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With thanks to: all of TE/MPE/MI, A. Dinius, R. Schmidt, J. Wenninger et al. 0v2. What is the aim of this work?. Beam Interlock System was Internally Reviewed in 2006. Very well received. The 2006 internal review used only accelerator professionals.

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0v2

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  1. With thanks to: all of TE/MPE/MI, A. Dinius, R. Schmidt, J. Wenninger et al. 0v2

  2. What is the aim of this work? Beam Interlock System was Internally Reviewed in 2006 Very well received • The 2006 internal review used only accelerator professionals. • no means of referencing the Beam Interlock System design to other interlock systems in industry • VHDL (software/firmware) safety is difficult to quantify. • CERN has other systems which would benefit from generic review methods • Comparison of the system to international standards, such as DO-178B This review is to continue and enhance that work Remember the following points are the aim of this review • identify possible weaknesses in the mission-critical path of the BIS before LHC reaches high intensity beam operation • assess the adequacy of the external and internal mitigations for critical component failure in the BIS • provide a general comparison of the BIS with approaches in industrial systems. • suggest potential improvements of the BIS • review and comment on the pre/during/post operational software sequences that verify the integrity of the BIS • provide CERN with a model for future assessments of mission-critical systems Beam Interlock System

  3. Plan for the Review Week 18th August – 7th September Study of pre-review material Monday 7th September presentations Tuesday 8th September demonstrations Wednesday 9th September open-house Last week Thursday 10th September VHDL Friday 11th September AM:open-house PM: outgoing remarks 11th September – 2nd October Post-visit report Being created Beam Interlock System

  4. Critical Systems Labs Inc. Canadian Firm… Military Safety Automotive Safety Train Safety Contribute to Writing Standards Chaired the International System Safety Conference 2008 ++ Very well placed to judge our work My personal ambition certification for our systems These are the certification experts = push us the right way Start next projects with this in mind Beam Interlock System

  5. Preliminary Findings Engineering: Beam Interlock System is more than adequate for protecting LHC Safety vs Operation: Unusual to mix systems in industry = Justify all connections to BIS for safety Are all inputs adding to safety = Machine Protection System Hazard Table Documentation: Technical Engineering Specification & Hazard Table needed for the future Final Reference Manual for the future Traceability = Drill down from requirements to implementation Verification: Should be testable to meet the defined requirements Software & Testing: Pre-Operational Checks need integrity and verification As-Built Database needs integrity and verification Operator Screens need ‘heart-beat’ Beam Interlock System

  6. FIN Beam Interlock System

  7. Who is who…. ? Before we start… a quick ‘tour de table’… Section 3 of your folder has more Beam Interlock System

  8. Presentation Day Session 1: Introduction 0900 – 0915 Introduction & Outline of Review B. Todd Session 2: Overview of CERN and LHC 0915 – 0935 CERN and the LHC B. Todd 0935 – 0955 LHC Beam Interlock System B. Puccio 0955 – 1015 Dependable Design B. Todd Coffee 1015 – 1045 Session 3: Critical Electronics 1045 – 1115 User – Beam Permit Critical Path B. Todd 1115 – 1145 The Matrix CPLD B. Todd 1145 – 1215 Generators and Detectors A. Castaneda 1215 – 1245 Safe Beam Flags and SMP A. Castaneda Lunch 1245 – 1400 Session 4: Software Sequences 1400 – 1430 Preoperation Testing & DIAMON I. Romera 1430 – 1500 Postoperation and PM I. Romera Coffee 1500 – 1530 Session 5: Operational Experience 1530 – 1600 Observations since 2005 B. Todd 1600 – 1615 UJ33 Incident B. Todd 1615 – 1645 Irradiation Testing B. Todd Beam Interlock System

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