司在CRSP上要有股價紀錄 4.主併公司併購前一年的報償結構在Standard and Poor’s ExecuCompdatabase中有記錄 • 總樣本數: 1719筆併購活動(由771個美國公司進行)，其中merger:1577 筆 tender offers:142筆

  7. 變數衡量: 1.長期股價表現(long-term stock price performance) • 在觀察期間內，主併者第一次進行的併購案(以保持樣本的獨立性) • 計算併購後3年(0至3)的股價績效，所以只採納在1993~1996年間完成的併購案 • 總計共485筆資料 • 研究方法(II. Research Methods): A.事件研究法 期間:併購前200~60天(-200,-60)

  8. B. Size, Book-to-Market, and Preacquisition Return Adjusted Long-run Performance • 公司過去的績效很好(壞)，市場投資人就會認為主併公司會進行很好(壞)的併購案，當市場投資人再度對公司進行評估時，併購後的長期異常報酬反而是負(正)的，因為主併者在先前宣告併購時被市場高(低)估了 ---事前公司股票績效會影響事後的長期股票異常報酬 (Rau and Vermaelen(1998) argue that because of good (bad)past performance, marketparticipants assume that glamour (value)bidders make good (bad) acquisitions.When the market subsequently reassesses the acquisition as informationis received over time, the long-run postacquisition abnormal performance of glamour (value)bidders is negative (positive)because these firms wereovervalued (undervalued)at the announcement. Thus, the authors provideevidence that the preevent performance of acquiring firms plays an importantrole in influencing the postevent long-run abnormal performance ofthese firms.)

  9. ---這樣的情況下，對長期績效的檢定會出現偏誤(Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999)) C.使用Buy-and-Hold Returns來計算主併公司的異常報酬 D.無母數檢定Buy-and-Hold 異常報酬 • 因為Buy-and-Hold 異常報酬是有偏的分配，不適用標準有母數檢定，改用bootstrap method進行r假設檢定 • t-statistic for difference between means, • Wilcoxon (rank sum test) Z-statistic for difference between medians

  10. III. Empirical Findings A. Sample Characteristics 樣本依年度分類 average deal :value in constant 1998 dollars using the CPI

  11. 併購案支付方式 Cash:併購案100%以現金支付 Equity:併購案100%以股票(equitysecurities)支付 Mixed:現金+權益or其他支付方法 (Cash refersto acquisitions financed with 100 percent cash. Equity refers to acquisitions paid with equitysecurities. Mixed refers to a mode of financing that includes cash as well as equity and/or othersources of financing)

  12. Market capitalization:宣告日前一天CRSP的資料 Market-to-book ratio:宣告日前一個月的月底 BTA-BE+ME BTA Acquisition premium: 付給target最高的股價-target宣告日前4個禮拜的股價 (PREM4WK variable in the SDC) target宣告日前4個禮拜的股價 (Market capitalization is measured on the day prior to the acquisition announcement date using CRSP. Market-to-book ratio is measured using Compustat at the month-end prior to the acquisition announcement date, as book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of total assets. Acquisition premium offered is the difference between the highest price paid per share and the target share price four weeks prior to the announcement date as a percentage of the target share price four weeks prior to the announcement date, measured by the PREM4WK variable in the SDC database.)

  13. 主併公司併購前一年給高階經理人的報償方式 Compensation:主併公司併購前一年年底的資料,Mehran (1995): only 12.7 percent (1979–1980) Equity-based compensation:新股票選擇權 1990S年代有明顯成長 (EBC) 所有報償 Low EBC:EBC<=中位數(23.73%) High EBC:EBC>中位數 (All compensation data are recorded at the year-end preceding the acquisitionannouncement. For each acquiring firm, total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, otherannual compensation, value of restricted stock granted, value of new stock options granted duringthe year, long-term incentive payouts, and all other compensation paid to the top five executives.Equity-based compensation is the sum of the value of new stock options (using modifiedBlack–Scholes method)granted to the top five executives as a percentage of total compensationpaid to them.)

  14. Timeto Expiration:距執行日有多久時間，皆>1年，屬長期性 質，所以有影響投資決策的可能性 (As Panel B shows, 79.7 percent of firms award stock option grants with maturity between 3 and 10 years whereas 19.8 percent of the firms award grants that expire between 10 and 15 years. Thus, a majority of new stock option grants in our sample are long-term in nature, and have the potential to influence the investment decisions of managers)

  15. Out-of-the-money: < At-the-money: 發行日之市價 =1 In-the-money: 履約價格 > (compute a ratio by dividing the marketprice of the stock on the award date by the exercise price of the option. If the average ratio for a firm is equalto one, we classify the firm as having issued at-the-money options. If the average ratio for a firmis less than (greater than) one, we classify the firm as having issued out-of-the-money(in-themoney)options.)

  16. B. Equity-based Compensation and Acquisition Risk 研究3:用經理人的報償結構來衡量併購案的風險程度(被併者的成長機會、主併公司股票報酬的變異數的變化(+相關) 目標公司的市價對帳面比 Market-to-book ratio:宣告日前一個月的月底 BTA-BE+ME (proxy for成長機會) BTA t-statistic:low和highEBC Mean的差異 z-statistic: low和highEBC 分配的差異 (The t-statistic is from the t-test of difference between means. The z-statisticis from the Wilcoxon rank sum test for difference between the respective distributions.) 高EBC，併購成長機會較高 的公司即面臨較高風險的併購案---報償結構是決定經理進行何種併購案的因素之一

  17. 主併公司股價報酬的標準差變化—proxy for 主併公司的風險變化 高EBC公司風險增 加程度明顯較大 每日股價報酬標準差:表公司的風險大小 Postacquisition Minus Preacquisition Stock Return Standard Deviation: (表公司風險的變化)併購完成日後11天~70天(11,70)的股價報酬標準差- 宣告日前120天~60(-120,-60)天的股價報酬標準差 (standard deviation of daily stock returns to proxy for the acquirer’s risk. measure the change in the acquiring firm risk as the standard deviation of stock returns for thepostacquisition period(11 days to 70 days following the effective date) Minusthe preacquisition period standard deviation (120 days to 60 days prior tothe announcement date) The results, reported in Panel B, indicate that onaverage, firms with high EBC experience a larger increase in risk (0.27 percent)compared to firms awarding low equity-based compensation (0.08 percent)The mean and median differences between the two subgroups are highlysignificant.)

  18. 前面提到併購後公司風險增加，導致原因也可能是來自併購後公司的舉債增加，前面提到併購後公司風險增加，導致原因也可能是來自併購後公司的舉債增加， 為檢視風險的增加是否來自舉債程度增加，所以再將資料分類 不論併購後公司舉債程度有無增加，高EBC，風險都明顯增加 ---非因舉債程度增加而產生的風險增加而是高EBC就會進行風 險較高的併購案

  19. 研究3:用經理人的報償結構來衡量併購案的風險程度(被併者的成長機會、主併公司股票報酬的變異數的變化)研究3:用經理人的報償結構來衡量併購案的風險程度(被併者的成長機會、主併公司股票報酬的變異數的變化) ----以EBC作為報償，會驅使經理人進行風險較高的併購案 (EBC (+)風險) 一致於先前研究 小結: cv Smith and Stulz’s (1985) 能藉由增加經理人財富和公司績效的凸性，能減少經理人放棄有價值且風險性的計畫 (argument that shareholders can reduce the likelihood of managers passing up valuable risky projects by increasing the convexity of the relation between managers’ wealth and firm performance) Guay (1999). 因為股票選擇權可以增加經理人財富對公司基機的敏感性 (Because executive stock option grants significantly increase the sensitivity of managerial wealth to firm performance)

  20. C. Equity-based Compensation and Acquisition Premium 研究2--併購時付給被併者的溢價金和主併公司的報償結構(借代為經理人會依 照股東利益行事的程度)的關係 測試是否Low EBC比High EBC更容易overpay(付過多溢價金)(-相關) 54.6M Low EBC的經理人顯著的比High EBC的經理人付出更多溢價金 ----提供股票選擇權給經理人做為報償，真的會使經理人在併購過程中為股東保留及創造財富 Acquisition premium: 付給target最高的股價-target宣告日前4個禮拜的股價 (PREM4WK variable in the SDC) target宣告日前4個禮拜的股價

  21. Size:ln(主併者市價) EBC:ln(1+新股票選擇權) 所有報酬 (): t-statistics Acquisition premium(-)EBC

  22. free cash flow theory:績效好的公司，在創在過多現金流量後，就可能會進行價 (Jensen (1988))值減損(付出過多溢價金)的併購案 Good performers : BHR>中位數 不論績效好壞，Low EBC的經理人顯著的比High EBC的經理人付出更多溢價金

  23. 先前研究指出:主併者付款的方法也會影響市場對這次併購案能創在多少價值的 評估 (e.g., Travlos (1987)). 不論付款方式，Low EBC的經理人顯著的比High EBC的經理人付出更多溢價金

  24. 小結 研究2--併購時付給被併者的溢價金和主併公司的報償結構(借代為經理人會依照股東利益行事的程度)的關係: 1.經理人收到高比例的股權類報酬，會付出較少的 溢價金 (EBC(-) 溢價金) 2.以EBC作為報償，會驅使經理人進行風險較高的併購案(併購成長率較高的公司)—研究3的結論 ---High EBC會為股東創造財富 一致於先前研究: Shleifer and Vishny (1988), firms that award low EBC provide fewer incentivesfor managers to make value-maximizing decisions, and these managerspay higher premiums for their low-growth targets.

  25. D. Executive Compensation and Acquisition Abnormal Returns 研究1---主併公司在併購前的報償結構可否解釋主併者宣布併購案時所產生的股價反映(+相關) -0.13 -0.1 0.62* 0.26* 2.71* 2.05* 高EBC的公司較低EBC的公司在宣布併購時，更能獲得市場正面評價-----High EBC會為股東創造財富 CARs:(1,0) cumulative abnormal returns are computed using the marketmodel and Scholes–Williams betas(Rit = ai + biRmt + eit)

  26. Merger下:高EBC的公司較低EBC的公司在宣布併購時，更能獲得市場正面評價-----High EBC會為股東創造財富 Tender offer:不顯著

  27. 先前研究指出:主併者付款的方法也會影響市場對這次併購案能創在多少價值的評估先前研究指出:主併者付款的方法也會影響市場對這次併購案能創在多少價值的評估 (e.g., Travlos (1987)). ----市場較看好以現金支付併購案的方式 但並非所有以現金支付的方式能得到市場正面的評價，只有高EBC的公司才能顯著的獲得 非現金支付且低EBC的經理人執行的併購案得到顯著的市場負面評價

  28. McConnell and Servaes (1990)and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988): 指出當經理人擁有較高的所有權時，會開始設下不利投資人的自我保護壁壘 Ofek and Yermack (2000): 指出當經理人已擁有高所有權時，會減弱新的股票選擇權對經理人的激勵效果 ---所以在不同的經理人所有權程度下，股票選擇權的激 勵效果應該會不同 (entrenchment)

  29. 高EBC的公司較低EBC的公司在宣布併購時，更能獲得市場正面評價高EBC的公司較低EBC的公司在宣布併購時，更能獲得市場正面評價 -----High EBC會為股東創造財富 Executive Equity Ownership: 併購前一年年底，主併者的高階經理人擁有的股數 (M=3.59% Me=0.84%) 主併公司在外流通的所有股數 經理人的所有權高時，高EBC的公司和低EBC的在CAR上就無顯著差異 ---EBC的激勵效果消失---一致於Ofek and Yermack

  30. Smith and Watts (1992): 成長機會越高的公司以股票選擇權作為經理人的報酬，不但能吸引和留住有能力的經理人也能促使經理人進行對股東有利的投資決策即便是在投資案是很難被外界監控到的。若是成長機會差的公司則改以現金的方式 ---所以表示公司成長機會越好，越該使用EBC(+相關) 那前面討論的EBC和宣布併購案時股價反映的正相關關係會不會是來自併購者自身的成長機會和EBC的正相關關係呢? (自身的成長機會高 EBC高 股價高)

  31. TEST 1.EBC& 併購前一年主併公司的股票報酬----利用Table IV (Panel B)(投21) 4格無明顯差異 2.比較績效好的EBC和績效差的EBC---沒有顯著差異 ---併購前績效好的的主併公司的EBC=績效差的主併公司的EBC 3.把樣本分成高M/B(表成長機會)和低M/B CAR 低EBC 高EBCt/z-statistic 高M/B-0.21* 0.4 2.09* -0.23* 0.06 2.42* 低M/B 相似的結果 PS:若公司有許多資產負債表外資產，以M/B表公司成長機會可能就不適合，所以作者改用併購前3年銷售量的成長率來代表公司成長機會 ---高EBC的CAR明顯大於低EBC

  32. 4.使用迴歸 CAR=a+1.37EBC+ (c)managerial stock ownership+(d) ownership of previously granted +(f) options+ time and industry + e—高成長機會公司 CAR=c+0.97EBC+()+e ---低成長機會公司 (t=2.04/2.38)關係皆不顯著 ---1.EBC不是影響宣告日的CAR的唯一因素 2.高成長機會公司，EBC較有影響力 3.非因主併者成長機會高而使EBC高

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