Arjen de Wit & René Bekkers 7 th ERNOP Conference July 9, 2015, Paris, France

1. Arjen de Wit & René Bekkers 7th ERNOP Conference July 9, 2015, Paris, France Do donors raise their donations when they are aware of decreasing government subsidies? A survey experiment

2. In a perfect altruistic world... • Do people value certain public goods in society • Do people see where others spend their money on • Do people donate to public goods that are not funded by others

3. However...

4. However... • People often do not know how much subsidies an organisation receives • And if they know, they do not change their donations (Horne et al. 2005)

5. Previous findings • Laboratory experiments typically find partial crowding-out • But findings with administrative or survey data are inconclusive (De Wit & Bekkers 2013)

6. The current project • What if people know about actual subsidy change?

7. The current project • What if people know about actual subsidy change? • Survey experiment • Giving in the Netherlands Panel Survey 2014 • CAWI • N = 1,271

8. Experimental design • After filling out the survey, respondents get a reward in points • They can spend their reward (partly) on a personal voucher or (partly) on a charitable organisation

9. Experimental design • No information: 'The Dutch charities are in need of your support.' • Information: 'The Dutch charities are in need of your support. KWF Kankerbestrijding, for example, received € 361,000 on government subsidies in 2011 but received no subsidies in 2012.'

10. Experimental design • No information: 'The Dutch charities are in need of your support.' • Information: 'The Dutch charities are in need of your support. KWF Kankerbestrijding, for example, received € 361,000 on government subsidies in 2011 but received no subsidies in 2012.' • Manipulation check: 'What do you think, did KWF Kankerbestrijding receive more, an equal amount of, or less government susbidies in 2012 compared with 2011?'

11. Providing information on cuts does not substantially increase number of donors

12. Providing information on cuts does not substantially increase number of donors

13. ...nor does it increase the number of points donated

14. ...nor does it increase the number of points donated or does it? * *

15. Who would be more sensitive to information? • People who are more committed to the public good • In this case, people who are KWF donors

16. Effect not stronger among KWF donors

17. Effect not stronger among KWF donors

18. What if... • After decision and manipulation check: 'Imagine that you would have heard that KWF Kankerbestrijding had received [less/an equal amount of/more] subsidies in 2012 than in 2011. What would you have done with your reward?'

19. Some people who did not receive information earlier may start donating...

20. ...but no difference in points donated

21. Three innovations • Role of information tested in novel research design • Tested among different groups (donors vs. non-donors) in survey experiment • Actual and hypothetical decision

22. Summing up • When provided with information about subsidy decrease, people do not donate (more) • Effect not stronger among donors • No different effect for hypothetical situations of changing government subsidies

23. Summing up • When provided with information about subsidy decrease, people do not donate (more) • Effect not stronger among donors • No different effect for hypothetical situations of changing government subsidies • Important null findings

24. What about the altruistic world? • Even if people know about a change in government funding, they are reluctant to change donations • Previous beliefs and preferences seem to matter more than new information

25. Arjen de Wit René Bekkers Center for Philanthropic Studies VU University Amsterdam Thank you