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A password authentication scheme with secure password updating

A password authentication scheme with secure password updating. SEC 期末報告 　　　　　 學號： 89321037 　　　　　 姓名：翁玉芬. Source. Chun-Li Lin and Tzonelih Hwang, Computers & Security, Vol.22, No.1, pp. 68-72, 2003. Outline. Introduction Peryravian-Zunic’s Scheme Hwang-Yen’s Scheme Proposed Scheme

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A password authentication scheme with secure password updating

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  1. A password authentication scheme with secure password updating SEC 期末報告 　　　　　 學號：89321037 　　　　　 姓名：翁玉芬

  2. Source • Chun-Li Lin and Tzonelih Hwang, Computers & Security, Vol.22, No.1, pp. 68-72, 2003

  3. Outline • Introduction • Peryravian-Zunic’s Scheme • Hwang-Yen’s Scheme • Proposed Scheme • Conclusions

  4. Introduction • Password scheme • Password authentication protocol • replay attack • password search attack • stolen-verifier attack • Password change protocol • denial of service attack • Key distribution • forward secrecy

  5. Introduction (cont.) • Notations • id: user number • pw: password • Ks: the server public key • {M}Ks : Encryption of M with Ks • rc: random number generated by client • rs: random number generated by server • H(.) : one-way hash function

  6. stolen-verifier attack . id , rc rs id , H( H( id, pw), rc, rs) Access granted or denied Peyarian-Zunic’s Scheme – password transmission Client Server

  7. id , rc rs id , H( H( id, pw), rc, rs), denial of service attack Access granted or denied Peyarian-Zunic’s Scheme – password change Client Server

  8. id , { rc, pw}Ks , H ( rs) id , H (rc, rs) Access granted or denied Hwang-Yen’s Scheme –password transmission Client Server

  9. No forward secrecy id , { rc, pw}Ks receive rc , H ( rs) receive rs id , H (rc, rs) Compute H (rc,rs) Compute H (rc,rs) Access granted or denied one-time token Hwang-Yen’s Scheme -Key distribution Client Server generate rc generate rs

  10. denial of service attack id , { rc, pw}Ks , H( rs) id , H(rc, rs), Access granted or denied Hwang-Yen’s Scheme -password change Client Server

  11. id , { rc, pw}Ks , H( rs) id , H(rc, rs), H( H( new_pw), rs) Access granted or denied Proposed Scheme –password change Client Server

  12. id , Receive receive id , Compute Compute Access granted or denied Proposed Scheme –key distribution Client Server generate x generate y

  13. Conclusions • The password change protocol can protest against denial of service attack • The key distribution protocol can propose forward secrecy

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