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Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door. Vi Lipski, FAA Matt Schack, FAA. Topics for Discussion. Background Airplane Security Regulatory Actions Accomplishments Design Issues Flight Deck Bulkhead Other Design for Security Issues Transponders Procedural Issues

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Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

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  1. Aircraft Security:Beyond the Flight Deck Door Vi Lipski, FAA Matt Schack, FAA

  2. Topics for Discussion • Background • Airplane Security Regulatory Actions • Accomplishments • Design Issues • Flight Deck Bulkhead • Other Design for Security Issues • Transponders • Procedural Issues • Monitoring/Crew Alerting • Flightdeck Access • Use of Non-Lethal and Lethal Weapons

  3. Background • March 2000 - ICAO design security requirements went into effect • September 11, 2001 - urgent need arose to provide increased security to the flight deck

  4. Background • September 2001- Airplane Security Rapid Response Team Formed • October 2001 - 17 Rapid Response Team Recommendations Published • Flight Deck Doors • Transponders • Video Cameras/Alerting Systems • Crew Training • Aircraft Defensive Methods

  5. Background • November 2001 - U.S. Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act • Act affects both airplane design and operational procedures, including requirements to: • Reinforce flight deck doors • Evaluate video monitoring, transponders, and crew alerting • Investigate use of firearms by flightcrews • Take any necessary action to ensure safety and security of the aircraft

  6. Reinforced Flight Deck Doors • As of April 9, 2003, over 30 FAA design approvals for reinforced flight deck doors are on over 7,000 airplanes • Collaboration between industry and national authorities allowed for expeditious certification and installation of reinforced flight deck doors Part 121 Planned vs. Actual Reinforced flight deck Door Installations

  7. Doors for Other Aircraft • Act requested investigation of reinforced flight deck doors on other aircraft and other types of operation • Comments were solicited from public • Risk assessment concluded reinforced flight deck doors not necessary beyond what has already been mandated

  8. Design Issues

  9. Flight Deck Bulkhead • Flight deck door most critical element of flight deck security • Flight deck vulnerability is greater than just the door • A final standard needs to address the complete boundary on new airplanes

  10. Flight Deck Bulkhead (cont.) • Notice of proposed rulemaking in work • Adopt part 25 standard for intrusion and ballistic penetration resistance for the remainder of the boundaries between the flight deck and cabin (bulkhead, floor, ceilings, etc.) • Consistent with ARAC harmonized recommendations

  11. Design for Security • Amendment 97 to Annex 8 • Adopts design requirements relating to security into ICAO standards • Eight different issues addressed • FAA/JAA/TCCA agree to harmonize on standards to meet ICAO requirements

  12. Least risk bomb location (design) Least risk bomb location (identification) Flight deck protection (being addressed separately) Flight deck smoke penetration Cabin smoke evacuation Cargo fire protection Separation of vital systems and controls Design to facilitate searches The Eight Issues

  13. Least Risk Bomb Location • Design provision • Currently a fuselage door through voluntary practice • Proposal would permit continued use of doors, provided: • Operation issues are considered • Consequences of door loss are considered • Intended to minimize damage, not necessarily eliminate it

  14. Flight Deck Smoke Penetration • Rule would require flight deck to not permit smoke penetration • Slight positive pressure is means of compliance • Existing rules address smoke evacuation rather than penetration from other occupied areas

  15. Cabin Smoke Evacuation • No current rules address cabin smoke evacuation • Current approach would permit compliance using a rate of air change, with no further demonstration

  16. Cargo Fire Protection • Two Facets: • Agent • As good as Halon • System survivability • Either shock or fragment damage

  17. Separation of Vital Systems and Controls • ICAO requirement goes beyond security threat • Not addressed by current rules • Approach is “damage based” (rather than “threat based”) • Rule assumes damage within a “sphere”

  18. Design to Facilitate Searches • Current ICAO rules require search of interior • Design should facilitate searches • Areas of concern include: • Life vest pouches • Lavatories • Area above Stowage compartments • Should focus on making search easier (rather concealment more difficult)

  19. Intended Applicability • “Commercial” operation • 60 or more Passengers • 100,000 lbs or more MTGW • All-cargo airplanes not subject to all proposed requirements

  20. Rulemaking Status • ARAC HWG tasked with developing recommendations to implement ICAO standards • Recommendations accepted by the Transport Airplane and Engine Issues Group (with one exception) • FAA is waiting for transmittal of recommendations • Notice of proposed rulemaking planned to address ARAC recommendations

  21. Transponders • Notice of proposed rulemaking issued January 8, 2003 • Requires continuous operating transponders • Applicable to all Part 121 operated airplanes • Proposed compliance date March 29, 2005 • FAA evaluating comments to determine next actions

  22. Procedural Issues

  23. Monitoring/Alerting • ICAO Annex 6, Amendment 27 adopted retrofit requirements for flight deck doors: • New standards for monitoring area outside flight deck • New standards for alerting for security purposes • Effective for existing operations November 2003

  24. Monitoring/Alerting (cont.) • Notice of proposed rulemaking to address ICAO amendments targeted for June of 2003 • Proposed requirements for flight deck door monitoring and crew alerting • JAA coordination in work

  25. Lethal & Non-Lethal Weaponry • U.S. Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act in 2002 • TSA establishing voluntary program to deputize pilots • Small group of pilots trained and authorized to carry guns in flight deck • FAA to assess risk of catastrophic failure of airplane design as a result of discharge

  26. Lethal & Non-Lethal Weaponry • Notice 8400.41: Access to current and past SD’s • All offices have access • Notice 8400.46: Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDO) – Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act • First Class completed 4/19/03 • FFDO SOP • Issued on 4/18/03

  27. Flight Deck Access • Notice 8400.xx: Procedures for Opening, Closing, and Locking of Flight Crew Compartment Doors • Comprehensive Security Program for All-Cargo Carriers Regardless of Doors – FY03

  28. Personnel Licensing • FAA to study the feasibility of requiring all pilot licenses to incorporate a photograph of the license holder and appropriate biometric imprints • Status: Under review by Flight Standards

  29. Flight Standards Issues • New 110A will be issued to ASI starting in May 2003 • NPRM – Cabin Door Monitoring (June 2003)

  30. Summary • Reinforced flight deck doors are installed on airplanes operating under parts 121 & 129 • FAA continues to actively work on other rulemaking related to future security initiatives • FAA seeks industry and national authority input on security related initiatives

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