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Hoppo Ryodo /Kuril/Northern Territories

Hoppo Ryodo /Kuril/Northern Territories. Kurile/ Hoppo Ryodo : A Background. Sehingga Februari 2012: Lebih kurang 30,000 penduduk tinggal di Southern Kurile. Terdiri daripada : -Ukrainians - Belorussians -Tartars -Koreans - Nivkhs

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Hoppo Ryodo /Kuril/Northern Territories

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  1. HoppoRyodo/Kuril/Northern Territories

  2. Kurile/HoppoRyodo: A Background SehinggaFebruari 2012: Lebihkurang 30,000 penduduktinggaldi SouthernKurile. Terdiridaripada: -Ukrainians -Belorussians -Tartars -Koreans -Nivkhs an indigenous people inhabiting the region of the Amur River. - Oroch a small group of Russia that speak the Oroch (Orochon) dialect of the Southern group of Tungusic languages - Ainu

  3. Primary Occupation • Fishing. • Other extractive industries as significant deposits sulfur, pyrite and other metallic ores are found.

  4. Disputed Islands • The disputed islands are: • Kunashiri Island (国後島) • Etorofu Island (択捉島) • Habomai Islands (歯舞群島) • Shikotan Island (色丹島)

  5. Treaties Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation (Treaty of Shimoda, 1855). Established official diplomatic relations.

  6. 2. Treaty of St. Petersburg, 1875 • Extending Russian control over Sakhalin.

  7. Perjanjian Damai Portsmouth 1905 • Bahagian Selatan Sakhalin bermula daripada 50˚U dipersetujui diserahkan oleh Rusia kepada Jepun. Perjanjian juga memutuskan bahawa mana-mana perjanjian terdahulu mengenai persempadanan Kurile dan Sakhalin adalah terbatal selepas Perjanjian Damai Portsmouth ditandatangani.

  8. Perjanjian Yalta 1945 • Persidangan rahsia di antara Amerika Syarikat, Britain dan Rusia telah diadakan yang berakhir dengan termetrinya Perjanjian Yalta pada 11 Februari 1945. “The Kurile islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union in an exchange for the Soviet Union's declaration of war on Japan three months after Germany's surrender”

  9. Stalin agreed to enter the fight against the Empire of Japan within 90 days after the defeat of Germany. The Soviet Union would receive the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kurile islands after the defeat of Japan.

  10. Declaration of War by USSR • August 8, 1945 USSR declared war on Japan • August 18, 1945 Soviet force of 8,300 attacked the northernmost Kurile islands (Shumushu Island) located about 8 miles from Kamchatka. • Shumushu was the home of a major Japanese naval base.

  11. Japanese Forces Surrended • August 21, 1945 Japanese forces surrendered on the island, leaving the way open for a Soviet island-hopping advance down the archipelago. • Stalin ordered the immediate deportation of the 17,300 Ainus of the Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai and Shikotan to Hokkaido • Transmigration, replaced with Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian settlers.

  12. 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty • Japan gave up “all rights, titles and claims to the Kurile Islands and part of Sakhalin dan kepulauan berdekatan. • Jepun menyerahkan semua hak ke atas Kepulauan Kurile dan sebahagian daripada bahagian Selatan Sakhalin sepertimana yang termaktub dalam Perjanjian Portsmouth pada 5 September 1905. Walau bagaimanapun, Perjanjian Damai San Francisco tidak menjelaskan secara spesifik takrifan dan kepada negara mana Kurile diserahkan

  13. Weaknesses of the Peace Treaty • The 1951 Treaty does not clarify which specific islands are considered as part of Kurile island chain. Therefore, this allowed Japan to claim subsequently that Etorofu and Kunashiri were not to be considered as part of the 1951 renunciation of claim.

  14. Japanese Jurisdiction • Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai and Shikotan had been under Japanese jurisdiction since 1855, the year Japan and Rusia first divided the island chain.

  15. Deklarasi Jepun-Soviet Union 1956 • Perjanjian Damai perlu ditandatangani sebagai asas menyerahkan Shikotan dan Habomai tetapi Soviet Union tidak akan mengembalikan Etorofu dan Kunashiri.

  16. Post Communism Era • Gorbachev Era. Realized that economic reform at home could not be pursued successfully without an end to the global arms race. And also a reduction in tensions between East and West. - Glassnost and perestroika

  17. Glassnost and Perestrioka • Gorbached sought to gain support of the Western bloc including Japan. • Became the first Soviet leader to visit Japan in 1991 after the war. • Introduced people-to-people diplomacy by authorizing visa-free travel between Hokkaido and Southern Kurile archipelago.

  18. Yeltsin Era • Faced dysfunctional economy. • Japanese continued to link economic assistance to progress on the territorial issue. • Met Hosokawa in October 1993 and initiated the Tokyo Declaration, a landmark document of sorts that gave greater laverage to Japan regarding Hoppo Ryodo.

  19. Tokyo Declaration 1993 • The two Gs pledge to undertake serious negotiations on the issue where Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai and Shikotan islands belong. • Official from both countries met between 1993-1999 at various levels. • Year 2000, failed to sign the Peace Treaty because Japanese final proposal to renounce sovereignty over the islands.

  20. The Putin Administration • Viewed the 1956 Joint Declaration as the key to resolving the dispute. • Meeting held between Putin and Mori in Irkutsk in 2001 and accepted 1956 Joint Declaration as the ‘basic legal document’ that would function as foundation for the peace treaty negotiations.

  21. Koizumi Administration • Reform-oriented leader signaling intention to improve relations with Russia. • Improving the prospects for fossil fuel deliveries from Russia to Japan. • Putin announced 2003 as the ‘Year of Japan’ in Russia- numerous exhibits and activities.

  22. Sour Relations • Putin refused to move forward the negotiation and Koizumi came up with a planned ‘inspection’ of the Hoppo Ryodo in 2004. • Russia warned the “inspection’ or expedition would harm bilateral relations. • Koizumi viewed the islands from the coastguard. Kunashiri lies just 15 nm from Hokkaido

  23. Tokyo-Moscow Relations • Relations soured further over Putin’s remarks to follow the 1956 Joint Declaration and rejects the 1993 Tokyo Declaration. • Putin postponed his planned state visit to Japan in 2005. • Japanese diet endorsed a resolution that expanded territorial claims against Moscow.

  24. Sour Relations • Nakayama Nariaki, Minister of Education publicly demanded that textbooks use the word ‘occupied’ when referring to the Russian’s acquisition of control over the HoppoRyodo. • Defense Minister of Russia Sergei Ivanov proposed improvements in military and civilian infrastructure in Kurile. • Capture of a Japanese crab fishing vessel with 3 crewmen and shooting death of another.

  25. Russian Capture of a Japanese Crab Fishermen • Two crewmembers were released from Russian authorities by end of August. • The Captain, Sakashita Noboru was held until October 3, 2006 when he admitted guilty and paid US$18,000 fine for illegal entry into Russia’s territorial waters. • Russian Petrol Guards killed Japanese fisherman.

  26. Abe’s New Deal • Prime Minister of Japan on September 26, 2006. • Ready to modify its claim on Hoppo Ryodo. • Taro Aso, MOFA suggests to divide the Southern Kurile based upon the Russia-Chinese Model, Habomai, Shikotan and Kunashiri 100% and Etorofu 25%.

  27. Shinzo Abe • Yasuo Fukuda • Taro Aso • Yukio Hatoyama • Naoto Kan • Yoshihiko Noda

  28. Russia-Chinese Model • In 2005, Russia and China resolved their remaining territorial differences by calculating the square mileage of 3 disputed islands and dividing equally. • Bolshoi Island on the Argun River • Ussuriiskii Island • Tarabarov Island (Heixazidao)

  29. Critics to Russia-Chinese Model • 1. Islands in the Southern Kurils are of much higher economic and even strategic value than islands in the Amur or Argun rivers. This is particularly significant from the “pragmatic” point of view.

  30. Second Reason • 2. China’s current good and friendly relations with Moscow on one side, and its practically tense, mutually suspicious relations with Tokyo on the other, helped Russia to rid itself of fundamental concern about a “China plus Japan against Russia” syndrome which haunted the minds of the political elite from the 1970s.

  31. Third Reason • 3. The growing might of China is a real potential menace to Russia. Putin well understood that the earlier the better he resolved territorial issues with China. Except in military strength, the balance of economic power (GDP) between Russia and China is 1 to 5, and China’s supremacy over Russia will surely grow in the future. If the frontier issue were not resolved now it would require more concessions later, and become a cause for future diplomatic and economic pressure.

  32. Fourth Reason • 4. Having trouble with Europe and the U.S.A. over questions of democratization and natural resources, and striving to replace Western domination with a multipolar world and multiple models acceptable as “democratic”, Russia is approaching China as a “natural ally”. Japan, however, has firmly located itself on the opposite side with countries “abiding by democratic values” vis-à-vis Russia and China.

  33. Fifth Reason • The high prices of oil and natural gas have helped Russia to become more self-confident and nationalistic. Its patterns of behavior in the case of gas exports and the territorial dispute are surprisingly similar. “We have gas (territory), you need it, and so it is up to you to get it. But you must pay (make concessions) for that”. This is an expression of the philosophy of “national interest’s supremacy over other values”.

  34. Sixth Reason • 6. The economic factor, that used to be influential in pushing Russians for a compromise. Russia now has huge currency reserves, a vast consumer market, and enormous natural resources, attractive to Japanese companies. The recent dramatic developments in the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas projects indicate this drastic change.

  35. Japan New Formula • It was this method that Aso was proposing, declaring that if Japan continues to debate over the two islands or three islands or four islands without taking into consideration their actual size, these discussions will never get anywhere. • Noda’s stands? • MOFA • Head of governments

  36. Prospects for Resolution • Very small window of opportunity between the two. • If struck, such compromise could lead to further agreements especially in: • Economic • Energy • security

  37. Bilateral Trade Relations • Volume of trade between Tokyo and Moscow increased from US$6.4b in 2003 to over US$10b in 2005. In 2010 was USD24.1b. • Japanese business interests making major investments in Russia’s economy. • Cooperation in energy, Mitsui and Mitsubishi

  38. Japan Strategic Goal • Access to long-term supplies of energy resources from Russia in view of the mounting instability in the Middle East. • Japan imports 5.5 million barrels of oil/day with 4.2 barrels/day from Persian Gulf region. • In 2003, Japan’s dependence upon Persian Gulf increased from 57% to 78%. • In 2011, more than 75 percent of crude oil exports from the Gulf went to Asian markets, not to the West.

  39. Japan-Russia Strategic Goal • Japan allocates US$10 billion to construct 4,200 km Russian pipeline from Taishet near Lake Baikal to Nakhodka. • However, Russia appears to have left undecided the pipeline’s destination either to Daqing or Nakhodka. • Is a tactic to squeeze the best deal either Beijing or Tokyo.

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