Enhancing Defense Against Difficult Air Targets: C-DAT Overview

1. Welcome Defence Technology & Innovation CentreWeapons Integrated Technology TeamCDE theme day Countering Difficult Air Targets (C-DAT)

2. Mr Robin Horne Maj Michelle Crawford Dr Philip Smith Mr Andrew Burles PL 4 DTIC SO2 J3 Ops - Jt GBAD HQ Dstl Dstl Today’s presenters

3. Agenda • Define objectives, scope, boundaries

4. Agenda • Define objectives, scope, boundaries • Introduce C-DAT

5. Agenda • Define objectives, scope, boundaries • Introduce C-DAT • Introduce current capability & operational perspective

6. Agenda • Define objectives, scope, boundaries • Introduce C-DAT • Introduce current capability & operational perspective • Coffee

7. Agenda • Define objectives, scope, boundaries • Introduce C-DAT • Introduce current capability & operational perspective • Coffee • Introduce Maritime perspective

8. Agenda • Define objectives, scope, boundaries • Introduce C-DAT • Introduce current capability & operational perspective • Coffee • Introduce Maritime perspective • A glimpse into the future

9. Agenda • Define objectives, scope, boundaries • Introduce C-DAT • Introduce current capability & operational perspective • Coffee • Introduce Maritime perspective • A glimpse into the future • Wash-up

10. Agenda • Define objectives, scope, boundaries • Introduce C-DAT • Introduce current capability & operational perspective • Coffee • Introduce Maritime perspective • A glimpse into the future • Wash-up • How & what to submit

11. Objective • Reduce or eliminate threat caused by difficult air targets

12. Scope • We want to improve our ability to counter: • Rockets, artillery & mortars (C-RAM) • Tactical Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles • We are concerned about: • Non-state actors • Asymmetric/homemade threats • The proliferation of sophisticated kit

13. What’s not covered in this call

14. What’s not covered in this call

15. What is covered by this call • DRIT • Detection • Recognition • Identification • Track • Air Situational Awareness • Command and control • Dynamic Air Defence Resource Allocation • Deny enemy capability through • Interception (prior to firing) • Effectors (once in flight)

16. Definitions - RAM • Rockets Artillery & Mortars (RAM) • Indirect Fire weapons (IDF)

17. RAM

18. RAM – flight profiles

19. RAM – flight profiles

20. RAM – flight profiles

21. Definitions - TUAV • Tactical Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (TUAV) • Micro UAV • Mini UAV • MALE

22. TUAV

23. Non-State Threat - RAM • 240mm • Homemade 65MM

24. Non-State Threat – TUAV • Hezbollah UAVs over Lebanon/Israel • Hezbollah UAV post flight

25. Asymmetric – TUAV Model aircraft

26. Asymmetric – TUAV Model aircraft + GPS/Autopilot

27. Asymmetric – TUAV Model aircraft + GPS/Autopilot + Payload = Threat

28. Asymmetric – Light Aircraft Tamil Tigers modified ZLIN 143

29. Definitions – threat credibility • Threat credibility depends on: • Readiness to use • Practical readiness of the target weapons system • Political will • Ability to use • Detection capability • Targeting • Availability/capability/survivability of launch • Probability of encounter • May not be through direct confrontation with country of origin

30. Future Effectors • Kinetic effectors: • Rapid integration onto platform • Improved Lethality at range • Ability to take out Difficult Air Targets • Reduced collateral damage • Low cost seeker trade-offs • Rapid system upgrade • Missile commonality • Non-Kinetic effectors: • Directed Energy Weapons • Soft-Kill • ?

31. Kill chain • The kill chain is made up of a number of discrete events. • Each event has a time penalty: • Time to detect (Td) + Time to inform (Ti) + Time to launch (Tl) + Time to cue (Tc) + Time to kill (Tk) • Anything that can reduce these time penalties improves the chances of success • We need a networked whole kill chain approach to optimise response time and: • Integrate available ABAD, GBAD and MFAD assets • Maximise enabler system effectiveness • Ensure that we engage targets in effector probability-of-kill priority. Within this we need to improve, develop and integrate: • Air target ID and tracking concepts and technology • Air Situational Awareness • Command and control • Dynamic AD Resource Allocation

32. Things to think about • Defeat or disrupt • Troops must want to use it • Cost of use V’s cost of threat • The target signature • Your signature • SWaP • Manning levels • Operational environment

33. Environment

34. Questions?

35. Things to think about • Defeat or disrupt • Troops must want to use it • Cost of use V’s cost of threat • The target signature • Your signature • SWaP • Manning levels • Operational environment

36. Bid hints Reasonable GFA demands Give tangible deliverables Identify subcontractor relationship Implications to exploitation route Identify the innovation Clearly identify IPR ownership One step at a time