1 / 28

Engine Performance Deterioration Mitigation Control - A retrofit approach

Engine Performance Deterioration Mitigation Control - A retrofit approach. Dr. Sanjay Garg Branch Chief Ph: (216) 433-2685 FAX: (216) 433-8990 email: sanjay.garg@nasa.gov http://www.lerc.nasa.gov/WWW/cdtb. Presented at: Aerospace Guidance and Control System Committee Meeting

evelyn
Télécharger la présentation

Engine Performance Deterioration Mitigation Control - A retrofit approach

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Engine Performance Deterioration Mitigation Control- A retrofit approach Dr. Sanjay Garg Branch Chief Ph: (216) 433-2685 FAX: (216) 433-8990 email: sanjay.garg@nasa.gov http://www.lerc.nasa.gov/WWW/cdtb Presented at: Aerospace Guidance and Control System Committee Meeting Boulder, CO, March 1, 2007 Research Performed by: Jonathan Litt – Army Research Lab Shane Sowers – Analex Controls and Dynamics Branch

  2. Overview • Motivation • Architecture Description • Steady State Evaluation • Transient Evaluation • Piloted Simulation • Conclusions Controls and Dynamics Branch

  3. Propulsion Related Accidents & Incidents 1982 - 1991 Source: AIA PC 342 Committee on Continued Airworthiness Assessment Methodology Initial Report on Propulsion System and APU Related Aircraft Safety Hazards 1982 Through 1991 Includes all Part 25 Category Transports Aircraft Data - Turboprop, Low Bypass, High Bypass Turbofans. (Does not include data from former Soviet Union and satellite countries’ products.) Uncontained Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR) Controls and Dynamics Branch

  4. Example PSM+ICR Turbofan Accidents • Rejected Takeoff Events at or above V1 (30 Turbofan Events, 5 Hull Losses, 1 Fatal) • 13 June 1996; Garuda Indonesian Airways DC10-30; Fukuoka, Japan (Contributing event: fracture of a HPT stage 1 blade) • 19 October 1995; Canadian Airlines DC10-30ER; Vancouver, Canada (Contributing event: progressive HPC blade failures) • Shutdown / Throttle Wrong Engine (27 Turbofan Events, 2 Hull Losses, 1 Fatal) • 8 January 1989; British Midland Airways 737-400; near East Midlands Airport, UK (Contributing event: fan blade failure) • Loss of Control (14 Turbofan Events, 11 Hull Losses, 7 Fatal) • 24 November 1992; China Southern Airlines 737-300; Guangzhou, China (asymmetric thrust - stuck throttle) • 31 March 1995; Tarom Romanian Airlines A310; near Balotesti, Romania (asymmetric thrust - stuck throttle) Controls and Dynamics Branch

  5. Model-Based Fault Detection Vehicle Management System Fuzzy Belief Network Data Fusion Autonomous Propulsion System Technology- Reduce PSM+ICR incidents Reduce/Eliminate human dependency in the control and operation of the propulsion system Performance Requirement Engine Condition/Capability Demonstrate Technology in a relevant environment Diagnostics/PrognosticsAlgorithms Are Being Developed • Self-Diagnostic Adaptive Engine Control System • Performs autonomous propulsion system monitoring, diagnosing, and adapting functions • Combines information from multiple disparate sources using state-of-the-art data fusion technology • Communicates with vehicle management system and flight control to optimize overall system performance

  6. PILOT WORKSHOP at GRC - 2002 OBJECTIVE:Get direct input from pilots that will be used to help define the APST project plan • GOALS: • Under all flight regimes, identify what processes or procedures associated with propulsion system management could be candidates for autonomous operation • Identify what propulsion system information or control features will be helpful in managing the integration of propulsion with flight control for normal and abnormal operations • Identify what “sensory” information, other than the engine instruments, is used by the pilots in operation and control of the propulsion system for all flight regimes Controls and Dynamics Branch

  7. Results from PILOT WORKSHOP • The conclusions of 2002 NASA Glenn Pilot Workshop fell into three main categories • Control • Thrust asymmetry control • Thrust response rate variation between engines • Propulsion Controlled Aircraft • Operating envelope expansion for emergency operation • Diagnostics • Fault detection and isolation for vibration and potential engine shutdowns • Health and usage monitoring • Indications to pilots • Fault signals • Vehicle status under autopilot, especially concerning throttle movement and split throttles Controls and Dynamics Branch

  8. FADEC – Full Authority Digital Engine Control PLA Fan Speed Schedule N2c + eN2 Control Logic WFc Limit Logic WF y Engine - N2 Typical Current Engine Control • Since Thrust cannot be measured, another parameter such as Fan Speed (N2), which correlates to Thrust, is regulated • Engine Control Logic Is Developed Using A “Nominal” Engine Model…But “Nominal” Engine Does Not Exist Nominal Engine with Fixed Control Normal Variation Normal Variation Measure of Performance Thrust Time PLA Degraded Engine with Fixed Control

  9. Asymmetric Thrust Accident Information • Aircraft asymmetric thrust accidents have been identified as a concern in the AIA/AECMA study on PSM+ICR [1]: “A further area of concern was power asymmetry resulting from a slow power loss, stuck throttle, or no response to throttle coupled with automatic controls. Flying aids, such as the auto-pilot and auto-throttle, can mask significant power asymmetry until a control limit is reached. At this point, the flight crew has to intervene, understand the malfunction, and assume control of an airplane which may be in an upset condition. Better indications and/or annunciations of power asymmetry could warn crews in advance and allow them time to identify the problem and apply the appropriate procedures.” • The following description of past asymmetric thrust accident is taken from an FAA Policy Statement on aircraft thrust management systems (TMS) [2]: March 31, 1995, Tarom Airbus Model A310-300, Bucharest, Hungary: The airplane crashed shortly after takeoff. The Romanian investigating team indicated that the probable cause of the accident was the combination of an autothrottle failure that generated asymmetric thrust and the pilot's apparent failure to react quickly enough to the developing emergency. Report Conclusion: Data from these accident investigations have provided evidence that it is incorrect to assume that the flightcrew will always detect and address potentially adverse TMS effects strictly from inherent operational cues. • Sallee, G.P., and Gibbons, D.M., “AIA/AECMA Project Report on Propulsion System Malfunction Plus Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR), Volume I,” (Aerospace Industries Association and The European Association of Aerospace Industries, November 1, 1998). • FAA Policy Statement, “FAA Policy on Type Certification Assessment of Thrust Management Systems,” FAA Policy Statement Number ANM-01-02, March 2002. http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/0f670523ec44af9f86256ce9004c4539

  10. Model-Based Controls and Diagnostics • Actuator • Commands • Fuel Flow • Variable Geometry • Bleeds • Engine • Instrumentation • Pressures • Fuel flow • Temperatures • Rotor Speeds Actuator Positions Adaptive Engine Control • On-Board Model • & Tracking Filter • Efficiencies • Flow capacities • Stability margin • Thrust Component Performance Estimates Selected Sensors Sensor Validation & Fault Detection Sensor Estimates Sensor Measurements On Board • Ground-Based Diagnostics • Fault Codes • Maintenance/Inspection Advisories Ground Level • Applicable only to future systems • Still in research mode with many technical changes to overcome Controls and Dynamics Branch

  11. THE NEED • There is a need to develop a “simplified” approach to maintaining throttle to thrust relationship in the presence of engine degradation, and detecting thrust asymmetry situations. The approach “shall”: • Be retrofitable to existing FADEC systems • Leverage the extensive investment in existing FADEC control logic – specially in terms of limits imposed for operational life and safety • Be mostly software/logic additions – not require any new sensors or actuation hardware • Have “reasonable” development, verification and implementation costs Controls and Dynamics Branch

  12. FADEC – Retrofit PLA Fan Speed Schedule N2cmod + eN2 Control Logic WFc Limit Logic WF y Engine + - N2 delN2c Thrust Model T_des + N2c Modifier Addition to Existing FADEC Logic - Thrust Estimator T_est Engine Performance Deterioration Mitigation Control (EPDMC) • The proposed retrofit architecture: • Adds the following “logic” elements to existing FADEC: • A model of the nominal throttle to desired thrust (T_des) response • An estimator for engine thrust (T_est) based on available measurements • A modifier to the Fan Speed Command (delN2c) based on the error between desired and estimated thrust • Since the modifier appears prior to the limit logic, the operational safety and life remains unchanged

  13. EPDMC Testbed Architecture • Engine • Full envelope, nonlinear Component Level Model • Represents a large commercial turbofan engine

  14. Parts of EPDMC Testbed Architecture • Engine Control • Typical Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) type controller • PLA in, fuel flow out • Fan speed is controlled

  15. Parts of EPDMC Testbed Architecture • Nominal Engine Model • Piecewise linear model • Scheduled on percent corrected fan speed

  16. Parts of EPDMC Testbed Architecture • Thrust Estimator • Piecewise linear Kalman filter • Based on Nominal Engine Model • Provides optimal estimation of variables in a least squares sense subject to sensors selected

  17. Parts of EPDMC Testbed Architecture • PI Control with Integrator Windup Protection • Performs outer loop PLA adjustment • Stops integrating error when PLA limit is reached

  18. EPDMC Evaluation • The purpose of the evaluation is to determine • The steady state accuracy of the thrust estimator at many operating points and degradation levels with various types of uncertainty (model mismatch, nonlinearities, noise) • How well the outer loop control is able bring the thrust back to the nominal level in steady state • How well the outer loop control is able to maintain a nominal thrust response over a typical flight trajectory with a deteriorated engine Controls and Dynamics Branch

  19. EPDMC Evaluation • Evaluation was performed in two phases • Steady State • Transient • Assumptions • 10 health parameters, two each (efficiency and flow capacity) for each of the five major components • Worst case degradation 5% in each health parameter • Health parameters degrade at their own pace, pretty much independent of each other  no restrictions placed on simulated deterioration except upper limit of 5% Controls and Dynamics Branch

  20. Steady State Evaluation • Thrust performance deterioration with engine degradation Outer Loop Control off • Thrust estimation error is << Thrust deterioration • => Thrust estimate can be used effectively for performance recovery

  21. Steady State Evaluation Outer Loop Control off Outer Loop Control on • EPDMC maintains “close” to nominal thrust performance • - even with high levels of engine degradation

  22. Transient Evaluation • Trajectory is takeoff/climb/cruise • It passes through or near the linearization points • No airframe is included, the engine is operating as if it were in a wind tunnel Controls and Dynamics Branch

  23. Transient Evaluation • Nominal Engine with and without Outer Loop Control Controls and Dynamics Branch

  24. Transient Evaluation • Degraded Engine with and without Outer Loop Control Controls and Dynamics Branch

  25. Flight Simulator INSTRUMENTATION DISPLAY HEADS UP DISPLAY SCREEN THROTTLE STICK PEDALS Controls and Dynamics Branch

  26. “Piloted” Evaluation of Architecture • Pilot-in-the-loop in a fixed-base simulator • Maintain airspeed and heading while following profile • - Three cases: Nominal, 1 engine degraded – OLC Off/On

  27. Pilot Workload During Transient Flight Very Clear Increase in Workload With Outer Loop Control Off Controls and Dynamics Branch

  28. Conclusions • Developed a controls architecture that would maintain throttle to thrust relationship as the engine degrades • Addresses one of the major issues of propulsion related workload identified during a pilot workshop • Requires “minor” additions to existing FADEC logic • Preliminary simplified simulation results encouraging • Current research focusing on implementing the architecture on the fan speed correction over the whole engine operating envelope and performing more detailed evaluations • Need to address some of the potential challenges for implementation: • Pilots are used to relating throttle setting to fan speed • Acoustics issues related to two engines running at different but very close fan speeds (Beat frequency) Controls and Dynamics Branch

More Related