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Physician Reminder System SNA Step 3

Physician Reminder System SNA Step 3. Earl Crane Hap Huynh Jeongwoo Ko Koichi Tominaga 11/14/2000. Overview. Attacker Profiling Vulnerabilities Existing Mediation Strategies Attack Scenarios which attackers will mount Attack Traces Compromiseable components Soft spots(*) Next Steps.

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Physician Reminder System SNA Step 3

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  1. Physician Reminder SystemSNA Step 3 Earl Crane Hap Huynh Jeongwoo Ko Koichi Tominaga 11/14/2000

  2. Overview • Attacker Profiling • Vulnerabilities • Existing Mediation Strategies • Attack Scenarios which attackers will mount • Attack Traces • Compromiseable components • Soft spots(*) • Next Steps

  3. Attacker Profiling

  4. Attacker Profiling • Most Likely Attacker • Insider: • High probability due to current policies and PRS configuration • Mode of attack will be within the Hospital network • Hacker: • Medium probability if attack is outside of the Hospital network because the network is closed • PRS will not be its primary target since it does not perform critical functions. • Competitor: • Low probability because repercussions will be more damaging than potential gain

  5. Vulnerabilities • Hospital network works under a trusted group model • PRS clinic policy allows for all users to view patient information • PRS system does not have real-time notification of unauthorized access by users • PRS system does not have an intelligent way of auditing user activity • Back-door installed from the inside network • Modem dial-in pool

  6. Existing Mediation Strategies • Tracking by “Audit trail” • Security policy education to the staffs • Password policy • Virus checks • Firewall implementation • In the process of eliminating modem pool

  7. Types of Attacks & Related Intrusion Usage Scenarios (IUS) • 1.Internal Network Access: • IUS(1) Unauthorized use of PRS • IUS(2) Spoofing/man-in-middle • 2. External Network Access: • IUS(3) Malicious code • IUS(4) Intrusion via modem pool

  8. Intrusion Usage Scenarios for Type 1: Internal Network Attack • IUS(1) Unauthorized use of PRS via access to confidential patient information • Who is the attacker • Insider (Disgruntled employee, former employee, or corporate spy) • What are at stake • View or modify private patient information • Disclosure of patient information to embarrass and harm the hospital • How does it happen • Abuse of legitimate access rights

  9. Tracing of IUS 1 PRS System Hospital Information System Modem pool PRS Client Firewall Email Server Email Browser Other Client Web Server PRS Client Program Affinity System (Registration) Eclypsis LAB Intruder’s Machine PRS Server Interface Engine Database

  10. Intrusion Usage Scenarios for Type 1: Internal Network Attack • IUS(2): Access to the PRS server/client via sniffing, man-in-middle, and spoof-the-server. • Who is the attacker • Insider (Curious employee, Disgruntled employee, former employee, or corporate spy) • What are at stake • Compromise the availability of the system • Denial of service • View or modify patient information • Disclosure of patient information to embarrass and harm the hospital • How does it happen • Illegitimately obtain passwords • Abuse of legitimate access rights

  11. Tracing of IUS 2 PRS System Hospital Information System Modem pool PRS Client Firewall Email Server Email Browser Other Client Web Server PRS Client Program Affinity System (Registration) Eclypsis LAB Intruder’s Machine X Intruder’s Machine PRS Server X Interface Engine Database

  12. Intrusion Usage Scenarios for Type 2: External Network Attack • IUS(3): Malicious Code • Who is the attacker • Hacker • Competitor • What are at stake • Data integrity, privacy, and availability. • Limit or deny access to the PRS • How does it happen • Client machines intentionally/unintentionally download malicious code from outside the network.

  13. Tracing of IUS 3 Public network PRS System Hospital Information System Modem pool PRS Client Firewall Email Server Email Browser Other Client Web Server PRS Client Program Affinity System (Registration) Eclypsis LAB PRS Server Interface Engine Database

  14. Intrusion Usage Scenarios for Type 2: External Network Attack • IUS(4): Intrusion via modem pool • Who is the attacker • Hacker • Competitor • What are at stake • Data integrity, privacy, and availability • How does it happen • Attacker locates modem pool to bypass hospital security system.

  15. Tracing of IUS 4 Public network PRS System Hospital Information System Modem pool PRS Client Firewall Email Server Email Browser Other Client Web Server PRS Client Program Affinity System (Registration) Eclypsis LAB PRS Server Interface Engine Database

  16. All Compromisable Components Public network PRS System Hospital Information System PRS Client Firewall Email Server Email Browser Other Client Web Server PRS Client Program Affinity System (Registration) Eclypsis LAB PRS Server Interface Engine Database

  17. Soft Spots Public network Soft Spots PRS System Hospital Information System PRS Client Firewall Email Server Email Browser Other Client Web Server PRS Client Program Affinity System (Registration) Eclypsis LAB PRS Server Interface Engine Database

  18. Next Step • Identification of Soft Spots (with WPH staffs) • Confirmation of existing strategies for resistance, recognition, and recovery • More detailed Analysis of intrusion scenarios • Presentation of Survivable map for the architecture, suggested policy changes, cost estimate, and recommended timeline for implementation

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