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Challenges and Solutions in Internet PKI Deployment

Explore the unique challenges faced in deploying systems on the vast and diverse Internet, and the approach of a Public-Space concept in addressing PKI issues. DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) struggle with deployment, while BGP-Origins aids in AS trust verification. Learn about the innovative SecSpider approach that leverages global polling for key verification. Understand the importance of public scrutiny in establishing trust, especially in an environment where conventional PKIs may not be ideal. Discover how the Public-Space concept offers a new perspective on security and trust verification in Internet systems.

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Challenges and Solutions in Internet PKI Deployment

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  1. Is an Internet PKI the Right Approach? Eric Osterweil Join work with: Dan Massey and Lixia Zhang

  2. Life in the Internet • The Internet is a uniquely challenging environment to deploy systems because: • It is immense • It is has a highly diverse makeup • Its constituent components are constantly in flux and are administered by independent authorities • As a result, systems must be designed to tolerate: • Constant configuration errors, incremental deployments (which may take years), and diverse opinions on who is trustworthy

  3. Problems • The Internet’s heterogeneity makes it difficult for systems to rely on being fully deployed • Systems must function while being incrementally deployed, broken, etc. • Internet parties are notorious for not agreeing whom to trust • Choosing “trusted authorities” often sparks debate • Successful Internet Systems tend to be very tolerant of misconfigurations and multiple independent opinions • Like DNS and BGP

  4. DNS has tried Crypto • The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) • RFCs 4033-4035 • Approach: a PKI following DNS’ hierarchy • A single “island of security” rooted at DNS’ root zone • Everyone trusts the root • DNSSEC uses public key cryptography • Each zone signs all of its own data, and the keys for its children zones too • By bootstrapping with a single key (trust-anchor) from the root, all keys can be recursively learned

  5. DNSSEC Status Today • Only 10,459 secure zones have deployed • Only about 900 seem to be production • Root zone has not signed • Rather than a single island there are 662 • 97.3% are singleton (isolated) zones • This means 662 trust-anchors would be needed • How can the keys for this many independent zones by globally verified? • Operational management of cryptography has reduced its effectiveness • Monitoring has shown that rapid re-signing leaves roughly 19.8% of data vulnerable to replays

  6. A New Concept: Public-Space • Trust doesn’t have to be predicated on the status of deployments • Track public actions instead • Public actions can be subjected to scrutiny • Anyone may publish data • Who has published data, its consistency, and its history can let each individual judge its veracity • Misbehavior like Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks cannot be denied when done in the Public-Space • Global consistency can be evaluated by polling from multiple locations • Local MITM attacks can be globally refuted in public

  7. Public-Space Systems • We record what is done rather than mandate what operators must do / who they must trust • SecSpider • DNSSEC key learning • Because DNSSEC’s PKI has not evolved • BGP-Origins • BGP prefix attestation system • Because BGP does not have a PKI

  8. SecSpiderhttp://secspider.cs.ucla.edu/ • Learns keys from many global pollers • Keys are tracked over time • Serves globally consistent keys • Anyone can verify keys they have looked up • Adversaries must compromise all pollers to subvert the Public-Space • Results are not provably correct but practically effective • Data owners check the Public-Space for correctness • SecSpider is not a data authority • We are formalizing this approach to achieve security through publicity

  9. BGP-Originshttp://www.bgp-origin.org/ • BGP allows any Autonomous System (AS) to announce that it hosts any IP addresses (prefixes) • ASes send out false announcements sometimes • Pakistan hijacked YouTube by announcing its prefixes • BGP-Origins uses global monitors (RouteViews) and tracks which ASes have announced which prefixes • Also, any user can attest to a prefix-AS binding • Operators could have attested to the proper binding of YouTube’s prefixes to avoid the hijack • Users decide whom to trust and discard attestations from unknown parties

  10. Ongoing Work • Are conventional PKIs a good fit for the Internet? • Operational groups disagree on many “trust” issues • Public-Space applications are maturing • Increasing usage is coming with ongoing publicity at operational meetings • Public-Space can be a substitute for the missing PKI in DNSSEC’s partially deployed state • Users can verify data against what is in the Public-Space • With no PKI for BGP, the Public-Space uses real-world trust that already exists between operators • Addresses attacks and misconfigurations

  11. Thank You Questions?

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