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Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role, Structure and Activities

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role, Structure and Activities. Presentation by Mr Roald Næss, Former Chairman of the NSG, at a Seminar in Bali, 2 November, 2006. Purpose of the presentation.

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Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role, Structure and Activities

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  1. Nuclear Suppliers Group:Its Origins, Role, Structure and Activities Presentation by Mr Roald Næss, Former Chairman of the NSG, at a Seminar in Bali, 2 November, 2006

  2. Purpose of the presentation Contribute to a broader understanding of the NSG and its non-proliferation activities as part of an overall effort to promote dialogue and cooperation between NSG participants and non-NSG participants This is consistent with: • “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non Proliferation and Disarmament” (1995 NPTREC) • UNSC Resolution 1540 (OP 9)

  3. What is the NSG all about? The NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports

  4. What is the aim of the NSG Guidelines? • ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field is not hindered unjustly • facilitate the development of trade in this area by providing the means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation can be implemented in a manner consistent with international nuclear non-proliferation norms

  5. The origins of NSG NPT • negotiated in the 1960th, entered into force in 1970 • rests on three fundamental pillars: • non-proliferation • nuclear disarmament • peaceful use of nuclear energy

  6. NPT and nuclear trade Article III.2 “Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article”

  7. The Zangger Committee • Established in 1971 • Mandate - limited to interpreting Article III.2 of the NPT • Published a “Trigger List” and the Zangger guidelines in 1974 • list of items which would “trigger” safeguards in the recipient State • guidelines (“common understandings”) governing the export, direct or indirect, of those items to NNWS that are not party to NPT

  8. The Nuclear Suppliers Group • Triggering event: The nuclear explosion by India in 1974 • Seven supplier countries* met in London to discuss how they could further strengthen their non-proliferation efforts • Agreed on the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, published by the IAEA in 1978 (INFCIRC 254) *Canada, France, UK, USA, Soviet Union, Fed. Republic of Germany and Japan

  9. Prevailing misunderstandings • NSG is not an international organization, or an internationally legally-binding agreement • NSG doesnotconduct export control • NSG does nothave a Secretariat or a common budget

  10. NSG Guidelines Part 1 • Governs the export of items that are especially designed or prepared for nuclear use. These items include: • nuclear material, • nuclear reactors and equipment therefor, • non-nuclear material for reactors, • plants and equipment for the reprocessing, enrichment and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and heavy water production, • technology associated with each of these items

  11. NSG Guidelines Part 1 • Export of the commodities and the related technology from the Trigger List is prohibited: • to any non-nuclear weapons state which does not have a legally binding commitment for full scope safeguards with the IAEA, or • if the exporting country is not satisfied that the export will be used for peaceful purposes

  12. NSG Guidelines Part 1 • A Non-proliferation Principle is included in the Part 1 Guidelines and states that: ”Suppliers should authorize transfer of items or related technology identified in the trigger list only when they are satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or to be diverted to acts of nuclear terrorism”

  13. NSG Guidelines Part 1 • There are twoexceptions to the prohibitions of Part 1: • if the export is deemed essential for the safe operation of an existing safeguarded facility (must be an Imminent Radiological Danger); or • if the export is under the “grandfather” provisions (April 3, 1992 for original members and time of membership of subsequent members)

  14. NSG Guidelines Part 2 • Governs the export of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials and technologies • Export of the controlled commodities and technologies is prohibited: • to any NNWS for use in nuclear explosive activity, or in an un-safeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle facility • if there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or if the export would be contrary to nonproliferation objectives • if there is a risk of diversion to terrorist acts • There are no exceptions to the prohibitions of Part 2

  15. Policy recommendations • Policy recommendations to be implemented by PGs relate to: • Conditions of supply • Assurances of peaceful uses • Retransfer procedures • Consultations in specific circumstances • Exchange of information in regard to potential proliferation activities

  16. Structure of the NSG • NSG Plenary • governing and decision making body of NSG issues • decisions by consensus • Consultative Group • working body • submits recommendations to the Plenary • decisions by consensus • Information Exchange Meeting • forum for exchange of information on proliferation trends and concerns

  17. Structure of the NSG • NSG Chair • nominated by host country of the annual Plenary and elected by the Plenary at the opening session • presides from opening session in his/her country to opening session in next year’s Plenary • represents the NSG in external matters • Chairman of the Consultative Group • individual appointed for 1 year (renewable) • Point of Contact • Permanent Mission of Japan in Vienna • assists the chairs and hosts meetings

  18. NSG Participation: A new Participating Government should: • be able to supply items • adhere to and act in accordance with the Guidelines • have in force a legally-based domestic export control system • be a party to the NPT, other non-proliferation agreements, and have in force full-safe safeguards agreement with IAEA • support efforts towards non-prolififeraton of WMDs

  19. Recent developments of the NSG • Strengthening the NSG Guidelines • Countries of concern(Iran and North Korea) • Transparency and outreach activities • NSG/India relations

  20. Strengthening the Guidelines • Vienna 2002: How to prevent and counter the threat of diversion of nuclear exports to nuclear terrorism? • agreed to several comprehensive amendments to strengthen the Guidelines • Göteborg 2004:Adopted a ”catch-all” mechanism in order to control the export of nuclear related items that are not on the control lists

  21. Strengthening the Guidelines • Oslo 2005: Adopted several measures • a procedure towards suspending through national decisions nuclear transfers to countries that are non compliant with their safeguard agreements • supplier / recipient state should elaborate measures to evoke fall back safeguards if the IAEA can no longer undertake its safeguard mandate in a recipient state • existence of effective export controls in the recipient state as a criterion of supply for nuclear material, equipment and technology (Part 1) and a factor for consideration for dual-use items and technologies

  22. Strengthening the Guidelines • Brasilia 2006:Adopted some amendments to strengthen the Guidelines, and agreed to • continue discussions of the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply • continue discussions with a view to agree on further strengthening of the NSG Guidelines with respect to enrichment and reprocessing technologies • enhance information exchange in all aspects • continue contact with non-participants and relevant organisations in the framework of the NSG outreach programme

  23. Countries of concern • Situation in DPRK • Chairman’s Statement on DPRK of 12 Nov 2006 • Busan Plenary Statement of 2003 • “..call on all States to exercise extreme vigilance to ensure that none of their exports of goods and technologies contribute to North Korea’s nuclear weapons effort” • Situation in Iran • Extraordinary Plenary Meeting 19 October 2005 • Supported efforts undertaken elsewhere

  24. NSG outreach programme • Transparency efforts in the margins of the IAEA General Conference and visits to capitals • Promote the NSG’s objectives in contacts with India, Pakistan and Israel • Dialogue with Organisations (IAEA, UNSC 1540 Committee, OSCE) • Seminars

  25. NSG/India relations • Several discussions held in the Consultative Group • US has provided PGs with extensive information • Information meeting hosted by India in Vienna in October 2006 • No decision discussed or taken by the NSG

  26. Thank you for your attention

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