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The Devil and Packet Trace Anonymization

This paper presents a comprehensive exploration of anonymization techniques for network packet traces, addressing critical issues with existing methods and proposing a robust policy framework. The authors, Ruoming Pang, Mark Allman, Vern Paxson, and Jason Lee, discuss the balance between the security needs of organizations and the research utility of released data. They introduce a tool, "tcpmkpub," designed for effective trace transformation and validation while emphasizing key methodologies for minimizing information loss. This work aims to facilitate safer sharing of network measurements in the research community.

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The Devil and Packet Trace Anonymization

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  1. The Devil and Packet Trace Anonymization Authors: Ruoming Pangy, Mark Allmanz, Vern Paxsonz, Jason Lee Princeton University, International Computer Science Institute, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) Publication: Computer Communication Review, January 2006. Presenter: Radha V. Maldhure

  2. AGENDA • ANONYMIZATION • PROBLEM WITH CURRENT TECHNIQUES • USE OF ANONYMIZATION • PAPER’S CONTENTS • METHODOLOGY • ANONYMIZATION POLICY • INFORMATION LOSS • VALIDATION • CONCLUSION • CONTRIBUTIONS • WEAKNESSES • SUGGESTIONS

  3. INTRODUCTION TO IMPROVE / TO DEVELOP RESEARCHER Released data ATTACKER TO ATTACK DATA e.g. packet traces RESEARCHER Released data anonymization ATTACKER

  4. ANONYMIZATION • Releasing network measurement data to research community • Publishing traces require balance between security needs of organization and research usefulness • Example: “tcpdpriv” removes TCP options from traces, no physical fingerprinting, no research value Research Usefulness Research Usefulness Security Needs SecurityNeeds

  5. AGENDA • ANONYMIZATION • PROBLEM WITH CURRENT TECHNIQUES • USE OF ANONYMIZATION • PAPER’S CONTENTS • METHODOLOGY • ANONYMIZATION POLICY • INFORMATION LOSS • VALIDATION • CONCLUSION • CONTRIBUTIONS • WEAKNESSES • SUGGESTIONS

  6. PROBLEM WITH CURRENT TECHNIQUES Existing publicly released traces have problems as: • No careful guidance on anonymization policy for public release • No tool that adapts to particular policy • Example : NLANR’s PMA packet traces

  7. AGENDA • ANONYMIZATION • PROBLEM WITH CURRENT TECHNIQUES • USE OF ANONYMIZATION • PAPER’S CONTENTS • METHODOLOGY • ANONYMIZATION POLICY • INFORMATION LOSS • VALIDATION • CONCLUSION • CONTRIBUTIONS • WEAKNESSES • SUGGESTIONS

  8. USE OF ANONYMIZATION Some uses of anonymization: • Your web site's performance and availability • Understanding of the Internet’s structure and behavior

  9. AGENDA • ANONYMIZATION • PROBLEM WITH CURRENT TECHNIQUES • USE OF ANONYMIZATION • PAPER’S CONTENTS • METHODOLOGY • ANONYMIZATION POLICY • INFORMATION LOSS • VALIDATION • CONCLUSION • CONTRIBUTIONS • WEAKNESSES • SUGGESTIONS

  10. PAPER’S CONTENTS • Arrives at acceptable anonymization policy • Presents a tool “tcpmkpub” that implements the suggested transformations • Provides meta-data about each trace for analysis

  11. AGENDA • ANONYMIZATION • PROBLEM WITH CURRENT TECHNIQUES • USE OF ANONYMIZATION • PAPER’S CONTENTS • METHODOLOGY • ANONYMIZATION POLICY • INFORMATION LOSS • VALIDATION • CONCLUSION • CONTRIBUTIONS • WEAKNESSES • SUGGESTIONS

  12. METHODOLOGY Precise method for anonymization Purpose of transform Concerns for appearing traffic Policy decisions Anonymization tool

  13. Example Specification Specification of IP Header anonymization:

  14. AGENDA • ANONYMIZATION • PROBLEM WITH CURRENT TECHNIQUES • USE OF ANONYMIZATION • PAPER’S CONTENTS • METHODOLOGY • ANONYMIZATION POLICY • INFORMATION LOSS • VALIDATION • CONCLUSION • CONTRIBUTIONS • WEAKNESSES • SUGGESTIONS

  15. ANONYMIZATION POLICY • Focuses on traces that include only packet headers • A possible policy but not completely a correct policy • It is crucial to prevent users of the trace files from determining: • identities of specific hosts • identities of internal hosts such that a map could be constructed of which hosts support which services • security practices of the organization

  16. Protocol Stack Application Layer FTP/ Telnet/ SNMP/ DNS Transport Layer TCP/ UDP Internet Layer IP/ ARP/ ICMP/ IGMP Network Interface Layer Ethernet/ ATM/ FR

  17. CHECKSUMS Reason to anonymize: Re-calculate checksums in traces for two reasons: • Gives content of data even when application data removed • To determine if original checksum were valid Way to anonymize:Original checksum Co, Calculated checksum Cc • Replace Co by Cc • Insert “1” into appropriate checksum field to mark packet as failed checksum

  18. NETWORK INTERFACE LAYER: Ethernet Address Reason to anonymize: • Ethernet Addresses are distinct to individual NICs • Can be used by an attacker to uncover actions of given user Way to anonymize: • Three Different methods of randomizing Ethernet addresses • Scrambling the entire 6 byte address • Scrambling only the lower 3 bytes of address • Scrambling lower 3 and upper 3 bytes independently

  19. INTERNET LAYER: IP Address Reason to anonymize: • Attacker can attain accounting of user’s activities if he knows IP Address • Can plan an attack using information about services running on the host Way to anonymize: Remap addresses differently based on type of addresses Multicast addresses preserved in anonymized trace

  20. TRANSPORT LAYER: TCP/UDP Reason to anonymize: Not given Way to anonymize: • Preserves port number and sequence number but not the timestamp • They transform timestamps into separate monotonically increasing counters • Research use: uniqueness and transmission order of segments

  21. AGENDA • ANONYMIZATION • PROBLEM WITH CURRENT TECHNIQUES • USE OF ANONYMIZATION • PAPER’S CONTENTS • METHODOLOGY • ANONYMIZATION POLICY • INFORMATION LOSS • VALIDATION • CONCLUSION • CONTRIBUTIONS • WEAKNESSES • SUGGESTIONS

  22. INFORMATION LOSS • The effectiveness in preserving information is checked by analyzing original and anonymized traces • Two tools for analysis: “tcpsum” and “pOF” • tcpsum : Used to find number of packets and bytes sent in each direction Crunches each Tcp connection in trace • Except for IP addresses, crunching original and transformed traces matched • No value lost in transformation pOF : Did not get what they tried to explain!

  23. AGENDA • ANONYMIZATION • PROBLEM WITH CURRENT TECHNIQUES • USE OF ANONYMIZATION • PAPER’S CONTENTS • METHODOLOGY • ANONYMIZATION POLICY • INFORMATION LOSS • VALIDATION • CONCLUSION • CONTRIBUTIONS • WEAKNESSES • SUGGESTIONS

  24. VALIDATION • Need to validate information intended to mask was indeed transformed or left out of anonymized trace • Two ad hoc validations: • Inspected the log created by “tcpmkpub” • Flags all unexpected aspects of a packet trace • Used “ipsumdump” to dump Tcp options • Picked timestamps, sorted and verified • Timestamp re-numbering appears accurate

  25. AGENDA • ANONYMIZATION • PROBLEM WITH CURRENT TECHNIQUES • USE OF ANONYMIZATION • PAPER’S CONTENTS • METHODOLOGY • ANONYMIZATION POLICY • INFORMATION LOSS • VALIDATION • CONTRIBUTIONS • WEAKNESSES • SUGGESTIONS

  26. CONTRIBUTIONS • Enumerated and explored devil-ish details in preparing packet traces • A framework for implementing anonymization policy and developed “tcpmkpub” • Sets framework for future work of packet trace anonymization

  27. AGENDA • ANONYMIZATION • PROBLEM WITH CURRENT TECHNIQUES • USE OF ANONYMIZATION • PAPER’S CONTENTS • METHODOLOGY • ANONYMIZATION POLICY • INFORMATION LOSS • VALIDATION • CONTRIBUTIONS • WEAKNESSES • SUGGESTIONS

  28. WEAKNESSES • No timing information for analyzing TCP dynamics • Preserving port number may lead to identification of a particular machine • No performance analysis

  29. AGENDA • ANONYMIZATION • PROBLEM WITH CURRENT TECHNIQUES • USE OF ANONYMIZATION • PAPER’S CONTENTS • METHODOLOGY • ANONYMIZATION POLICY • INFORMATION LOSS • VALIDATION • CONCLUSION • CONTRIBUTIONS • WEAKNESSES • SUGGESTIONS

  30. SUGGESTIONS • Needs to deal with different protocols at each layer of protocol stack • Should present performance analysis that indicates • tool’s efficiency in terms of maintaining security needs • preserving research values

  31. QUESTIONS?????????????????

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