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PPT-063-01

Safety Training for Supervisors. Bureau of Workers’ Comp PA Training for Health & Safety (PATHS). PPT-063-01. 1. Agenda. Supervisor Challenges Hazard Identification Incident Investigation Additional Resources. PPT-063-01. 2. Hazards.

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PPT-063-01

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  1. Safety Training for Supervisors Bureau of Workers’ Comp PA Training for Health & Safety (PATHS) PPT-063-01 1

  2. Agenda • Supervisor Challenges • Hazard Identification • Incident Investigation • Additional Resources PPT-063-01 2

  3. Hazards • What has been the hardest challenge you have had to overcome? • What could be the hardest challenge you will have to overcome? PPT-063-01 3

  4. Challenges • Attitudes • Communication • Competing Priorities • Employee Buy-In • Creating Safety Awareness PPT-063-01 4

  5. Attitudes • It won’t happen to me! • I’ve been doing this job for 15 years… • I’m CAREFUL! • I don’t want to get (someone) in trouble! PPT-063-01 5

  6. BETARI BOX MODEL MY ATTITUDE AFFECTS AFFECTS MY BEHAVIOR YOUR BEHAVIOR AFFECTS AFFECTS YOUR ATTITUDE PPT-063-01 6

  7. What’s Your Excuse? Address Unsafe Work Practices Get it done Undiscussed incompetence - unsafe practices that stem from skill deficits that can’t be discussed Just this once - unsafe practices that are justified because they are exceptions to the rule This is overboard - unsafe practices that bypass precautions management or workers consider excessive Are you a team player? - unsafe practices that are justified for the good of the team, company or customer PPT-063-01 7

  8. Communication Principles of Health & Safety Communication • Address communication barriers • Effective communication increases motivation • The more people a “communication” goes through, the more distorted it becomes PPT-063-01 8

  9. Time Management PPT-063-01 9

  10. Employee Buy-In • How to get employees engaged in your workplace safety message: • Watching it (training videos) • Hearing it (discussion and feedback on safety issues) • Reading it (posters, email newsletter) PPT-063-01 10

  11. Employee Buy-In Employee Involvement – Why? • Provides the means for everyone to develop and express their own commitment to safety and health • Involves the persons most in contact with potential safety and health hazards • Utilizes everyone’s wide range of experience • Everyone is more likely to support and use programs in which they have input PPT-063-01 11

  12. Employee Buy-In Employee Involvement - How? How do you get employees involved in the safety and health process at your workplace? Keyquestion: What is keeping employees from participating in the safety and health process? PPT-063-01 12

  13. Employee Buy-In Potential Ways to Get Employee Involvement • Recognition for Achieving Goals (individual and/or facility) • Safety Events • Discussion of and feedback on safety issues • Questionnaires/Suggestion Boxes • Build safety into your facility’s communications PPT-063-01 13

  14. Employee Buy-In • Protect employees’ voices • Give employees something meaningful to do • Show results • Provide positive consequences • Make people aware of their impact on safety PPT-063-01 14

  15. Promotion • RECOGNITION: • Awards for Achieving Goals • Participation in JSAs • SAFETY PROMOTION: • Safety Days, Picnics & Contests • Publications (newsletters, posters, bulletin board notices, etc.) • Training (videos/fact sheets) • EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT: • Committee Updates • Questionnaires/Suggestion Box PPT-063-01 15

  16. Safety Excellence Beyond Compliance… Achieving Safety Excellence PPT-063-01 16

  17. Safety Excellence What is “Safety Excellence” • Safety means prevention of injury or loss • Excellence means superiority PPT-063-01 17

  18. Safety Excellence Why Move to Safety Excellence? • An average of 4,713 people annually are killed on the job over the past 4 years.^ • Over 250,000 productive years of life lost annually – more than from cancer and cardiovascular disease combined • ^ According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics PPT-063-01 18

  19. Statistics • 2008 – 5,214 on the job fatalities • 2009 – 4,340 on the job fatalities • 2010 – 4,690 on the job fatalities • 2011 – 4,609 on the job fatalities • According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics PPT-063-01 19

  20. Compliance • Why not be satisfied with compliance? • Won’t it get the job done? • What more do we need? PPT-063-01 20

  21. Compliance There are still too many incidents in the workplace costing too many lives The traditional compliance-based approach doesn’t seem to be doing the job WHY NOT????? PPT-063-01 21

  22. Compliance Is it the safety program? or Is it the management system driving the organization’s behavior? PPT-063-01 22

  23. It is the culture • Culture is the major determinant in the behavior of an organization and it’s people • Implementing a behavior-based safety process without a solid cultural foundation to support it is cause of most behavior-based safety failures PPT-063-01 23

  24. Culture Culture determines behavior, both social and organizational PPT-063-01 24

  25. It is the culture PPT-063-01 25

  26. It is the culture PPT-063-01 26

  27. It is the culture PPT-063-01 27

  28. It is the culture PPT-063-01 28

  29. It is the culture PPT-063-01 29

  30. It is the culture PPT-063-01 30

  31. It is the culture PPT-063-01 31

  32. It is the culture PPT-063-01 32

  33. It is the culture PPT-063-01 33

  34. Culture Study Major Disasters Common Threads Space Shuttle Challenger Space Shuttle Columbia Three Mile Island Chernobyl Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Edwin L. Zebrowski, “Lessons-Learned from Man-Made Catastrophes” 1991 PPT-063-01 34

  35. Culture Study • The Common threads that emerge from these accidents identify cultural elements that allowed them to happen • Do any of these common threads exist in your workplace? PPT-063-01 35

  36. Shuttle Culture Study • Unclear who was responsible for what • Rigid communication channels • Decision-makers too distant from the field • Mindset that success is routine, fortifying a belief that everything is ok, “we’re in good shape” PPT-063-01 36

  37. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Excerpts from Tangled Oily Mess by Mark Pynes, published June 20, 2010, in The Sunday Patriot-News, Harrisburg, PA “ … The six-member panel of Coast Guard and Minerals and Management Services officials pressed for answers about what occurred on the rig on April 20 before it exploded. They wanted to know who was in charge, and heard conflicting answers. They pushed for more insight into an argument on the rig that day between a manager for BP, the well’s owner, and one for Transocean, the rig’s owner, and asked Curt R. Kuchta, the rig’s captain, how the crew knew who was in charge.” PPT-063-01 37

  38. Shuttle Safety Culture • Safety is not a priority – it is a corporate value • All levels of management accountable • Safety performance measured & tied to compensation / incentives • Safety integrated into all operations PPT-063-01 38

  39. Shuttle Culture Study • Safety resources and techniques were available but not used • There was undefined responsibility, authority, and accountability for safety PPT-063-01 39

  40. Why is Culture Important? • It is an atmosphere we work in that shapes our behavior • Unwritten rules that define what’s really • important in an organization • Invisible force that largely dictates the behavior of employees & management PPT-063-01 40

  41. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Tangled, oily mess continued: ’It’s pretty well understood amongst the crew who’s in charge,’ he said ‘How do they know that?’ a Coast Guard investigator asked. ‘I guess, I don’t know,’ Kuchta said. ‘But it’s pretty well – everyone knows.’” … “Amid this tangle of overlapping authority and competing interests, no one was solely responsible for ensuring the rig’s safety, and communication was a constant challenge.” PPT-063-01 40

  42. Shuttle Culture Study • Belief that rule compliance is enough for safety (If we’re in compliance – we’re ok) • Team-player emphasis with no tolerance for whistle-blowers • “culture of silence” PPT-063-01 42

  43. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Taken from Tangled, oily mess “… Steve Bertone, the chief engineer for Transocean, wrote in his witness statement that he ran up to the bridge where he heard Kuchta screaming at a worker, Andrea Fleytas, because she had pressed the distress button without authorization. Bertone turned to another worker and asked him if he had called to shore for help but was told he did not have permission to do so. Another manager tried to give the go-ahead, the testimony said, but someone else said the order needed to come from the rig’s offshore installation manager.” PPT-063-01 43

  44. Shuttle Culture Study • Emergency drills & procedures for severe • events were lacking • Design and operating features were confusing • and complex but were allowed to exist • although recognized as hazardous elsewhere PPT-063-01 44

  45. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Taken from Tangled, oily mess “… …they asked for and received permission from federal regulators to exempt the drilling project from federal law that requires a rigorous type of environmental review, internal documents and federal records indicate. … Regulations have not kept up with the risks that deepwater drilling poses. …regulators have not required technology and strategies for deepwater spills to be improved.” PPT-063-01 45

  46. Shuttle Culture Study • Problems experienced from other locations not applied as “lessons learned” • Lessons learned not built into the system • Defects / errors became acceptable PPT-063-01 46

  47. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Taken from Tangled, oily mess “… a hodgepodge of oversight agencies granted exceptions to rules, allowed risks to accumulate and made a disaster more likely on the rig, particularly with a mix of different companies operating on the Deepwater whose interests were not always in sync.… … As early as June 2009, BP engineers had expressed concerns in internal documents about using certain casings for the well because they violated the company’s safety and design guidelines. But they proceeded with those casings.” PPT-063-01 47

  48. Culture Study Would you agree that what was true of the NASA culture study of 1991 would also be true of a study of this oil spill in 2010? All of us need to do better - NOW PPT-063-01 48

  49. Employee Perception Survey • “Perceptions are reality” • The ultimate “customer” of safety, is the employee • Measures differences in the way employees & management think about safety • Gaps in perceptions provide starting point for improving safety culture PPT-063-01 49

  50. Employee Perception Survey Notice to Participants: This is a confidential survey. Please do not put your name on the form.Please answer each question by circling the most accurate answer using a scale of 1 to 5. PPT-063-01 50

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