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Policy Issues in US Corrections: The California Template

Policy Issues in US Corrections: The California Template. Llad Phillips University of California Santa Barbara To be presented at Oxford Round Table March 27, 2006. The Issue. The high rate of imprisonment in the United States Why did it not fall when the crime rate came down?.

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Policy Issues in US Corrections: The California Template

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  1. Policy Issues in US Corrections: The California Template Llad Phillips University of California Santa Barbara To be presented at Oxford Round Table March 27, 2006

  2. The Issue • The high rate of imprisonment in the United States • Why did it not fall when the crime rate came down?

  3. The Analysis • California exhibits the same pattern: crime rates falling but imprisonment rates staying high • California accounts for about one eighth of all prisoners under state jurisdiction in the US • California has extensive historical data that describes the operation of the correctional system over time

  4. The Story • Prison system staffing responded to a higher inflow of new felons committed to prison from court. • Parole staffing lagged behind. • The higher caseload for parole officers motivated them to return a higher fraction of parolees to prison

  5. The Phenomenon, P. 2

  6. Another View

  7. National Crime Victimization Survey, 2004

  8. Figure 2: Schematic of Prison & Parole Stocks and Flows: 2004 Felon Parole Violators with a New Term 17,842 Escapes 122 Felon First Releases to Parole 58,994 Discharged & Died 42,483 Felons Newly Admitted from Court 46,798 Prisoners 163,939 Parolees 113,768 Felons Re-paroled 55,866 Reinstated 32,090 Discharges & Deaths 4,324 Absconded 40,758 Felon Parole Violators Returned to Custody: 58,712 Parolees At Large 19,056 Conceptual Framework, p. 4

  9. Model of CJS, Perfect EfficiencyNo Revolving Door Felon New Admissions from Court Per Capita Prison Population; Time in Prison Before First Release California Population Parole Population; Time on Parole Before Discharge Discharges; 1/Total Time

  10. Stocks and Flows, p. 5Prisoners Plus Parolees • Outflow from CJS(t) = kCJS*[Prisoners+ Parolees](t-1) • Total Time in CJS = (1/kCJS)* = [Pris. + Par.]/Discharges • Equilibrium: • Outflow of Discharges = Inflow of New Admissions • Total Time in CJS = (1/kCJS)* =[Pris. + Par.]/New Admits

  11. Stocks and Flows, p. 5Prisoners • Outflow from Prison(t) = kPRIS *Prisoners(t-1) • Time in Prison = 1/kPRIS = Outflow/Prisoners • Equilibrium: outflow = inflow • Time in Prison = 1/kPRIS = Inflow/Prisoners

  12. Model of CJS, Inefficiency Felon New Admissions from Court Per Capita Prison Population; Time in Prison Before First Release California Population Parole Population; Time on Parole Before Discharge Discharges; 1/TotalTime Probability of Moving from CA Pop. To CJS = Felon New Admissions Per Capita Probability of Moving from CJS to CA Pop. = 1/Total Time

  13. Time in Prison, p. 9

  14. Creation of the Revolving Door, p. 11

  15. Deteriorating Performance of the California Parole System, p.12 • Parole Violators Returned to Custody, PVRTC • Parolees Absconding from Supervision • Parolees At Large, PAL • Shorter Time on Parole

  16. Time On Parole

  17. What Caused the Deteriorating Performance of the Parole System?

  18. Caseloads: Prison Vs. Parole, p.13

  19. What Caused Such High Prison and Parole Populations?, p. 15 • The Minimal (Prison + Parole) Population • Perfect efficiency: no revolving door • (Prison + Parole) Pop. = (tPRIS + tPAR ) * New Admits • ? (2004) = (1.67 + 1.39) * 46,812 • Prisoners and Parolees (est. 2004) = 143, 245 • Prisoners & Parolees (obs. ‘04) = 162,352 + 110,130 • = 272,482 • Ratio of Actual/Minimal = 1.90

  20. Another View: Estimated Time Spent in California Corrections • Turning the stock/flow relation around • Estimated total time = (Prisoners + Parolees)/New Admits • Total time includes spins inside the revolving door • Estimated total time = (Prisoners + Parolees)/(Discharges From Parole + Deaths)

  21. Where Does the Increase in the StocksCome From? Inflow or System Inefficiency? [Prisoners + Parolees = New Admits*Total Time]

  22. Policy? Source: California Department of Corrections, Historical Trends ….1978-1998, www.corr.ca.gov

  23. Prisoners + Parolees = New Admits*Total Time

  24. Summary • The increase in prison populations is only partly due to increases in new admissions from court, and hence the crime rate. • The total time spent cycling back and forth between prison and parole before discharge has increased by 70% between 1980 and 2004. • The “war on drugs” has inflated new admissions to prison in 2004 by 25% compared to the policy on imprisoning drug offenders in 1980

  25. What Caused Such High Populations of Prisoners and Parolees? • New Admissions per capita = new admissions per offense * offenses per capita • The per capita California Crime Index fell from ~0.04 in 1980 to ~0.02 in 2004

  26. It Was Not the Inflow from Court

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