1 / 18

International Safeguards and the Role of SSACs and RSACs

International Safeguards and the Role of SSACs and RSACs. Tom Ellacott Director-International Safeguards Division Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 11 November 2011 Seminar – 20 Years of ABACC. Introduction. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission is Canada’s Safeguards Regulatory Authority

jaimin
Télécharger la présentation

International Safeguards and the Role of SSACs and RSACs

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. International Safeguards and the Role of SSACs and RSACs Tom Ellacott Director-International Safeguards Division Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 11 November 2011 Seminar – 20 Years of ABACC

  2. Introduction • Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission is Canada’s Safeguards Regulatory Authority • Evolution of Safeguards in Canada • 1969 Non-Proliferation Treaty • 1972 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement • 2000 Additional Protocol • Sep 2005 Broad Safeguards Conclusion • Dec 2005State-Level IS Approach for Canada • Jan 2010 SLA established for entire State

  3. Canadian Fuel Cycle U3O8 UO3 UO2 Uranium Mining and Milling Uranium Fuel Fabrication Uranium Refining Uranium Conversion Fresh Fuel SpentFuel Spent Fuel Research and Development Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs) and Research Reactors Power Reactors

  4. State-Level Concept • Change in perspective • IAEA’s Evaluation Process • Optimization

  5. Features of the State-Level Approach Main Considerations for Canada • Presence of an IAEA regional office • Natural uranium fuel cycle • Absence of enrichment or reprocessing Elements • Division of the fuel cycle into Sectors • Secure electronic communication system • Randomization of inspections • Cooperative arrangements with the IAEA

  6. Sector-Based Approach Sector 1 • Conversion and fuel fabrication facilities • On-load reactors and associated dry storage facilities Sector 2 • Chalk River Laboratories Sector 3 • Research reactors and critical assemblies • Static spent fuel dry storage facilities • Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs) Sector 4 • Mines, mills and decommissioned facilities

  7. Enhanced Cooperation by SSAC-1: Development of IAEA Procedures Collaborative approach • IAEA IS procedures developed through a consultative process involving IAEA, CNSC and facility operators • Total of 10 procedures developed to cover all locations in Canada • Ownership of documents with IAEA but used as the basis of IS implementation by CNSC and operators

  8. Enhanced Cooperation by SSAC-2: Provision of Information Secure communication system • Secure channel for provision of information electronically • Provides near-real time overview of the flows of nuclear material • Content and frequency of submissions specified in agreed procedures • Digital signature provides sender authentication and non-repudiation

  9. Enhanced Cooperation by SSAC-3:Inspector Access Short-Notice Random and Unannounced Inspections • For the detection and deterrence of nuclear material diversion and facility misuse • Detection of borrowing Physical Inventory Verification • Randomized selection • Short notification • Non-simultaneous inventory takings

  10. Enhanced Cooperation with SSAC-4:Expansion of Support Activities Physical Inventory Taking Evaluation • Assessment to determine if a facility not selected for a physical inventory verification was properly prepared Information flow • Supervision and administration of near-real time accountancy and operational information through the mailbox

  11. Implementation of the SLA-1 • Considerations • Sector-by-sector approach • Determination of priorities • Established order: • Spent fuel transfers at CANDU stations • Research reactors and LOFs • CANDU stations and bulk handling facilities • Chalk River Laboratories

  12. Implementation of the SLA-2 Agreed work plan • Draft procedures agreed to by the CNSC and the IAEA • Bilateral meetings between the CNSC and the facilities • Trilateral meetings among the CNSC, the facilities and the IAEA • Field trials (as required) • Operational experience and revision

  13. Timeline of SLA Implementation

  14. PDIs in Canada

  15. Lessons Learned / Good Practices • Importance of trilateral collaboration • Recognition of evolutionary approach • Need for synchronization • Need for information management

  16. Future Refinement • Conceptual • DDG’s vision for information-driven and objectives-based safeguards • Working group on a revised SLA for Canada • Procedural/Technical • Quantity and type of information provided • Spent Fuel transfers at multi-unit stations • Material flows at Chalk River Laboratories

  17. Conclusion • Achieve the goal of a unified State level approach • Achieve further efficiencies in the application of safeguards

  18. Questions/discussions

More Related