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This analysis delves into the Common Criteria (CC) and its relationship with various ISO security standards such as ISO 15408, ISO 27001, and others. It discusses the complexities of implementing these standards in the payment card industry, contrasting the approaches of organizations like APACS and the smartcard industry. The focus is on the effectiveness of the CC in providing a comprehensive security framework, exploring areas where adaptation has been beneficial and where misinterpretations or excessive prescriptiveness may have hindered progress.
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Omissions and errors in the CC Who got it right? 8ICCC Denise Cater
Security Standards ISO alone have issued: • ISO15408 – Common Criteria • ISO19092 – Financial Service – Security • ISO19790 – Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules (FIPS 140) • ISO27001 – Information Security Management • ISO27002 (formerly ISO 17799) – ISMS best practice
Many standards: One CC • Catalogue of security components: • Functional • Assurance • Focus on repeatability • Voluminous guidance for consistent application • Scheme rules and interpretations =“Heavy” process
APACS Payment Industry Security Standards • Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard • EMV (Europay, Mastercard, Visa) Specifications • APACS PIN Entry Device PP
APACS application of CC • Own Certification Body • Appointment of labs • Issuing of certificates • Focus on CC • Less emphasis on CEM • Concentration of efforts • Design and testing seen as paramount • Procedural requirements seen as supporting
Smartcard Industry • Developed PPs • Generated own interpretations • Adopted as CC Supporting Documents • Included own Attack Potential Table • Examples of Smartcard Specific Attacks
Smartcard Industry • Took the CC and gave specific guidance for their industry • A lot of focus placed on penetration testing • Identified additional stages in lifecycle/delivery
Adapt to Adopt • Both industries have made changes to use CC • Interpretations • Greater emphasis in some areas, less in others
Who got it right? • The CC of course! • Providing a catalogue that Industry and other schemes can draw upon • But, also Industry/other schemes • Focus on areas of specific interest • Light-touch on other areas
Who got it wrong? • Those who requested EALs to be included in CC (for backwards compatibility) • Led to “incorrect” use of CC • Initially less PPs developed as just concentrated on assurance level
Who got it wrong? • Authors of the CEM or CC Schemes? • Too prescriptive • Forcing evaluators to complete work units at level of detail that is not always necessary • Time spent on “meeting the CEM” that would be better spent on testing and vulnerability analysis
In summary • CC got it right • CC got it wrong But, Industry can adapt the CC to adopt it
Thank you Denise Cater denise@iconsecurity.co.uk