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Certificates and network security

Certificates and network security. Aalto University , autumn 2012. Outline. X.509 certificates and PKI Network security basics: threats and goals Secure socket layer . Note : the SSL part overlaps with T-110.2100 course. X.509 certificates. Key distribution problem.

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Certificates and network security

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  1. Certificates and network security Aalto University, autumn2012

  2. Outline • X.509 certificates and PKI • Network security basics: threats and goals • Secure socket layer Note: the SSL partoverlapswith T-110.2100 course

  3. X.509 certificates

  4. Key distribution problem • Public keys make key distribution easier than it is for secret keys, but it is still not trivial: How to find out someone’s authentic public key? • Solution: an authority or trusted third party issues certificates that bind public keys to names Certificate = SignCA(Name, PK, validity_period) • Message signed by the authority, containing the subject name and public key • Questions: • Who could the authority be? • How does everyone know the public key of the authority? • What is the difference between “authority” and “trusted third party”?

  5. X.509 certificate example • Save certificate into a file and pretty print: • % openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -text Issuer info Validity dates Subject name Subject public key Revocation list URL Key usage CA signature… Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: d1:32:5b:f8:d7:09:02:37:50:57:93:55:84:c9:b2:4c Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=FI, O=Sonera, CN=Sonera Class2 CA Validity Not Before: Nov 19 12:02:09 2009 GMT Not After : Nov 19 12:02:09 2010 GMT Subject: C=FI, O=TKK, OU=Computing Centre, CN=wwwlogin.tkk.fi/emailAddress=webmaster@tkk.fi Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) Modulus (1024 bit): 00:c7:94:9b:49:29:6f:2d:6d:32:70:97:73:39:1e: 04:20:89:ea:05:89:02:01:1a:d7:2d:ad:86:f6:99: 69:7e:13:19:f2:09:d0:e6:05:ca:93:13:a7:e2:7b: 3b:b6:68:e7:49:c7:3b:53:fd:b5:c1:bc:64:65:6c: 4d:89:37:ab:b5:6b:2a:38:2b:45:82:f6:99:97:21: 57:fc:ac:26:9b:04:3b:ad:13:26:8e:85:ff:44:ba: 4f:1e:27:cc:f2:fd:c1:47:c4:de:b6:d2:6c:2c:48: 6e:a3:cc:cd:0c:ed:75:4b:a2:c7:f0:c2:e1:9b:e9: d3:0c:1b:90:35:c8:ee:e7:01 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:4A:A0:AA:58:84:D3:5E:3C X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.271.2.3.1.1.2 X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: URI:ldap://194.252.124.241:389/cn=Sonera%20Class2%20CA,o=Sonera,c=FI?certificaterevocationlist;binary X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 86:4C:D0:93:1A:A4:C4:7C:94:A0:28:04:F3:DA:17:12:18:FF:23:D7 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 50:c3:94:71:b3:d2:1d:7f:be:71:5e:fe:ff:ec:09:50:68:f0: 27:54:cd:e8:f2:17:90:3e:ea:6c:e2:81:12:bf:e2:73:72:9e: 02:d3:b4:03:88:2a:6a:b1:00:ca:70:24:1b:3f:da:d6:30:46: 0e:db:99:af:65:7d:d9:58:dc:ed:47:36:04:63:c4:f8:c1:22: e6:ab:f6:63:b8:d4:bf:68:a4:13:73:82:4c:94:b1:9c:1f:fb: e8:87:c5:f1:12:e1:73:e0:ef:71:af:8b:85:cf:e3:9e:6e:dd: d1:0b:11:29:ca:ec:24:37:eb:23:df:63:35:f7:9d:b8:13:47: bf:4a:93:c1:a5:0c:b7:1d:8d:1a:61:22:06:56:17:07:f4:f8: 7d:41:92:04:83:f7:6c:f9:9b:94:27:35:11:c5:d2:e6:95:1d: 71:8a:01:bb:f5:2b:c0:21:e3:7c:5a:0a:44:66:98:38:de:b7: 2f:b7:9d:1f:35:95:05:21:03:a2:d3:ba:7d:e2:4e:87:0f:ad: e1:68:cd:b9:c9:d2:21:67:85:32:6f:0b:d0:26:b2:2d:dd:10: 4e:88:30:e3:d7:52:73:f6:eb:ca:4b:28:56:9f:06:25:a8:91: 45:b5:26:93:01:ab:8b:aa:7d:2e:bd:96:5f:39:50:cc:2a:11: f0:69:4d:ff

  6. X.509 certificate example • Save certificate into a file and pretty print: • % openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -text Issuer info Validity dates Subject: C=FI, O=TKK, OU=Computing Centre, CN=wwwlogin.tkk.fi/emailAddress=webmaster@tkk.fi Subject name Subject public key Revocation list URL Key usage CA signature… Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: d1:32:5b:f8:d7:09:02:37:50:57:93:55:84:c9:b2:4c Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=FI, O=Sonera, CN=Sonera Class2 CA Validity Not Before: Nov 19 12:02:09 2009 GMT Not After : Nov 19 12:02:09 2010 GMT Subject: C=FI, O=TKK, OU=Computing Centre, CN=wwwlogin.tkk.fi/emailAddress=webmaster@tkk.fi Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) Modulus (1024 bit): 00:c7:94:9b:49:29:6f:2d:6d:32:70:97:73:39:1e: 04:20:89:ea:05:89:02:01:1a:d7:2d:ad:86:f6:99: 69:7e:13:19:f2:09:d0:e6:05:ca:93:13:a7:e2:7b: 3b:b6:68:e7:49:c7:3b:53:fd:b5:c1:bc:64:65:6c: 4d:89:37:ab:b5:6b:2a:38:2b:45:82:f6:99:97:21: 57:fc:ac:26:9b:04:3b:ad:13:26:8e:85:ff:44:ba: 4f:1e:27:cc:f2:fd:c1:47:c4:de:b6:d2:6c:2c:48: 6e:a3:cc:cd:0c:ed:75:4b:a2:c7:f0:c2:e1:9b:e9: d3:0c:1b:90:35:c8:ee:e7:01 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:4A:A0:AA:58:84:D3:5E:3C X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.271.2.3.1.1.2 X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: URI:ldap://194.252.124.241:389/cn=Sonera%20Class2%20CA,o=Sonera,c=FI?certificaterevocationlist;binary X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 86:4C:D0:93:1A:A4:C4:7C:94:A0:28:04:F3:DA:17:12:18:FF:23:D7 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 50:c3:94:71:b3:d2:1d:7f:be:71:5e:fe:ff:ec:09:50:68:f0: 27:54:cd:e8:f2:17:90:3e:ea:6c:e2:81:12:bf:e2:73:72:9e: 02:d3:b4:03:88:2a:6a:b1:00:ca:70:24:1b:3f:da:d6:30:46: 0e:db:99:af:65:7d:d9:58:dc:ed:47:36:04:63:c4:f8:c1:22: e6:ab:f6:63:b8:d4:bf:68:a4:13:73:82:4c:94:b1:9c:1f:fb: e8:87:c5:f1:12:e1:73:e0:ef:71:af:8b:85:cf:e3:9e:6e:dd: d1:0b:11:29:ca:ec:24:37:eb:23:df:63:35:f7:9d:b8:13:47: bf:4a:93:c1:a5:0c:b7:1d:8d:1a:61:22:06:56:17:07:f4:f8: 7d:41:92:04:83:f7:6c:f9:9b:94:27:35:11:c5:d2:e6:95:1d: 71:8a:01:bb:f5:2b:c0:21:e3:7c:5a:0a:44:66:98:38:de:b7: 2f:b7:9d:1f:35:95:05:21:03:a2:d3:ba:7d:e2:4e:87:0f:ad: e1:68:cd:b9:c9:d2:21:67:85:32:6f:0b:d0:26:b2:2d:dd:10: 4e:88:30:e3:d7:52:73:f6:eb:ca:4b:28:56:9f:06:25:a8:91: 45:b5:26:93:01:ab:8b:aa:7d:2e:bd:96:5f:39:50:cc:2a:11: f0:69:4d:ff

  7. X.509 certificate example • Save certificate into a file and pretty print: • % openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -text Issuer info Validity dates Subject name Subject public key X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication Revocation list URL Key usage CA signature… Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: d1:32:5b:f8:d7:09:02:37:50:57:93:55:84:c9:b2:4c Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=FI, O=Sonera, CN=Sonera Class2 CA Validity Not Before: Nov 19 12:02:09 2009 GMT Not After : Nov 19 12:02:09 2010 GMT Subject: C=FI, O=TKK, OU=Computing Centre, CN=wwwlogin.tkk.fi/emailAddress=webmaster@tkk.fi Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) Modulus (1024 bit): 00:c7:94:9b:49:29:6f:2d:6d:32:70:97:73:39:1e: 04:20:89:ea:05:89:02:01:1a:d7:2d:ad:86:f6:99: 69:7e:13:19:f2:09:d0:e6:05:ca:93:13:a7:e2:7b: 3b:b6:68:e7:49:c7:3b:53:fd:b5:c1:bc:64:65:6c: 4d:89:37:ab:b5:6b:2a:38:2b:45:82:f6:99:97:21: 57:fc:ac:26:9b:04:3b:ad:13:26:8e:85:ff:44:ba: 4f:1e:27:cc:f2:fd:c1:47:c4:de:b6:d2:6c:2c:48: 6e:a3:cc:cd:0c:ed:75:4b:a2:c7:f0:c2:e1:9b:e9: d3:0c:1b:90:35:c8:ee:e7:01 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:4A:A0:AA:58:84:D3:5E:3C X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.271.2.3.1.1.2 X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: URI:ldap://194.252.124.241:389/cn=Sonera%20Class2%20CA,o=Sonera,c=FI?certificaterevocationlist;binary X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 86:4C:D0:93:1A:A4:C4:7C:94:A0:28:04:F3:DA:17:12:18:FF:23:D7 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 50:c3:94:71:b3:d2:1d:7f:be:71:5e:fe:ff:ec:09:50:68:f0: 27:54:cd:e8:f2:17:90:3e:ea:6c:e2:81:12:bf:e2:73:72:9e: 02:d3:b4:03:88:2a:6a:b1:00:ca:70:24:1b:3f:da:d6:30:46: 0e:db:99:af:65:7d:d9:58:dc:ed:47:36:04:63:c4:f8:c1:22: e6:ab:f6:63:b8:d4:bf:68:a4:13:73:82:4c:94:b1:9c:1f:fb: e8:87:c5:f1:12:e1:73:e0:ef:71:af:8b:85:cf:e3:9e:6e:dd: d1:0b:11:29:ca:ec:24:37:eb:23:df:63:35:f7:9d:b8:13:47: bf:4a:93:c1:a5:0c:b7:1d:8d:1a:61:22:06:56:17:07:f4:f8: 7d:41:92:04:83:f7:6c:f9:9b:94:27:35:11:c5:d2:e6:95:1d: 71:8a:01:bb:f5:2b:c0:21:e3:7c:5a:0a:44:66:98:38:de:b7: 2f:b7:9d:1f:35:95:05:21:03:a2:d3:ba:7d:e2:4e:87:0f:ad: e1:68:cd:b9:c9:d2:21:67:85:32:6f:0b:d0:26:b2:2d:dd:10: 4e:88:30:e3:d7:52:73:f6:eb:ca:4b:28:56:9f:06:25:a8:91: 45:b5:26:93:01:ab:8b:aa:7d:2e:bd:96:5f:39:50:cc:2a:11: f0:69:4d:ff

  8. Certificate chain • Typical certificate chain: • Root CA self-signed certificate • Root CA issues a CA certificate to a sub-CA • Sub-CA issues end-entity certificate to a user, computer or web server • Chain typically has 0..2 sub-CAs (Why?) • Self-signed certificate is an X.509 certificate issued by CA to itself; not really a certificate, just a way to store and transport the CA public key

  9. CA hierarchy • One root CA • Each CA can delegate its authority to sub-CAs • All end-entities trust all CAs to be honest and competent • Original X.500 idea: • One global hierarchy • Reality: • One CA or CA hierarchy per organization (e.g. Windows domain hierarchy) • Competing commercial root CAs without hierarchy (e.g. Verisign, Sonera) • Cross-certification rare

  10. Certificate path • End-entities (e.g. Bob) know the root CA • Root CA’s PK stored as a self-signed certificate • To verify Alice’s signature: • Bob needs the entire certificate path from root CA to Alice (self-signed root certificate + 2 CA certificates + end-entity certificate) • The root CA must be in Bob’s list of trusted root CAs

  11. Certificate revocation • When might CA need to revoke certificates? • If the conditions for issuing the certificate no longer hold • If originally issued in error • If the subject key has been compromised • Certificate revocation list (CRL) = signed list of certificate serial numbers • Only certificates are revoked, not keys • No mechanism for revoking the root key • Unlike PGP • Who issues the CRL? How to find it? • By default, CRL is signed by the CA that issued the certificate • CRL distribution point and issuer can be specified in each certificate

  12. Setting up a PKI • Potential root CAs: • Commercial CA such as Verisign, Sonera, etc. usually charges per certificate • Windows root domain controller can act as an organizational CA • Anyone can set up their own CA using Windows server or OpenSSL • The real costs: • Distributing the root key (self-signed certificate) • Certificate enrolment — need to issue certificates for each user, computer, mobile device etc. • Administering a secure CA and CRL server !

  13. Name and identity • With certificates, it is possible to authenticate the name or identifier of an entity • e.g. person, computer, web server, email address • What is the right name anyway? • wwwlogin.tkk.fi, security.tkk.fi, leakybox.cse.tkk.fi • George Bush, George W. Bush, George H. W. Bush • tuomas.aura@aalto.fi, aura@cs.hut.fi, aaura@hut.fi, taura@cse.tkk.fi, aura@cse.tkk.fi • Who decides who owns the name? • xyz@aalto.fi, Ville Valo on Facebook • Identity proofing= verification of the subject identity before certification • Email to registered domain owner • Extended validation certificates • Electronic ID cards and mobile certificates in Finland • Does knowing the name imply trust? • Should I order a second-hand camera from buycam.fi? • Should they post the camera to Tuomas Aura?

  14. Network security basics

  15. Network-security threat model • Traditional network-security model: trusted end nodes, unreliable network • End nodes send messages to the network and receive messages from it; the network may deliver, delete, modify and spoof messages • Metaphors: unreliable postman, bulletin board, dust bin Messages Messages Network =Attacker Alice Bob

  16. Network security threats • Traditional threats: • Sniffing = attacker listens to network traffic • Spoofing = attacker sends unauthentic messages • Data modification (man in the middle) = attacker intercepts and modifies data • Corresponding security requirements: • Data confidentiality • Data-origin authentication and data integrity • Q: Can there be integrity without authentication or authentication without integrity? • Other treats: denial of service, server compromise, worms etc.

  17. Secure socket layer

  18. Secure web site (https) HTTPS connectionsareencrypted and authenticated to preventsniffing and spoofing

  19. SSL/TLS in the protocol stack • SSL implements cryptographic encryption and authentication for TCP connections • SSL offers a secure socket API, similar to the TCP socket API, to applications • TLS is the standardized version of SSL • similar but not quite compatible Socket API Secure socket API

  20. SSL/TLS protocol • SSL provides a secure connection over the insecure network • Two stages: • Handshake i.e. authenticated key exchange creates a shared session key between the browser and the server • Session protocol protects the confidentiality and integrity of the session with symmetric encryption, message authentication codes, and the session key • Handshake may use digital signatures or RSA encryption • Basic idea of the RSA-based handshake protocol: • The server sends its certificate to the client, which thus learns the server name and public RSA key • The browse generates random bytes, encrypts them with the servers RSA key, and sends to the server • Usually only the server authenticated ! !

  21. TLS handshake Client Server ClientHello --------> ServerHello Certificate* ServerKeyExchange* CertificateRequest* <-------- ServerHelloDone Certificate* ClientKeyExchange CertificateVerify* [ChangeCipherSpec] Finished --------> [ChangeCipherSpec] <-------- Finished Application Data <-------> A pplication Data SignCA(server name, server PK, validity_period) EPK(secret session key material)

  22. Trust chain • In the handshake, browser receives a certificate chain from the server • Browser checks that the chain start with a (self-signed) certificate that is in its trusted CA list • Browser checks the certificate chain: • Each certificate is signed with the subject key of the previous one • All but the last certificate are CA certificates • Some other details, e.g. CRL, key usage, constraints • If the certificate chain is valid, the last certificate binds together the host name and public key of the server • Public key is used for server authentication in the SSL handshake • Host name shown to user in the browser address bar

  23. Whatdoes SSL achieve? Thanks to the trustchain, the I knowthatthisserverreally is webmail3.tkk.fi Issuer is Sonera Class2 CA Sonera root CA wasnotpre-installed in the browser; soI downloaded the self-signedcertificatefrom the web and addedit to the list of trustedrootCAs Certificate of the web server webmail3.tkk.fi How do I knowthat the webmailservershouldhave the name webmail3?

  24. Exercises • Set up your own CA with OpenSSL (or a commercial CA implementation if you have access to one) and try to use it for protecting web access; what were the difficult steps? • What are extended validation certificates and how do they improve security? • Find several web and user certificates and compare the names and certification paths on them • Why do almost all web sites have certificate chains with two CAs and not just one? • What information does the signature on the root certificate convey? • Why is the front page of a web site often insecure (HTTP) even if the password entry and/or later data access are secure (HTTPS)? What security problems can this cause? • What actions are required from the user when logging into a secure bank web site?

  25. Related reading • Stallings and Brown: Computer security, principles and practice, 2008, chapters 21-22 • other Stallings books have similar sections • Stallings, Network security essentials, 4th ed. chapters 4.4–4.5, 5 • Dieter Gollmann: Computer Security, 2nd ed., chapter 12-13; 3rd ed. chapters 15.5, 16–17 • Matt Bishop: Introduction to computer security, chapter 13 • Online: • Survival guides - SSL/TLS and X.509 (SSL) Certificates, http://www.zytrax.com/tech/survival/ssl.html

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