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Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy

EUROPOS SÀJUNGA Europos socialinis fondas. MYKOLO ROMERIO UNIVERSITETAS. Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy. Institutional Innovation at the Domestic-International Frontier. Richard Sherman Assistant Professor of Political Science Leiden University, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2004-now

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Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy

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  1. EUROPOS SÀJUNGA Europos socialinis fondas MYKOLO ROMERIO UNIVERSITETAS Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy Institutional Innovation at the Domestic-International Frontier

  2. Richard Sherman Assistant Professor of Political Science Leiden University, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2004-now Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1996-2004 Ph.D., University of Washington, 1996 What I do International Relations Political Economy Empirical Political Science Comparative Politics Where I publish The World Economy Comparative Political Studies Journal of Conflict Resolution International Interactions Economics Letters Social Science Quarterly International Politics Current Politics and Economics of Europe Who is this person?

  3. Intersection of domestic politics and international relations International trade politics, related economic & regulatory issues Connections: The liberal-realist debate: (how) does domestic politics matter? The “two-level game” idea (Putnam, Milner, Moravcsik) International regimes & organizations Political markets vs. political contests My research

  4. Institutional mechanisms that let private-sector actors: petition for the initiation of trade disputes consult formally with government on trade-negotiation agenda issues attend WTO talks with government officials negotiate privately (industry-to-industry) on regulatory reform EU Trade Barriers Regulation US Section 301 US: Private Sector Advisory CommitteesEU: UNICE, WWF, civil-society dialogues Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, related organizations Privatizing commercial diplomacy

  5. Nihil nove sub sole? Industry influence on government Petition processes for trade complaints (anti-dumping, etc.) Government organizing industry (corporatism) But... Formal avenues for industry to influence government on trade negotiations Market-opening pressure is institutionalized, not only protectionist pressure International industry groups are being organized by states Civil-society groups, as well as industry, are given formal access Institutional innovation

  6. Why is this interesting? • The state as a literal agent of interest groups at the international level • Alternative sequencing of actions in two-level games • An open question: can government organize interest groups internationally? • Growing immediacy between domestic politics and international institutions • Normative issues

  7. Research questions • Positive: • What are the factors giving rise to “privatized” commercial diplomacy? • Which industries & groups are most active, influential? • What explains the pattern of activity & access across groups? • What are the differences across institutions and polities? • Normative: • Is “the cart leading the horse”? • Does the government grant of access exclude some important voices ? • Can privatized diplomacy be accommodated within the existing global trade regime? • Do these institutional innovations add legitimacy to the process, or do they lend ammunition to its critics?

  8. Research strategy Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis

  9. Research strategy Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis • Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US • Political-economy analysis: --use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301 --compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping) • Institutional analysis --compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes • Cross-polity analysis --compare patterns in US with those in EU

  10. Research strategy Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis • Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US • Political-economy analysis: --use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301 --compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping) • Institutional analysis --compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes • Cross-polity analysis --compare patterns in US with those in EU • Interviews and analysis of documents • Information / opinion from industry, government, and civil-society groups • Emphases: --implementation and politics / process --extent of business-government cooperation --connection to global trade regime --normative questions

  11. Conclusions • The petition processes are relatively successful • still, government might be more enthusiastic than industry • “International corporatism” has proved difficult • Civil-society groups are reluctant to become involved in state-organized consultation • The petition processes are likely to attract “difficult” cases • It is more striking, then, that they are relatively successful • Explaining origins: • institutional causes • political/electoral causes • hegemony/state-power causes • Normative issues: • “nuisance” disputes are perhaps less likely under privatized diplomacy • petition processes provide a relatively immediate path to disputes against unauthorized retaliatory measures • Privatized diplomacy provides a documented record of state-industry interaction

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