Authentic Publication The TRUTHSAYER Project

1. Authentic PublicationThe TRUTHSAYER Project Chip Martel Premkumar Devanbu Michael Gertz April Kwong Glen Nuckolls Stuart Stubblebine Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis http://truthsayer.cs.ucdavis.edu

2. Databases Play a Vital Role • Commerce: credit card data, find goods • Financial: Investment sites • Health: treatments, doctors/credentials, drugs • Many more

3. Server Integrity? Correct Query processing?Performance? Reliability? Data Query Database User Answers Answering queries

4. Goals • Correct and complete answers (with assurance) • Efficient Protocols

5. Example Queries • Is Credit card number 5543… Valid? • List all Hong Kong to San Francisco flights. • Find Digital cameras with 3-5 Mega-pixels, and cost < $200 • List all bars within one mile of HKU

6. What is a Correct Answer? • We assume a trusted Data Owner with the official copy of the Database: Defines the “correct answer”

7. What is a Correct Answer? • We assume a trusted Data Owner with the official copy of the Database: Defines the “correct answer” • Problems with a single Data Owner: 1) May not want/be able to answer queries 2) Hard to keep online DB secure 3) Scalability

8. Solution: Third-Party Servers • Third party sites (Publishers) get information from the Data Owner and answer queries • Example: Travel sites (Expedia, Travelocity, Orbitz) answer using government airline Data (FAA)

9. Server Replication Can ITrustThis Server? Travelocity FAA Expedia Data Orbitz

10. Trust Issues • Sites have left out cheaper flights from non-preferred airlines (deliberate) • Sites may be corrupted: outside hacker or insider • Errors

11. Data + Digest of Data Query Authentic Publication: The TRUTHSAYER project. Initially: for RDB (DBSEC 2000, Jnl. Comp. Sec.)General Model for a Variety of Data (Algorithmica, 2004) Owner Publisher Answer +Verification Object

12. Talk Outline • Introduction • Background--- Merkle Trees • Range Queries (Multi-attribute Queries) • A General Model for Authenticated Data Structures • Conclusion

13. Authentic Publication • A trusted Owner digests the Data Set, and signs it. • Untrusted Publishers receive the data & signature. • Clients submit queries to untrusted Publishers. • Publishers return Answers (A), and Verification Objects (A+ VO) • Clients use A + VO to Prove the answer is correct/complete. Protocol is correct, and secure.

14. Verifying answers Protocol provides: • Correctness:Returns exact elements matching the query. • Completeness:Returns allelements matching query. • Security: Cheating is infeasible. • Efficiency:Overhead is low. Recall: No signatures!!

15. h(d1) Merkle hashing a data set. • Leaves: data in some lexical order. • One way hash function h; h1=h(d1) • Bottom-up hashing, starting with data • Root hash value = the digest of the data set.

16. Merkle Trees • Classic use: prove that data value d is in the data set • Solves: Is Credit card number 5543… Valid? • But also can verify all items in a range: e.g. camcorders from $400 to $900

17. 1 3 5 15 6 8 10 11 q Verifying a Range To Show that q =(5,6,8) is the Answer to 4<d <10: Used Lower Bound 3, Upper Bound 10 and starred hashvalues to compute/verify root hash.

18. 1 3 5 15 6 8 10 11 q Verifying a Range Query: 4<d <10: Answer: 5,6,8 (in practice, key + data) Verification Object: [( (h(1),3), (5,6) )( (8,10), *) ]

19. Authentic Publication Hash Digest Merkle Tree

20. Security Property • If the Answer and VO are correct, user accepts

21. Security Property • User accepts an Invalid answer only if a specific collision in h is found (provable): h(x,y)= z in a correct VO (x,y, z are the hash values of tree nodes), VO uses different x’, y’ with h(x’,y’)=z

22. Good Features • Proofs are short (size proportional to tree height and answer size). • Use hashes, a fast cryptographic operation • Proofs as easy to compute as finding the answer • No secret keys: hash function and digests all are public (no insider attack once data set is digested).

23. Extensions • Want to handle more complex queries • Find Digital cameras with 3-5 Mega pixels, and cost < $200 • List all bars within one mile of HKU

24. Multi-Attribute Queries • Model as a 2-D Range query • Find points (x,y) with a < x < b • c < y < d (b,d) (a,d) Pixels (a,c) (b,c) Cost

25. Leaves are 2D points, or 2 attributes (cost, pixels). Sorted by x-value in X-tree A Y-tree for each internal node 2-Dimensional range tree

26. Searching a 2D-range Tree • Find (x,y) with 4 < x <50 AND 4 < y < 10 • All in Associated Y-trees Match x-range

27. Searching a 2D-range Tree • Find pairs (x,y) with 4 < x <50 AND 4 < y < 10 • In X-tree: subtrees rooted at 5 and 13 • Search in Associated Y-trees

28. Searching a 2D-range Tree • Find (x,y) with 4 < x <50 AND 4 < y < 10 • Answer: (12,5) and (23,8) AND values in 5’s Y-tree

29. Digesting a 2D-range Tree • Digest each Y-tree as Merkle tree • Each internal node in the X-tree gets the hash of three values: two children and associated Y-tree value

30. Range Trees • Let k be the number of answers (out of n) • Search: O(k+ log2n) time, nlogn space • improve to O(k+ logn) time with extra pointers (can still get a hash digest) • VO (proof) size also O(k+logn) • Extend to d-dimensions (d-attribute query). Search time: O(k+log(d-1) n), VO size: same.

31. Authenticated Data Structures • Problem: May want to use a variety of efficient data-structures: • B-trees (reduce disk access) • Suffix arrays (string queries) • Geometric data structures (items within one mile) • Many more

32. Authenticated Data Structures • Solution: General method to digest a data structure (produce a single summary hash value). • Efficient: Proof size and construction time = search time. • Secure: Similar security property: break only with a specific collision in h

33. Search DAGS • Our general setting is any data structure modeled by: • A labeled Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) • A search process that visits DAG nodes and determines which neighboring nodes to visit next (based on labels of visited nodes) This Models a wide range of structures

34. A Search DAG • Search starts at the unique source node s of in-degree zero • Digesting starts from the sinks (here u, v ): hash the associated values s b c a v u

35. A Search DAG • D(u): Digest of u • Node u data : du • D(u)= h(du) • D(v)= h(dv) s b c a v u

36. A Search DAG • Other Digests use data and successors • D(c) = h(dc, D(v) ) • D(b)=h(db,D(v),D(c)) • D(s) is DAG Digest s b c a v u

37. Verification for Search DAG • Traditional Merkle Tree verification is Bottom up (hash path values to root) • We use top down verification to simulate a correct search • Owner provides search procedure P and root digest D(s)

38. Authentic Publication D(s), P DAG, P

39. Verification Object for DAG • VO: information so User can reproduce the search (and thus verify answers) • “Lines” of VO match steps of P: • Data of a node and successor hashes • ds, D(v1), D(v2) … (successors of s) • dv1 , D(u1), D(u2), … (successors of v1)

40. An Example Search • Starts at s, then visits b then v • VO: • ds, D(a), D(b), D(c) (line 1) D(s) = h(ds, D(a), D(b), D(c)) So know data ds is OK. s b c a v u

41. An Example Search • Starts at s, process ds and decide b is next • VO: • ds, D(a), D(b), D(c) [line 1] • db, D(v), D(c) [line 2] If D(b)=h(db,D(v),D(c)) (using D(b) from line 1) • Data db is correct s b c a v u

42. Verified Search • The verified computation proceeds until all nodes in the actual search are visited (the VO has one line for each node visited). • The correct answer is now returned by search procedure P.

43. Verified Search • The verified computation takes time proportional to the original search (visits the same nodes). • Security Proof: shows that a User accepts the wrong answer only if a specific collision in hash function h used (e.g. D(b)=h(d’b,D’(v),D’(c))

44. Updates • Typically Digests are updated with work similar to the data structure’s update time (e.g. length of the search paths to updated items) • If updates are frequent, overall scheme doesn’t work well (can use time-stamped digests)

45. Generalizations • Allowing multiple Owners: often want to query data collected from several owners. Can be done, but now need to trust owners and data collector. • Privacy: VO’s may reveal information about about the data set. Methods to conceal extra data.

46. Generalizations • I/O efficient digests/VO’s: can use a multi-way tree to store multiple values in one disk block (still logically a binary tree for VO purposes, but stored more efficiently). • Top-down search DAG approach may be improved for specific data-structures (e.g. 2D range trees)

47. Generalizations • Collections of structured data: XML documents (can answer path queries) • Relational operations (Joins, Selection, Projection) • Fancier Crypto operations (to reduce VO size)

48. References P. Devanbu, M. Gertz, C. Martel, and S. G. Stubblebine. Authentic Third Party Data Publication, 14th IFIP 11.3 Working Conf. in DB Security (DBSec 2000), Original Authentic Publication Paper A General Model for Authenticated Data Structures, Algorithmica, 2004 Many Data Structures and Search DAG ( above group and G. Nuckolls)

49. References Certifying Data from Multiple Sources, Proceedings of the 17th Database Security Conference, 2003 Shows how to use multiple Owners Flexible authentication of XML documents, Journal Computer Security, 2004

50. Survey Chapters Li, Hadjieleftheriou, Kollios, Reyzin Authenticated Index Structures for Outsourced Databases(Overview of area and efficiency issues) R. Sion: Towards Secure Data Outsourcing Both in: Michael Gertz and Sushil Jajodia (eds.): "Handbook of Database Security: Applications and Trends", Springer, 2007, to appear.