Engaging non-State Actors in Zones of Competing Governance

1. Engaging non-State Actors in Zones of Competing Governance Dr. James Forest University of Massachusetts Lowell

2. A Question of Terminology • Lots of discussion about weak states, failing states, failed states, and “ungoverned spaces” • Lack of central govt. presence in parts of the country • Various security implications (criminals, terrorists find safe haven in isolation, freedom of movement) • Are these “ungoverned spaces,” “ungoverned territories,” “lawless areas,” etc. really “ungoverned”? • Or . . . something else?

3. If ungoverned . . . • Nobody is providing any services for the common good • No order, no security, etc. • No infrastructure; difficult terrain, climate • Truly a “no man’s land” • Relatively few actual benefits for criminals and terrorists • Inhospitable for training camps, operational headquarters • Difficulties in transportation to, from, through • Difficulties with communications, moving funds, etc. • No intelligence apparatus, commerce, food supply, etc. • No infrastructure, no security means having to provide it yourself . . .

4. Alternate Perspective • Zones of Competing Governance • Region with parallel governance structure • Infers “governance” but by forces separate from an established nation-state • Recognizes powerful tribal, clan, ethnic loyalties • Informal governance (traditional customs and codes, tribal structures of loyalty, dispute resolution, etc.) • Less emphasis on Westphalian nation-state system • Can be rural or urban; within a state or trans-national • DRC, Mindinao (& other islands), regions of Sudan, Yemen, Colombia, Nigeria, Peru, etc. • Southern Lebanon, kacha abadi (slums) of Karachi, etc. • AfPak border region, Sahel, TBA, “Kurdish regions,” Caucasus

5. So What? • What are the critical research questions: • Is there an absence of governance in these spaces? or • Who is “governing”? • What are the local networks of power distribution? • How they are governing? • What services do they provide in their regions of influence? • Do they provide hospitable environments for criminal, terrorist networks? Stability or instability? • Which “zones” should receive priority of our attention?

6. So What? • What are the critical policy questions: • How to engage non-state actors in zones of competing governance? • What are the local political dynamics? • Is central govt. seen as legitimate or corrupt, inept, etc.? • Will “strengthening the state” exacerbate preference for alternative governance systems? • Are there ways to influence leaders in Pashtun, Taureg, other regions to achieve our security objectives (without undermining the already fragile legitimacy of the nation-state)? • Under what conditions would tribal leaders see it in their tribe’s best interests to prevent the activities of criminal, terrorist networks?

7. Summary • Policy recommendations from the “ungoverned spaces” perspective typically focus on strengthening a state’s capacity to control that space • Terminology matters: A focus on “ungoverned” implies that only the imposition of the central govt. will make this territory “governed”; state-centric approach is insufficient • In contrast, the “zones of competing governance” perspective suggests the need to identify who is governing that space, and why, and then develop and implement strategies to influence the ways in which that space is governed