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A Delegation-Based Authentication Protocol for Portable Communication Systems

This paper proposes a novel delegation-based authentication protocol designed for Portable Communication Systems (PCSs). It addresses key challenges in wireless communication including secrecy, authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation, leveraging efficient key management and user identity privacy. The protocol contrasts with traditional GSM systems, highlighting their limitations regarding identity privacy and non-repudiation. Through an innovative approach, the protocol facilitates both online and offline authentication processes, ensuring secure communication between Mobile Stations (MS) and Home Location Registries (HLR).

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A Delegation-Based Authentication Protocol for Portable Communication Systems

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  1. Meeting Reports 95/12/13 H.H. Ou A new delegation-based authentication protocol for use in portable communication systems IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, Volume 4, Issue 1, Jan. 2005 Page(s):57 – 64 Wei-Bin Lee; Chang-Kuo Yeh

  2. Paper Goals • Portable Communication Systems (PCSs) • Wireless • Secrecy, Authenticity, Integrity, Nonrepudiation • RSA have above characteristics but.. • Complicated • Periodical changing Public-Key • Author’s Methods • User identity privacy • Nonrepudiation • Mutual authentication • Efficient key management Meeting Reports by H.H. Ou

  3. Main Concepts (1/2) • GSM • Original GSM • Advantages • Secret-key system • Long-term secret key • Drawbacks • No nonrepudiation • Identity privacy can not keep • No security protection between VLR and HLR • MS can not authenticate VLR • Public-Key system GSM Protocols • Advantages • Nonrepudiation • Mutual authentication • Drawbacks • Complex computation • MS must retrieve CRL • Public-key of MS should be updated periodically • Real identity of MS is revealed because the public key is necessary for verification Meeting Reports by H.H. Ou

  4. Main Concepts (2/2) • Delegation • Proxy signature Meeting Reports by H.H. Ou

  5. Author’s Protocol (On-line authentication process) x: private key of HLR v: public key of HLR k: random by HLR K: gk mod p, pseudonym of MS σ: x+kK, secret key shared by MS, HLR t, n1, n2, m1: random number C1: session key used by VLR, MS l: prepared for VLR to verify MS for offline ? VLR verify MS generate session key MS verify VLR Prevent replay Meeting Reports by H.H. Ou

  6. Author’s Protocol (Off-line authentication process) Meeting Reports by H.H. Ou

  7. Comments MS TS MS Home TS Home n2, IDTS Calculate rM, sM rM, sM, K, n1, IDMH check sM Calculate rT, sT n4 n1, n2, n3, K, IDTS, TDTH, rT, sT check sT Calculate C1, l [n3, n4, n5, IDTS, C1, l]KMTH, n5, IDMH Check n5 (TS, MS Home) Check n5 (TS Home) [[n3, C1, l]β, n5]KMTH [n3, C1, l]β, [n1, m1]σ check n3 Store l [n1, m1]σ Check n1 Calculate C1 Meeting Reports by H.H. Ou

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