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Security Handshake Pitfalls, II

Security Handshake Pitfalls, II. CS 519 Cryptography and Network Security Instructor: Ali Aydin Selcuk. Key Establishment and Authentication with KDC. A simple protocol: Problem: Potential delayed key delivery to Bob. (besides others). Alice, Bob. K B {Alice, K AB }. KDC.

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Security Handshake Pitfalls, II

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  1. Security Handshake Pitfalls, II CS 519 Cryptography and Network Security Instructor: Ali Aydin Selcuk Security Handshake Pitfalls, II

  2. Key Establishment and Authentication with KDC A simple protocol: Problem: Potential delayed key delivery to Bob. (besides others) Alice, Bob KB{Alice, KAB} KDC KA{Bob, KAB} Alice Bob Security Handshake Pitfalls, II

  3. Another simple protocol: Problems: • No freshness guarantee for KAB • Alice & Bob need to authenticate Alice, Bob KA{Bob, KAB}, ticketB where ticketB= KB{Alice, KAB} KDC Alice Bob Alice, ticketB Security Handshake Pitfalls, II

  4. Needham-Schroeder Protocol N1, Alice, Bob KA{N1, Bob, KAB, ticketB} where ticketB= KB{KAB, Alice} KDC ticketB, KAB{N2} Bob Alice KAB{N2-1, N3} KAB{N3-1} Security Handshake Pitfalls, II

  5. Needham-Schroeder Protocol • N1: for authenticating KDC& freshness of KAB. • Ticket is double-encrypted. (unnecessary) • N2, N3: for key confirmation, mutual authentication • Why are the challenges N2, N3 encrypted? • Problem: Bob doesn’t have freshness guarantee for KAB (i.e., can’t detect replays). Security Handshake Pitfalls, II

  6. Messages should be integrity protected. Otherwise, cut-and-paste reflection attacks possible: replay ticketB, KAB{N2} KAB{N2-1, N3} Trudy Bob KAB{N3-1} ticketB, KAB{N3} Trudy Bob KAB{N3-1, N4} Security Handshake Pitfalls, II

  7. Expanded Needham-Schroeder Protocol hello KB{NB} N1, Alice, Bob, KB{NB} KA{N1, Bob, KAB, ticketB} where ticketB= KB{KAB, Alice, NB} KDC Alice Bob ticketB, KAB{N2} KAB{N2-1, N3} KAB{N3-1} Security Handshake Pitfalls, II

  8. Otway-Rees Protocol NC, “Alice”, “Bob”, KA{NA, NC, “Alice”, “Bob”} KA{NA, NC, “Alice”, “Bob”} KB{NB, NC, “Alice”, “Bob”} KDC NC, KA{NA, KAB}, KB{NB, KAB} Bob Alice KA{NA, KAB} KAB{anything recognizable} Security Handshake Pitfalls, II

  9. Otway-Rees Protocol • NA, NB: Provides freshness guarantee for A & B, as well as authentication of KDC. • NC: Binds Alice, Bob, and the session. Also authenticates Bob. • Having separate NA & NC is redundant for security,though it’s good for functional separation of nonces and uniformity of KDC messages. Security Handshake Pitfalls, II

  10. Basic Kerboros Protocol N1, Alice, Bob KA{N1, Bob, KAB, ticketB} where ticketB= KB{KAB, Alice, expiration time} KDC Bob Alice ticketB, KAB{T} KAB{T+1} Security Handshake Pitfalls, II

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