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August 14, 2003 Blackout

August 14, 2003 Blackout. MAC Meeting October 8, 2003 Paul Murphy IMO. The Event. Thursday, August 14, 2003 at approximately 04:11 PM EDT Northeastern United States and portions of Canada lost major portions of load, generation and transmission

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August 14, 2003 Blackout

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  1. August 14, 2003 Blackout MAC Meeting October 8, 2003 Paul Murphy IMO

  2. The Event • Thursday, August 14, 2003 at approximately 04:11 PM EDT • Northeastern United States and portions of Canada lost major portions of load, generation and transmission • Effects felt throughout the Eastern Interconnection centered around the Great Lakes • Approximately 61, 800 MW of customer load was lost affecting 50 million people.

  3. The Interconnections

  4. Remaining paths into eastern 16 Michigan 17 ONTARIO 15 18 14 13 4:10:00 – 4:10:38 PM Transmission Lines Disconnect across Michigan and Northern Ohio, Generation Trips Off Line in Northern Michigan and Northern Ohio, and Northern Ohio Separates from Pennsylvania

  5. Summary of the Situation at 4:10:38

  6. Interface flows 3:10:38 PM EST

  7. 29 (North of Lake Superior) 27 ONTARIO 28 30 4:10:42 – 4:10:45 PM Transmission Paths Disconnect in Northern Ontario and New Jersey, Isolating the Northeast Portion of the Eastern Interconnection

  8. 33 ONTARIO 35 34 4:10:50 – 4:11:57 PM Ontario Separates from New York West of Niagara Falls and West of St. Lawrence. Southwestern Connecticut Separates from New York and Blacks Out.

  9. Beginning of collapse Unstable Island remains Quickly reduces to ~ 1200 MW

  10. Restoration Plan Priorities • Restore Class IV AC power to all nuclear sites • Restore power to critical transmission and generating station, station service loads • Restore critical utility owned telecom facilities • Restore customer loads only to the extent necessary to control voltages and secure generating units • Synchronize islands together and/or to adjacent power systems

  11. Complexities of the Restoration Process Post Contingency conditions Equipment Problems Communications Balancing generation/load and maintaining frequency and voltage Using load to control high voltage during the line restoration process Assessing available generation to support restoration

  12. Nine Days of Emergency Operations • Over the week, assessment of insufficient internal and external generation to meet the normal Ontario demand • August 14 Provincial Government declares a Provincial Emergency • August 17 Government requests industrial, commercial and residential customers to reduce load by 50% over peak hours. • Reliable supply maintained at reduced demand level due to: • Customer response to requests for curtailment and conservation • dispatch of emergency generators • emergency purchases from Ontario’s neighbours

  13. Nine Days of Emergency Operations 25000 20000 15000 Demand (MW) 10000 5000 0 14-Aug-03 1:00 15-Aug-03 1:00 16-Aug-03 1:00 17-Aug-03 1:00 18-Aug-03 1:00 19-Aug-03 1:00 20-Aug-03 1:00 21-Aug-03 1:00 22-Aug-03 1:00 14-Aug-03 13:00 15-Aug-03 13:00 16-Aug-03 13:00 17-Aug-03 13:00 18-Aug-03 13:00 19-Aug-03 13:00 20-Aug-03 13:00 21-Aug-03 13:00 22-Aug-03 13:00 Normal Actual Estimated Demand Response Forecast

  14. Observations System Restoration and Crisis Management Processes > Equipment protections operated as designed > Public telephone system was generally available • Efficient and effective assignment of accountabilities within the control room • Good cooperation from field staff of generators and transmitters, distributors and customers • Good cooperation with neighbouring area operators • Successful restoration plan Large-scale restoration is inherently complex, and our control room staff adapted to changing circumstances as the restoration proceeded, modifying approaches as necessary to achieve objectives. The overall restoration and crisis management processes proceeded in an orderly fashion and met their objectives.

  15. Communication Centre / Provincial Decision Support A Communications Centre was set up to brief media on status of system restoration in Ontario and to provide information as to how customers could assist in the restoration effort. Press conferences, scheduled twice daily, were coordinated with Provincial officials. Provincial government officials were continuously briefed on power restoration to ensure coordination with other government agencies.

  16. Early Lessons Learned 1. We confirmed that the devices that are in place to protect equipment operated as planned 2. We confirmed that maintaining a well-documented restoration plan, supported by training and rehearsals involving the IMO, market participants and government, was and will continue to be a key investment 3. We confirmed that close cooperation amongst the IMO, the interconnections, and Ontario Transmitters, Generators, market participants and government is essential to achieving an orderly restoration.

  17. Early Lessons Learned 4.Effective communications is essential to reliable operation. 5. The extreme speed at which events can cascade across the system increases the significance of timely information. 6. Frequent communication with customers is critical to support their decision making 7. Administered pricing rules need review

  18. Prevention of Future Incidents 1. Maintain and enhance the integration of systems and markets through robust interconnections with our neighbours 2. Reliability standards for the interconnected North American grid should be mandatory. 3. The industry should build on the strong institutional and regulatory foundations already inplace 4. The industry should continue to pursue the three part strategy of Prevention, Containment and Minimizationof Impact:

  19. Ongoing Review • Internationally: • Canada-U.S. Joint Task Force • Within Ontario: • Emergency Preparedness Task Force’s (EPTF) Restoration Working Group • Compliance Assessment

  20. Canada-U.S. Joint Task Force • 3 Working Groups to develop recommendations • Electricity • Nuclear • Security • IMO is supporting Electricity and Security WGs, through NERC and directly with Joint Task Force • Electricity - sequence of events, event simulation, standards, operations, and planning • Security - physical and cyber security review

  21. The Ongoing Investigation

  22. Restoration Working Group • Restoration Working Group (RWG) established by the EPTF Sep 22 Goal: • To improve our level of preparedness Objectives: • Review the facts regarding the restoration of the IMO-controlled grid • Assess the effectiveness of our restoration efforts • Identify findings and recommend improvements

  23. RWG Areas of Interest • Rules and procedures • restoration priorities • rotational load shedding • curtailment requests • Auxiliary equipment and tools • Generator re-start • Voice communications • Class IV to nuclear Focus on items essential to restoring the grid and the supply to consumers (by Nov 26)

  24. Compliance • Examine Compliance With Market Rules: • NPCC criteria • Ontario Power System Restoration Plan • Communication Requirements • Technical Performance Requirements

  25. Thanks to all of you for aiding in a successful restoration of the IMO Controlled Grid and restoring supply to Ontario consumers

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