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Recent Threat Trends and a Look Ahead

Recent Threat Trends and a Look Ahead. Buck Watia iDefense Security Intelligence Operations. Presentation Agenda. Today’s Threat Environment Progression of Threat Motives & Impact A Look Back Current & Future Trends, Motivations Recent Malicious Activity Statistics Notable Malcode

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Recent Threat Trends and a Look Ahead

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  1. Recent Threat Trends and a Look Ahead Buck Watia iDefense Security Intelligence Operations Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  2. Presentation Agenda • Today’s Threat Environment • Progression of Threat Motives & Impact • A Look Back • Current & Future Trends, Motivations • Recent Malicious Activity • Statistics • Notable Malcode • Where Do We Go From Here? • Threats in Context Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  3. Today’s Threat Environment • Enterprise Environment is Increasingly Complex • Critical System Explosion • Asset Criticality isn’t Enough to Prioritize • Increase in Vulnerabilities • Constant Updates and Patches • Sophistication of Threats • Increasingly Advanced Malicious Code • Increase in Communication/Teamwork Among Hackers • Time to Exploitation Drastically Reduced • Stealth Attacks Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  4. Progression of Motives & Impact • 2003 Year of the Worm • Notoriety • Dawn of code for cash • MSFT Bounty program established • 2004 Worm War & Criminal Code • Bounty program curbs notoriety actors • Bounty program hardens criminal gain actors • Hundreds of variants, source code releases • 2005 Year of the Bot & Ad/Spyware • Criminalization and commoditization well developed • Target Attacks: Espionage and hacker for hire quickly escalating • 2006 Threat of the Unknown: Stealth for Survival • Increase in innovation, organization and sophistication • Targeted attacks to defeat specific authentication protection NASA.GOV Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  5. Creating Code for Cash Millions of Stolen Account Credentials Phishing& Pharming Stolen CD Keys - Fedex Account #! Millions of Stolen Credit Cards Money Mules Extortion Ad/Spyware Industrial Espionage Hackers for Hire Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  6. 2005: Vulnerability Activity Source: VeriSign iDefense Vulnerability Team • 2,954 unique vulnerability reports • 13,550 re-versioned reports • 598 new exploits Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  7. Exploitation Frameworks • Metasploit Framework • Open-source project created in mid-2003 by H.D. Moore • Created for pen-testing and research; a free alternative to others • Widely used by hacking community since it is free • CANVAS • Offered by Immunity Inc., started by Dave Aitel in 2002 • Aimed at promoting exploit development and providing a penetration testing platform • Core Impact • Core Impact was developed by CORE Security Technologies in 1996 • Dubbed as the first fully automated penetration testing product • Expensive product used mainly by corporations Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  8. 2005: Top Exploited Vulnerabilities Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  9. 2005: Malcode Activity Source: VeriSign iDefense Malcode Team Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  10. Notable Attacks and Vectors • MS05-039/Zotob • Google Adword Attack • DNS Poisoning • WMF File Format Vulnerability • Metafisher Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  11. MS05-039 - Zotob • Zero Day Exploit • MSFT Discloses Vulnerability – August 9th • Public exploits Released –August 11th • More exploits released including one by HOD – August 12th • Why is PNP/ZoTob Important • Speed of attack • Intel gathering and analysis is key • Actors are important and threat is critical Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  12. Innovation: Google Adwords Attack Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  13. Operations: Organized Criminal Groups • Earn thousands of dollars with a part time job at work – apply today! • Private Financial Receiver   • Money Transfer Agent • Country Representative • Shipping Manager • Financial Manager • Sales Manager • Sales Representative • Secondary Highly Paid Job • Client Manager Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  14. Sophistication: DNS Cache Poisoning • 2,000 or more DNS servers poisoned after hacked through AWStats/Other vectors • Over 17 families of code, upwards of 20 MB of files, and 45+ malicious files silently installed • Mostly adware, spyware, Trojans, and fraud identified as the primary focus of attacks • Long term success, not being easily identified or mitigated Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  15. .WMF File Format Vulnerability • Graphic File Format • No User Interaction Necessary • Originally Developed to Promote a “Pump and Dump” Stock • Originally Downplayed by MSFT • Came out with out of cycle patch 4 days before Patch Tuesday • Still being Exploited Today by Several Codes Including Metafisher Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  16. Metafisher – Sophisticated Phishing Attacks • A Highly Sophisticated Bot for Financial Fraud • The IceBerg threat • Under the radar for months • Encryption cracked • Web-based command-and-control server • Large numbers of Bots • professionally built • suite of tools • user-friendly administration interface • Professional software lifecycle management comparable to many professional software products Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  17. Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  18. Metafisher – Known Attack Structures to Date Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  19. Metafisher – PHP Configured Bots Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  20. Metafisher – Searchable Stolen Log Files Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  21. Metafisher – Form.txt – Keylogger and Phished Data Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  22. BrizTrojan Targets US Banks • Briz Trojan Family • Not new, family has been around for several months • Targets Argentina, Australia, France, Germany, Spain, and US • Banks in the US: Bank of America, wellsFargo • Sophisticated Attack • BHOs combine to make complex credential stealing unit • Downloads configuration files to inject HTML and JavaScript into pages to steal credentials that otherwise would not be requested • Screenshots taken on every initial page load and at each mouse click • Logged data is stored with time stamps to determine user usage profiles to trick anti fraud devices • Trojan injected verification questions after a successful login • Challenges banks customized authentication systems • US Banks were not previously a threat to sophisticated financial attacks • Increasing Trend • Intelligence, Sophistication, Custom code injection • Similar path as MetaPhisher • Used in combination with money mule operations to move money to off shore accounts Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  23. Initial Compromise Home User Browser Helper Object Spammed links via fake windows update sites/porn • Trojan can take on multiple layer authentication systems • i.e. Site Key- BOA • Steals all forms • Injects custom code for targeted attacks against specific banks Installs BHO in IE Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  24. Command and Control Servers Initial Compromise Home User Biz Trojan Downloads Javascript to inject SSL verified pages Installs BHO Screen Shots Taken, Data Logged and saved US Banking Servers Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  25. SNATCH: Russian Advanced Banking Malcode • Sophisticated malicious code targeting financial services • Created by Russian SE-Code’s #Rock group • Sophisticated threat similar to Metaphisher and Briz Trojans Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  26. SNATCH: Russian Advanced Banking Malcode • Targets European and American transactions • Grabs: • SSL Forms and Logs • E-gold, ebay, paypal, Casino accounts, bank accounts • TANs • ITANS • Search Engine • Spoofs queries to redirect users to sites of its choice • Currently being sold for profit as a sophisticated tool for financial gain, here is the pricing • Enhanced Builder Version for $600. • AV Updates for $50 to get around all new anti-virus engine builds to extend the life of the product Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  27. Threat Context is King: MS05-039 & MS05-051 MS05-051 (MSDTC and COM+) • No Underground Activity or Chatter • Privately Traded Exploit Code • Not in the hands of known actors. Not in the wild. • No Functional Malicious Code in the Wild • Deploy MS05-051 at normal speed (ID# 425064). • Do Not Go into Emergency Patch Procedures MS05-039 (UPnP) • Unprecedented Underground Activity and Chatter • Public exploit code in 2 days • Rooters and bots within 5 days • Leading bot author, Diabl0, releases first bot on day 5, ZoTob.A. • Workarounds and Emergency Patch Procedures Implemented Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  28. Threats in Context • Vulnerabilities • Is this a real threat to my critical systems? • Example: What exactly is vulnerable to MS06-001 WMF exploitation? • Malicious Code & Exploit Code • Is there malicious code or exploit code in the wild? • Is it public or private? • Is it limited to a specific operating system or application? • Is it highly functional or only work part of the time? • Threat Environment • Where did the malicious code come from? • What actors or groups are responsible? • Is there underground chatter? • Is the exploit code being traded or sold? Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  29. iDefense Background • The Leading Security Intelligence Research Team • iDefense provides pro-active notification of impending threats, including vulnerabilities and malicious code • Industry-Leading Services Offerings • Intelligence is all the iDefense team does • Completely vendor-agnostic • Marquee Customer and Partner Base • Government, financial services, insurance, healthcare, retail • Security software and services • 5 Experienced Intelligence Teams • VAT, Labs, Malcode, RRT, Threat • Actively Gathering Cyber Intelligence Since 1998 Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

  30. Thank you If you have any questions regarding this presentation please contact Buck Watia at bwatia@verisign.com Contains VeriSign Confidential and Proprietary Information

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