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CSE 566 Wireless Network Security

CSE 566 Wireless Network Security. Vehicular networks security Presented by Rohan Vijayvargiya Malay harendra varaiya Yogesh Birajdar. Introduction of Important Terms. VANET : Vehicular adhoc networks RSU : Road Side Units IVC : Inter vehicle communications

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CSE 566 Wireless Network Security

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  1. CSE 566Wireless Network Security Vehicular networks security Presented by RohanVijayvargiya Malay harendravaraiya YogeshBirajdar

  2. Introduction of Important Terms VANET : Vehicular adhoc networks RSU : Road Side Units IVC : Inter vehicle communications RVC : RSU to vehicle communications Application categories : Infotainment, safety related Main focus : Safety related applications Threats Vulnerabilities

  3. Previous solutions : Pseudonym based solutions Secret public-private key pairs given by the authority Migrating from old to new pseudonym Have a random silent period between pseudonym changes Privacy Protection hindered due to periodicity Using group and group manager : N.A. here because each node has to broadcast safety messages periodically Use mix-zones Changing pseudonyms by a group of nodes at the same time This increases anonymity level. Lot of public private key pairs generated, not efficient, requires large database in authority to store credentials of all nodes. In all of the techniques, certificate revocation is a major problem

  4. Previous solutions : Using group Signatures Making groups and having a group manager Although members can validate sender, Only group manager knows the sender’s identity. Certificate Revocation done by group manager Pseudonyms + Group Signatures : less overhead on authority as group manager does the job of signing pseudonyms Vehicles create their own pseudonym : Communication overhead Brings disadvantages of pseudonyms in picture Another solution : Pseudonym without RSU (performance issues) HMAC approach : One way hash, RSU compulsory now Message delay : because of RSA mediating interactions Our solution : Using PKI at the core.

  5. Security Requirements Message authentication and integrity Message non repudiation Entity authentication Privacy protection

  6. System overview Uses PKI structure A: Authorities- • CA used for managing • Local and root CA B : Identification Unique ID, Private-Public key pair, Time C: Tamper proof device • Vehicles have sensor and OBU(on board unit) • Hardware security modules

  7. Certificate management • Local CA issues certificate • Maintains CRL • Two sets of public-private key 1.Anonymity set 2. Emergency set • Both the set valid for specific period • Mobility in Vanets

  8. Creating safety messages 1) HSM receives safety message m generated by OBU 2) Generates m’=m||t 3) HSM calculates SigN=Sign(m’, PrvN) 4) HSM encrypts SigN using the local CA’s public key. EP=Enc(SigN, PubCA) 5) HSM generates packet M =m’||EP 6) HSM produces signature SigA, over M, using the active private key PrvAi of the anonymity key set SigA=Sign(M, PrvAi) 7) HSM passes over M and SigA communication device to broadcast the safety message

  9. vehicle receives a safety message 1) Safety message is passed to HSM 2) HSM validates the signature SigA using the active public key PubAi of the anonymity key set Verify(SigA, PubAi) 3) If the signature is valid, HSM extracts m’ from M. If validation fails the message is discarded. 4) HSM obtains the timestamp t and checks for its validity 5) HSM passes m to the on board unit for processing.

  10. Actions by CA for misbehaving node 1) Local CA obtains the safety message (M||SigA) generated by the suspicious node. 2) Local CA extracts the EP from M. 3) Local CA calculates the SigN from EP by decrypting it. 4) From SigN, obtains nodes certificate and ID 5) Local CA validates the signature SigN using the node’s public key PubN. Verify(SigN, PubN) 6) If the signature is valid, local CA successfully identifies the node reported as misbehaving.

  11. Certificate revocation Local CA generates message for misbehaving node E_Message = Private-key(Public key-user(ID+T)) If self id deletes all the key pairs and become non functional If not then delete the given user from its list and uses emergency key set Next pair to be fast generated

  12. Evaluation and Conclusion Message authentication and integrity Message non repudiaiton Entity authentication Privacy protection Modeled in spi-calculus Verified with an automatic cryptographic protocol

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