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Finding a Needle in a Haystack: Pinpointing Significant BGP Routing Changes in an IP Network

Finding a Needle in a Haystack: Pinpointing Significant BGP Routing Changes in an IP Network. Jian Wu (University of Michigan) Z. Morley Mao (University of Michigan) Jennifer Rexford (Princeton University) Jia Wang (AT&T Labs Research) . Failure. Mitigation. Congestion. Disruption. BR.

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Finding a Needle in a Haystack: Pinpointing Significant BGP Routing Changes in an IP Network

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  1. Finding a Needle in a Haystack: Pinpointing Significant BGP Routing Changes in an IP Network Jian Wu (University of Michigan) Z. Morley Mao (University of Michigan) Jennifer Rexford (Princeton University) Jia Wang (AT&T Labs Research)

  2. Failure Mitigation Congestion Disruption BR BR BR BR C C C C Motivation destination AS4 AS2 AS3 B A C AS1 A backbone network is vulnerable to routing changes that occur in other domains. D source

  3. Goal • Identify important routing anomalies • Lost reachability • Persistent flapping • Large traffic shifts • Contributions: • Build a tool to identify a small number of important routing disruptions from a large volume of raw BGP updates in real time. • Use the tool to characterize routing disruptions in anoperational network

  4. BR BR BR BR BR BR BR BR C C C C C C C C Interdomain Routing:Border Gateway Protocol “I can reach 12.34.158.0/24 via AS 1” “I can reach 12.34.158.0/24” AS 2 AS 1 eBGP AS 3 eBGP iBGP data traffic 12.34.158.0/24 data traffic 12.34.158.5 • Prefix-based: one route per prefix • Path-vector: list of ASes in the path • Incremental: every update indicates a change • Policy-based: local ranking of routes

  5. BR BR BR BR BR BR BR BR BR BR BR BR C C C C C C C C C C C C Capturing Routing Changes A large operational network (8/16/2004 – 10/10-2004) eBGP Updates Updates eBGP iBGP Best routes Best routes iBGP BGP Monitor CPE iBGP eBGP

  6. Challenges • Large volume of BGP updates • Millions daily, very bursty • Too much for an operator to manage • Different from root-cause analysis • Identify changes and their effects • Focus on actionable events rather than diagnosis • Diagnose causes in/near the AS

  7. BGP Updates (106) Large Disruptions “Typed” Events Clusters (103) BR BR BR BR BR BR E E E E E E E E E E E E Events (105) (101) BGP Update Grouping Event Classification Event Correlation Traffic Impact Prediction Netflow Data Persistent Flapping Prefixes Frequent Flapping Prefixes (101) (101) System Architecture From millions of updates to a few dozen reports

  8. BR BR BR E E E E E E Grouping BGP Update into Events Challenge: A single routing change • leads to multiple update messages • affects routing decisions at multiple routers • Approach: • Group together all updates for a prefix with • inter-arrival < 70 seconds • Flag prefixes with changes lasting > 10 minutes. BGP Update Grouping BGP Updates Events Persistent Flapping Prefixes

  9. Grouping Thresholds • Based on our understanding of BGP and data analysis • Event timeout: 70 seconds • 2 * MRAI timer + 10 seconds • 98% inter-arrival time < 70 seconds • Convergence timeout: 10 minutes • BGP usually converges within a few minutes • 99.9% events < 10 minutes

  10. Persistent Flapping Prefixes • Types of persistent flapping • Conservative damping parameters (78.6%) • Protocol oscillations due to MED (18.3%) • Unstable interfaces or BGP sessions (3.0%) A surprising finding: 15.2% of updates were caused by persistent-flapping prefixes even though flap damping is enabled.

  11. C B A D E E E E Example: Unstable eBGP Session • Flap damping parameters is session-based • Damping not implemented for iBGP sessions Peer ISP p Customer

  12. Event Classification Challenge: Major concerns in network management • Changes in reachability • Heavy load of routing messages on the routers • Change of flow of the traffic through the network Event Classification “Typed” Events, e.g., Loss/Gain of Reachability Events Solution: classify events by severity of their impact

  13. C D A B E E E E E E Event Category – “No Disruption” p AS2 AS1 No Traffic Shift “No Disruption”: no border routers have any traffic shift. (50.3%) ISP

  14. C D A B E E E E E E Event Category – “Internal Disruption” p AS2 AS1 “Internal Disruption”: all traffic shifts are internal. (15.6%) ISP Internal Traffic Shift

  15. C D A B E E E E E E Event Category – “Single External Disruption” p AS2 AS1 external Traffic Shift “Single External Disruption”: only one of the traffic shifts is external (20.7%) ISP

  16. Statistics on Event Classification • First 3 categories have significant day-to-day variations • Updates per event depends on the type of events and the number of affected routers

  17. Event Correlation Challenge: A single routing change • affects multiple destination prefixes Event Correlation “Typed” Events Clusters Solution: group the same-type, close-occurring events

  18. EBGP Session Reset • Caused most of “single external disruption” events • Check if the number of prefixes using that session as the best route changes dramatically • Validation with Syslog router report (95%) Number of prefixes session recovery session failure time

  19. A B C E E E Hot-Potato Changes • Hot-Potato Changes • Caused “internal disruption” events • Validation with OSPF measurement (95%) [Teixeira et al – SIGMETRICS’ 04] P “Hot-potato routing” = route to closest egress point 11 9 10 ISP

  20. BR BR BR E E E E E E Traffic Impact Prediction Challenge: Routing changes have different impacts on the network which depends on the popularity of the destinations Traffic Impact Prediction Large Disruptions Clusters Netflow Data Solution: weigh each cluster by traffic volume

  21. Traffic Impact Prediction • Traffic weight • Per-prefix measurement from netflow • 10% prefixes accounts for 90% of traffic • Traffic weight of a cluster • the sum of “traffic weight” of the prefixes • A small number of large clusters have large traffic weight • Mostly session resets and hot-potato changes

  22. Performance Evaluation • Memory • Static memory: “current routes”, 600 MB • Dynamic memory: “clusters”, 300 MB • Speed • 99% of intervals of 1 second of updates can be process within 1 second • Occasional execution lag • Every interval of 70 seconds of updates can be processed within 70 seconds Measurements were based on 900MHz CPU

  23. Conclusion • BGP troubleshooting system • Fast, online fashion • Operators’ concerns (reachability, flapping, traffic) • Significant information reduction • millions of update  a few dozens of large disruptions • Uncovered important network behavior • Hot-Potato changes • Session resets • Persistent-flapping prefixes

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