Security Cooperation Policy Update

1. UNCLASSIFIED Security Cooperation Policy Update Mr. Jonathan Ng Multinational Strategy and Plans Division 5 November 2013 FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

2. Why am I here? • To update you on policy efforts that… • better translate regional and functional strategies into effective security cooperation guidance, and • ensure that tools and resources are targeted toward DoD priorities. • Discuss key questions about security cooperation • What is security cooperation, and what is the Policy office's role? • What are some key elements of DoD strategy-to-resources processes? • How do I influence strategies and plans for security cooperation? • How can I ensure that the security cooperation investment is tailored and prioritized toward what DoD wants to achieve? • How can I get more information and seek assistance? FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

3. Security Cooperation (SC) • DoD activities that encourage and enable a partner to provide things or do things (or not) that help the USG achieve its strategic objectives • Conflict prevention/deterrence • Steps to mitigate crises before US forces are required • US or partner ability to respond in a contingency • The USD(P) disseminates SECDEF security cooperation goals and priorities and provides accountability (oversight) • What are we trying to achieve in the region or across the function? • What are the roles of the partner? • How should we be engaging the partner? • What’s really important? • Did we actually spend time/money/effort on our priorities? FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

4. UNCLASSIFIED What does SC look like in practice? • Defense/Military contacts • Exchanges • Strategic communication • Intelligence Cooperation/Information Sharing • Equipment Sales/Financing/Provision • Education &Training (incl. on-the-ground training, ministerial advising, and classroom instruction) • Facilities/Infrastructure Support • Humanitarian Assistance • Exercises FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

5. SC Strategy and Planning Importance • Security cooperation activities define the defense relationship and influence partner decisions • Partnerships will increasingly become more important in the current defense budget environment • Security cooperation resource investment is driven by country objectives (in a context) • Resources are shrinking, so it’s more important to target resources toward priority policy objectives • Absent clear country objectives, component actions may not support SECDEF intent, resources may or may not address priorities • Someone needs to mind the store FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

6. SC Highlights of the Strategic Guidance • “Provide a Stabilizing Presence” • “sustainable pace of presence operations…including bilateral and multilateral training exercises.” • “build the capacity and competence of US, allied, and partner forces…” • “…require creative and innovative solutions…” • “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches…” • “…with reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location and frequency of these operations.”

7. What Thoughtful Choices? • Ask the tough questions • What are we trying to accomplish? • Is the requirement defined? • Is it a priority? • How much is enough? • Will it work to achieve our objectives? • Are they partners or clients? • What are the risks? • Do the right things • Sweet spot: State, DoD, Partner • Specific & Measureable IMOs (or Phase 0 Shaping requirements) • Articulate the role we need partner to play • Political will and institutional capacity prerequisite to DOTMLPF • Regional over bilateral

8. SC Distributed Management System • Guidance comes from the top, e.g. GEF, DPG • Security cooperation values deliberately distributed by competency + authority + priority • Functional in some cases • Regionally in others • Span of control limited at top • Resources distributed per broader system • Services (most) • State (some) • Agencies (some more) • Execution distributed by competency + proximity • Services (most, mainly through Components) • COCOMs (many) • Agencies (several) FABRIC FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

9. Security Cooperation Cycle Partner Interaction FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

10. UNCLASSIFIED Security Cooperation Cycle: OSD/JS • Theater/Functional Plans • COCOMs communicate prioritized intermediate objectives and corresponding partner roles to resource providers and executors • Influence and validate country objectives • Partner buy-in • Interagency buy-in • 3rd party collaboration  • Ensure that country objectives are incorporated into bi-lateral and multilateral exchanges • Ensure that validated country objectives are followed in resource allocation forums • FMF/IMET roundtables • Service support plans conference output • Security Cooperation event planning conference output If you get the objectives right, a lieutenant can write the strategy. -- George C. Marshall FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

11. UNCLASSIFIED Security Cooperation Planning SC Activity UNCLASSIFIED DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

12. UNCLASSIFIED SC Ends: Desired Partner Roles For each country, DoD should have a coordinated set of prioritized objectives that articulate the desired partner roles •  Partner Political Action • Political Communication • Votes • Partner Access Provision • Territory • Resources • Information/Intelligence • Research & Development • Partner Capacity/Capabilities Application • Internal defense (may be tied to access provision) • Expeditionary • Coalitions • Consistent with norms of accountability, transparency, legitimacy Coming Guidance FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

13. UNCLASSIFIED SC Ends: Desired Partner Roles Desired Bandaria Roles • Support US in UN and regional Forum • Leadership publicly condemns violent extremism • Provides contingency access to secure port • Shares information on internal challenges • Deploys one peacekeeping battalion to UN mission • Secures sea lanes out to 300 miles • Does not employ force against innocent civilians Desired partner role: Actions or absence of action by an international partner that supports U.S. strategic goals and objectives. FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

14. UNCLASSIFIED SC Ends: Deriving Partner Roles • Conflict prevention/mitigation • Provide Human Security • Deter adversaries • Contingency • Act in lieu of US forces in a contingency • Work alongside US forces in a contingency • Enable US forces in a contingency • US force development • Provide access to training areas • Provide cultural/linguistic opportunities • Participate in exercises Ties the desired partner role to the global or regional strategy, intermediate military objectives, and contingency plans FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

15. UNCLASSIFIED SC Ends: Required Partner Condition Leadership Consensus Civil Society Consensus Legitimacy and Legal Leadership and Planning Information and Decisions Resource Management Human Resources Equipment and Logistics Integrating Mechanisms Doctrine Organizations Competencies Materiel/Equipment Logistics Human Capacity/Leadership Facilities/Infrastructure Integrating Mechanisms Will Institutional Capacity Operational Capability DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release FOUO

16. UNCLASSIFIED SC Ends: Required Partner Condition Desired Partner Role: Bandaria deploys a peacekeeping battalion Political leadership supports deployments Public supports deployments Constitution permits/corruption laws Gen Staff can plan a PKO Information to support ministerial decisions PPBE-like process will sustain capabilities Trained personnel do not disappear into system PKO can be sustained at a regional distance Foreign ministry linked into processes PKO doctrine exists PKO battalion designation Assigned personnel are proficient in line with METL PKO battalion has necessary equipment/can sustain PKO battalion is capable of communicating needs Leaders are well-trained, selected on merit PKO battalion has access to training facilities PKO battalion can communicate with coalition forces Leadership Consensus Civil Society Consensus Legitimacy and Legal Leadership and Planning Information and Decisions Resource Management Human Resources Equipment and Logistics Integrating Mechanisms Doctrine Organizations Competencies Materiel/Equipment Logistics Human Capacity/Leadership Facilities/Infrastructure Integrating Mechanisms FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

17. UNCLASSIFIED Setting meaningful objectives • Specific defined partner condition tied to clearly defined role • Measurable (observable progress) • Achievable (articulated assumptions about resources, will) • Relevant (to theater or functional IMOs or regional strategies) • Time-Bound (3-5 year horizon at most) Key collateral questions • Partner will? • Interagency buy-in? • Competing U.S. objectives? • Necessary sequencing? • Sustainment? An objective is something to be accomplished Objective (ends): The store has apples for sale by the opening of business on Friday. Things you do (ways): Bob drives a truck full of apples to the store. FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

18. UNCLASSIFIED Setting meaningful objectives FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

19. DoD Country Objectives

20. UNCLASSIFIED State-DoD SC Planning FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

21. Best Practice: Partner-based Approach • Type of government and source of legitimacy • How are decisions made? • Structure and roles of state security institutions • Interior? Border guards? Gendarmerie? Elite political units? • Ministry of Defense power and status • Existing or traditional military capabilities (or lack of) • Niche roles? • Traditional strengths? • Culture of maintenance? Deployment? • Economic and budgeting capacity? • Threats, external and/or internal government stability • Incentives for seeking security relationship with US • Counterpart personnel: source, experience, incentives • Effect on regional dynamics, other partners

22. Key System Interlocutors • OSD Policy Country Director • Embassy Security Cooperation Officer (SCO/SDO) • State Department Country Desk Officer • Geographic COCOM Country Desk Officer • Joint Staff Country Desk Officer • Service Country/Regional counterpart • DSCA Country Desk Officer …and in some cases • NSS IPC coordinator • Functional regional strategists • AT&L • USDI • State (PM, INL, ISN) • DTSA • DTRA • Service functionals • Congressional staffers FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

23. UNCLASSIFIED Security Cooperation Ways • Defense/Military contacts • Exchanges • Strategic communication • Intelligence Cooperation/Information Sharing • Equipment Sales/Financing/Provision • Education &Training (incl. on-the-ground training, ministerial advising, and classroom instruction) • Facilities/Infrastructure Support • Humanitarian Assistance • Exercises Activities that facilitate a relationship …but the relationship is not an end, just another way toward the desired partner role FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

24. UNCLASSIFIED Assistance for the Policy AO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release FOUO

25. UNCLASSIFIED Security Cooperation Means • Authorities • Title 22 authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act • Title 10 authorities • Inherent to DoD (e.g., meetings, discussions, exercises) • Special authorities (e.g,. 1206, 1208, CTFP, ASFF, Global Lift and Sustain, CCIF) • Funding • State appropriation • DoD appropriation • Capability • US Forces • Civilian forces • Programs Authority + Funding + Capability = Tool FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

26. UNCLASSIFIED Security Cooperation Cycle: OSD/JS • Validate the activities that occur in the country • Focused on DoD objectives • Sequenced • Sync’d with political objectives  • Identify unacceptable risk or overmatch • Tie required partner condition to desired partner role • Recognize opportunity costs • Review IPLs and Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CCMD assessments) • Risk Management • OSDand JS adjust risk, provide resource reallocation recommendations to resource providers, or provide guidance change recommendations to leaders • Activity Plans + Risk Assessment • COCOMs synchronize and deconflict activities with resource providers • COCOMs communicate to OSD/JS risk to intermediate objectives because partners will be unable to execute desired role FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

27. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

28. UNCLASSIFIED Security Cooperation Cycle: AME “Really? My question is: Did we agree on what impact we expected before climbing up here?” FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

29. SC Policy Focus Areas • Be more strategic about what we are trying to achieve (regional and functional strategies) • Improve policy demand signal • Focus attention on better articulating the “ends” • Improve SC dialogue • Identifying ends, gaps & significant risk • Managing resource & legislation expectations • Continue to advocate for shared responsibility and joint formulation with State Department • Pilot, experiment, manage expectations FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

30. SC Planning and Process Focus Areas • Enable SC strategists and planners to: • better translate regional and functional strategies into effective security cooperation guidance and • ensure policy priorities have tools and resources targeted • provide a more accurate activity demand signal to resource providers • Improve Technology Security/Foreign Disclosure Processes • Develop anticipatory policies • Streamline decision-making bureaucracy • Provide better customer service to partner nations • Further reduce FMS case timelines FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

31. Security Cooperation Initiatives • CCMD Security Cooperation Outreach • Identifies security cooperation gaps • Facilitates remedies • Team approach • Team Patchwork • “Helping security cooperation strategists, planners and executors navigate the patchwork of tools and authorities to develop and sustain partner capacity and access”  • Security Cooperation Authorities Working Group • Informal DoD-wide working group • Resource and prioritization challenges vs. authority gaps • Helps Policy build recommendations

32. Security Cooperation Initiatives (2) • Country planning frameworks and collaboration • Spring/Summer 2013 VTC-based workshops • Lessons learned from divergent CCMD approaches • Policy planner & strategist seminars • Army SC Planners Course • DISAM SC Planners Course • Policy SC Oversight Course • PME integration • Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) • Security Sector Assistance IPC • PPD-23, Interagency Planning Process • National SSA priorities

33. A New Kind of SC Planner Hero • Critically & skeptically assesses country, plan, activities • Keeps regional priority perspective • Targets strategic objectives before individual activities • Considers range of capability & activity options • Builds contiguous logic chains: role to equipment/activity • Finds sweet spot: OSD/JS, CCMD, Service, State, partner • Various institutional objectives • “Righteous events” vs. “random acts of security cooperation” • Manages expectations Strives to get the most bang for the buck, not just the most bucks

34. UNCLASSIFIED Questions? FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

35. OSD/JS Panel FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

36. Security Cooperation Cycle Partner Interaction FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

37. UNCLASSIFIED Service Perspectives “Another area there the Air Force can save some money is in the realm of cooperative engagements with other countries,” US Air Forces in Europe chief Gen. Mark A. Welsh III said. “We can take a hard look at” activities that fall under building partnership capacity, Welsh said. “We do an awful lot of work in that area. ...I think we do too much, so I think that's a place we can reduce." He said the Air Force engages in too many activities with emerging air forces and "not enough with near-peer" air arms. -- Managing a Drawdown...and a War, Air Force Magazine, November 11, 2011 FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

38. DoD/JS Panel: Expectations of Services • Assist in the development of Theater and Functional ends (IMOs, country objectives) • Army institutional objectives • Ensure that Army leaders communicate messages consistent with US goals (country objectives) • Assess partner capacity for LOEs where Army has functional expertise • Recommend areas where SC activity can make a difference FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

39. DoD/JS Panel: Expectations of Services • Enable CCMDs to develop SC plans for LOEs where Army has functional expertise • Activities tied to theater and country desired ends • Discontinue and reinvent Army SC activities • Monitor partner progress • Enter partner assessment and recommendations for future activity into G-TSCMIS • Provide feedback direct to embassy and CCMD desk officers • Evaluate the efficacy of Army activities • Identify Army SC capability gaps FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

40. UNCLASSIFIED Improve the Narrative: Requirements • Intermediate Military Objective • What is the goal I want to achieve in the region? • How will I know that I am achieving the goal? • Desired Role of Country • What do I want the country to do/not do in support of the IMO? • engage in a political act • provide access to territory, information, resources • apply capabilities/capacity • Required condition of a country to play the desired role • political will • institutional capacity • operational/tactical capabilities • If the country does not play the desired role, why does it create substantial risk? UNCLASSIFIED

41. UNCLASSIFIED Improve the Narrative: : Gaps • What activities must the USG conduct to encourage and enable partner to play desired role? • What activities* will encourage and enable the partner to reach the required condition? • What activities can be conducted by interagency and international partners? • What activities has the GCC requested other DoD components to conduct? • What activities will not be conducted? • Why will those activities not be conducted? • Capability (We don’t have the right tool in the toolbox.) • Authority (We can’t expend USG funds to conduct the activity.) • Resource (We can’t divert the tool from other commitments.) • Collaboration (We can’t get ambassador clearance, it’s a seam issue.) * Activities includes transfer of defense articles and services UNCLASSIFIED

42. UNCLASSIFIED Improve the Narrative: Solutions What actions do we take to address significant or unacceptable risk? • Capability • Tee up a new capability requirement to the Force Capability Board (FCB) • If necessary, develop an issue paper to fund the new capability • Authority • Verify that authority does not exist • Develop a legislative change proposal/socialize with State UNCLASSIFIED

43. UNCLASSIFIED Framing the Discussion: Solutions What actions do we take to address significant or unacceptable risk? • Resource • Work with appropriate component to realign resource allocation (out of court settlements) • If necessary, develop risk mitigation policy guidance for components • If necessary, develop issue paper (or tee up senior level interagency engagement) to fund risk mitigation plan • Collaboration • Tee up the issue at an IPC • Facilitate a phone call or email to State or other entity • Develop a multi-COCOM approach to a seam issue UNCLASSIFIED

44. Examples of linked objectives—national strategic level Courtesy Maria Kingsley, Center for Naval Analyses

45. Examples of linked objectives—theater strategic level Courtesy Maria Kingsley, Center for Naval Analyses

46. Examples of linked objectives—country operational level Courtesy Maria Kingsley, Center for Naval Analyses

47. Examples of linked objectives—country tactical level Courtesy Maria Kingsley, Center for Naval Analyses

48. Back-Up FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

49. UNCLASSIFIED Definitions • security cooperation. Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. (DODD 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Related to Security Cooperation.) • security force assistance. DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (DODI 5000.68 , Security Force Assistance) FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release

50. UNCLASSIFIED Definitions • security assistance. A group of programs authorized by Title 22 by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease. The Department of Defense does not administer all security assistance programs. Those security assistance programs that are administered by the Department are a subset of security cooperation. (DODD 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Related to Security Cooperation.) • building partnership capacity. Targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners. (QDR BPC Execution Roadmap, May 2006) FOUO DRAFT Deliberative – Not Subject to FOIA Release