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Research Direction Introduction. Advisor : Professor Frank, Y.S. Lin Presented by Yu Pu Wu. Agenda. Introduction Problem description Scenario. Definition of Survivability.
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Research Direction Introduction Advisor: ProfessorFrank, Y.S. Lin Presented by YuPuWu
Agenda • Introduction • Problem description • Scenario
Definition of Survivability • We define survivability as the capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents. We use the term system in the broadest possible sense, including networks and large-scale systems of systems. [1] • [1] R. J. Ellison, D. A. Fisher, R. C. Linger, H. F. Lipson, T. Longstaff, and N. R. Mead, “Survivable Network Systems: An Emerging Discipline,” Technical Report CMU/SEI-97-TR-013, November 1997.(Revised: May 1999)
Defense strategiesHoneypot • Existing Classifications • Lure • Defend(deception& intimidation ) • Study • [2] H. Debar, F. Pouget, and M. Dacier, “White Paper: “Honeypot, Honeynet, Honeytoken: Terminological issues”,” InstitutEurécom Research Report RR-03-081,2003
Defense strategiesHoneypot • Level of interaction classification • Low-Interaction • Mid-Interaction • High-Interaction • [3] H. Debar, F. Pouget, and M. Dacier, “White Paper: “Honeypot, Honeynet, Honeytoken: Terminological issues”,” InstitutEurécom Research Report RR-03-081,2003
Defense strategiesHoneypot • The objective of a false target is to distract or conceal something that someone else may search for (to gain access to, control, destroy, etc.) • [4] G. Levitin, and K. Hausken, “False targets efficiency in defense strategy,” European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 194, Issue 1, Pages 155-162, 1 April
Defense strategiesRotation • [5] Y. Huang, D. Arsenault, and A.Sood, “Closing Cluster Attack Windows Through Server Redundancy and Rotations”,Proc. IEEE CGRIDW'06.
Defense strategiesRotation • Outrunning Component Failures, which replicates key application components and intelligently places new replicas on suitable hosts upon noticing failures. • Attack Containment, which isolates host intrusions and network based distributed denial of service attacks and stops their propagation. • Continuous Unpredictable Changes, which tries toput strict time constraints on the usefulness of obtained attack information by constantly changing unpredictably. • [6] M.Atighetchi, P.Pal, F.Webber,and C.Jones, “Adaptive Use of Network-Centric Mechanisms in Cyber-Defense”,BBN Technologies LLC.
Agenda • Introduction • Problem description • Scenario
Attack Strategies • Compromise • PretendtoAttack • TestReaction • TakeOpportunity • [8] S.Braynov and M.Jadliwala, “Representation and Analysis of Coordinated Attacks”,” FMSE'03,2003,
RiskAvoidance&RiskTolerance • Risk Avoidance • Compromise • RiskTolerance • PretendtoAttack
Period, P • N:ThetotalnumbersofnodesintheDefenseNetworks. • F:ThetotalnumbersofnodewhichiscompromisedintheDefenseNetworks. • IfNis100andFis 10, the Period will be 90%.
SuccessRate, SR • SuccessRate(SR) =RiskAvoidanceCompromised/RiskAvoidanceAttacks • RiskAvoidance-CompromiseNodes : 10 • RiskTolerance-PretendtoAttack : 5 • CompromisedSuccessfully : 6 • (3CompromiseNodes : 3PretendtoAttack) • SuccessRate=30%
EarlyStage • EarlyStage
LateStage • LateStage
Selection Criteria • High Traffic & Low Defense Resource
No.ofAttackers • NumberofAttackers • M : Numberofselectedcandidates • M=4,Period=99%,Success Rate=100% • RiskAvoidance:6RiskTolerance:0 • M=25,Period=80%,Success Rate=0% • RiskAvoidance:6RiskTolerance:0
ChooseIdealAttackers • AttackEnergy • Budget&Capability • CorrespondingDefenseResourceforEachAttacker • Aggressiveness • AttackEnergy
ChooseIdealAttackers • ExampleChooseIdealAttacker • 100DefenseResource • 90~110CorrespondingDefenseResource • AppropriateAggressiveness • LowerBound(50%,0%) • IfSuccessRate(SR)islow,raisetheLowerBound. • IfSuccessRate(SR)ishigh,reducetheLowerBound.
VirtualMachine • VirtualMachine • VirtualMachineMonitor • LocalDefenseEffect • CoreNodecouldbeoneoftheVirtualMachines. • IfVMMwascompromised,allofitsVMwouldbecompromised,too.
Agenda • Introduction • Problem description • Scenario
Scenario CoreNodeCompromisedFalseTargetNextHop 7 DefenseResource Fake Traffic False Target & Fake Traffic Insider
G A D H K N L I B E O 7 9 9 4 3 5 8 5 M F C J
G A D H K N L I B E O 7 9 9 4 3 5 8 5 M F C J
G A D H K N L I B E O 7 9 9 4 D 5 8 5 M F C J
G A D H K +2 N L I B E +2 O D 8 5 5 C 9 9 7 M F C J
G A D H K +2 N L I B E +2 O D 8 5 5 9 9 7 C M F C J
G A D H K +2 N L I B E +2 O D 8 5 5 B 9 9 7 M F C J
G A D H K +2 N L I B E +2 O D 8 A 5 B 9 9 7 M F C J
G A D H K +2 N L I B E +2 O D 8 A 5 B 9 9 7 M F C J
G A E H K +2 N L I B D +2 O D 8 A 5 B 7 9 9 M F C J
G A E H K +2 N L I B D +2 O D 5 A 5 B 7 9 9 M F C J
G A E H K +2 N L I B D +2 O D 8 A 5 B 7 9 9 M F C J
G A E H K +2 N L I B D +2 O D 8 A B B 7 9 S M F C J
G A E H K +2 N L I B D +2 O D 8 A B B 7 9 S M F C J
G A E H K +2 N L I B D +2 O D 8 A B B 7 9 S M F C J