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What role do harm reduction products play in tobacco industry strategy?. Geoff Ferris Wayne Harvard School of Public Health Center for Tobacco Regulation U Maryland School of Law April 20, 2007. Context–the current market. Long term declines in US but continued growth internationally
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What role do harm reduction products play in tobacco industry strategy? Geoff Ferris Wayne Harvard School of Public Health Center for Tobacco Regulation U Maryland School of Law April 20, 2007
Context–the current market • Long term declines in US but continued growth internationally • Market consolidation • Strategic acquisitions targeting new populations and markets • Altria Sampoerna (2nd largest producer of cigarettes in Indonesia, primarily kreteks) • RAI Conwood (2nd largest smokeless manufacturer in US, other cigarette companies following suit)
Context–the current market • Accelerating movement toward regulatory oversight, as well as greater coordination of strategies and approaches (e.g. via FCTC/ WHO) • Heightened public awareness of health burden of tobacco • Heightened public mistrust of industry • Greater vulnerability in litigation • Response by manufacturers: emphasis on perceived corporate social responsibility and public image, dialogue and cooperation
Context–brand development • Brand proliferation, particularly by expansion of popular brands (Marlboro, Camel) into new line extensions • Flavored products • KOOL Smooth Fusions Midnight Berry, Caribbean Chill, Mocha Taboo, Mintrigue • Exotic Camel Mandarin Mint, Twist, Izmir Stinger, Crema, Dark Mint • Also: cigars, bidis, smokeless, waterpipes, rolling paper
Context–brand development • New conventional delivery technologies • Filter pellet • Introduction of new smokeless products • RAI Camel Snus • Altria Taboka • Smokeless line extensions of BAT cigarette brands (e.g. Lucky Strike) • Reduced harm products/ PREPs
Some open questions • What market considerations provide the primary motivation behind development of PREPs? • Threat of litigation or anticipated regulation • Need to expand or develop new markets • Competition among manufacturers • Are PREPs different from other industry product innovations? • Are PREPs developed in response to the same or different market considerations from other product innovations?
One approach to answering these questions is to study the industry: • Market/ analyst reports • Public statements • Internal documents • Trial testimony
Analysis of industry trial testimony • How PREPs are described or presented in comparison to conventional cigarettes • How market success or failure of PREPs is defined • How PREPs are described with respect to their potential “safety” or potential for harm reduction • Do these change over time? (1996-2003)
Comparison to conventional cigarettes • Language used to describe PREPs is more excited/ radical in earlier testimony than in later testimony • Earlier testimony contrasts conventional products with PREPs; later testimony tends to promote similarities (continuum) • In later testimony, difference is not a positive attribute (i.e. “next generation”) but a negative (i.e. challenge to be overcome)
Market success and failure • Earlier testimony evaluates PREPs based on their market performance; later testimony avoids evaluations of market failure • Later testimony focuses on test markets as a vehicle for gathering information rather than as a means of demonstrating market acceptance • In later testimony, positive expectations are relied on to provide a sense of progress despite the ongoing reality of continued market failure
Conclusions based on testimony • At least some within the industry appear to have been convinced early on that they were on the verge of the “next big thing” • Failures in market have curbed this enthusiasm • The new reality means protection of the conventional market is the primary concern • Introduction of PREPs is problematic because it begs the question: • If there is a radically different, safer alternative to cigarettes, then why are cigarettes still around?
Conclusions based on testimony • So, the industry needs to position PREPs alongside and not separately from conventional products • Legitimizes the sale of conventional products • Legitimizes (by association) conventional “harm reduction” efforts (including low tar) • Shifts responsibility for harm reduction from company to consumer, as an issue of market acceptance • PREPs remain in indefinite test market in order to support the illusion of “choice”
Another approach to answering questions about PREPs is to study the products: • Market approach • Advertising • Physical and chemical analysis • Consumer response • Market impact
Marlboro UltraSmooth (MUS) • Test marketed in the US, specifically: • Salt Lake City, UT (Apr 2005) • Tampa, FL (Apr 2005) • Atlanta, GA (Apr 2005) • As Marlboro Ultra Lights in North Dakota (June 2005) • Uses a modified charcoal filter • Various configurations
SEM carbon slides MUS Carbon Bead and interior structure Standard Charcoal Granule and interior structure
Machine smoke constituent yields (intense) Percent Yield of Conventional
http://tobaccodocuments.org/product_design/508026176-6283.htmlhttp://tobaccodocuments.org/product_design/508026176-6283.html
Consumer sensory assessment Acceptability* Irritation Aftertaste Amount AftertasteQuality* Taste Amount* Impact/ Kick* Taste Quality* Mouth Full Mouth Drying Draw Effort * p<0.015
Perceptions of product messaging N = 147
Summary of findings for MUS • Unique technology, but questionable value for harm reduction in comparison to conventional cigarettes • Consumer response to MUS is not positive, low levels of satisfaction and acceptability • MUS was not perceived as a safer product or as a quitting alternative
What was the objective for MUS? • Why introduce a product that is clearly not ready for consumer acceptance? • Why attach the Marlboro name to it? • Is this: • Information gathering? • Stepping stone to a new product technology? • Protection from litigation? • Positioning for potential regulation? • Serious attempt at a competitive product introduction?
Putting it all together • Given what we learned from testimony, MUS and products like it may simply be intended to blur the line between “conventional” and “reduced harm” • Proliferation of new products supports the industry presumption that consumers are responsible for “choosing” harm reduction • This also defines the regulatory framework, in which “safer” products are placed on the market within the context of a full spectrum of conventional products
Putting it all together • Recent market acquisitions and product innovations suggest continued expansion into alternative tobacco products and technologies • The objective of these product innovations is to support and expand the current market • Smokeless products negate impact of indoor air laws • Flavors/ kreteks develop alternative starter products • At least from the industry’s perspective, there is no magic harm reduction bullet on the horizon
Conclusions • What lessons can we take from this? • Eliminate the false continuum of “less safe” to “safer” products • Place the burden of harm reduction on manufacturer, not consumer “choice” • Limit expansion of products in market and development and use of new technologies • Harm reduction products must be evaluated on the basis of their viability as a serious alternative/ replacement to conventional products