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Vertical Restraints

Vertical Restraints. Dr. Patrick Krauskopf Swiss Competition Commission (COMCO). National Training Workshop on Competition Policy and Law organised by CUTS International & Coordinated by CUTS Institute for Regulation and Competition (CIRC), Botswana, 25 – 27 July, 2007. Agenda. Introduction

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Vertical Restraints

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  1. Vertical Restraints Dr. Patrick KrauskopfSwiss Competition Commission (COMCO) National Training Workshop on Competition Policy and Law organised by CUTS International & Coordinated by CUTS Institute for Regulation and Competition (CIRC), Botswana, 25 – 27 July, 2007

  2. Agenda Introduction Main concepts Vertical restraints evaluation Conclusions

  3. Initial situation I. Introduction (1) Markup Not enough variety Low quality Lack of effective competition Surplus redistribution Isolated markets

  4. Reasons to create vertical restraints I. Introduction (2) Producers do not sell their products directly Existence of different market agents (dealers, wholesalers, retailers) Reduction of transaction costs To guarantee the stability of the offer Coordinated practices

  5. I. Introduction (3) Tools Competition promotion Market liberalization

  6. I. Introduction (4) Sanctioned activities in the E.C. (Art. 81 RT), and in Switzerland (Art. 5.1/5.4 LCart). Legal framework Switzerland. Cartel Act (LCart) Communication on vertical restraints (07/2007) Communication on vertical restraints in the automobile sector (10/2002). Explanation notes

  7. II. Main concepts (1) • Vertical restraints: Agreements (with or without compulsory force) between economic agents at different levels of the production line. (E.g. wholesalers and retailers). • Regulation of purchase conditions, sales / resale of products and services. • The firms taking part in the agreement do not compete directly (“no-competitors” agreement).

  8. II. Main concepts (2) • Vertical restraints are produced when one (or several) enterprises are capable to behave independently and to impose: • Resale prices (fixed or minimum prices) • Restrictions concerning territories and/or consumers • Restrictions regarding end consumers sales • Restrictions on freedom to contract

  9. Horizontal agreement A B II. Main concepts (3) Vertical agreement Producer Inter-brand Wholesale Inter-brand competition Retailer Intra-brand competition Consumers

  10. II. Main concepts (4) • Intra-brand competition: Competition between suppliers that sell the same product or the same brand. • E.g.: cars distribution. • Inter-brand competition: Different producers sell through retailers. • E.g.: soda drinks.

  11. II. Main concepts (5) • Double profit problem: • Producer and supplier have market power (can raise prices). • Vertical restraints / vertical integration could raise economic efficiency. • “Free-riding” problems in providing services: • “Horizontal” externality (between retailers) • Examples: quality standards, providing information, publicity.

  12. II. Main concepts (6) • Example: “Coke” price Coke Namibia: 0.30 South Africa: 0.35 Botswana: 0.40

  13. II. Main concepts (7) • Selective distribution systems • According to this agreement between supplier and retailer: • The supplier selects his authorized retailers according to predefined criterions • The retailer can not resale to unauthorized retailers

  14. III. Vertical restraints evaluation (1) Not all vertical agreements are illicit. Use of “Rule of reason” or “Per-se rule” for evaluating the agreement Analysis procedure: Detection of vertical agreement which threatens free competition. Relevant market definition. Verification of restrictive behavior Anticompetitive effects > benefits. Abuse of dominant position?

  15. III. Vertical restraint evaluation (2) Establishment of criterion to evaluate potential effects of vertical agreements: “Per-se rule” Rule of reason Effects of vertical restraints: Qualitative Quantitative Cases of minor importance Justifications

  16. III. Vertical restraint evaluation (3) “Per-se rule” Presumption of elimination of competition Can not be justified by economic reasons Exhaustive list with examples of practices There are no exceptions as to the size of the enterprise or its market share.

  17. III. Vertical restrictions evaluation (4) Rule of reason Behavior importance Territory and sales limitations, limitation of end consumers sales and cross distributions Creation of obstacles for distribution of products Non-competition clause for more than 5 years / or for more than one year after the expiration of the vertical agreement

  18. III. Vertical restraint evaluation (5) Cases of minor importance: Agreements which do not exceed 10% of the relevant market. Exception: cases where competition is limited by cumulative effects of similar vertical distribution nets. Justifications: Agreement allows an efficient organization of the distribution net. Necessary to reduce production or distribution costs; and Agreement does not eliminate efficient competition.

  19. Yes No Permitted agreement Yes Does the agreement exceed 10% of the relevant market? No Is the organization of the distribution net efficient? Yes Per – se prohibition? III. Vertical restraint evaluation (6) ¿Is the vertical agreement important ? No Yes Illicit agreement No

  20. IV. Conclusions • Not all vertical agreements are illicit. • Use of “Per-se rule” for the most serious cases. • It is important to clearly inform which agreements will be considered anticompetitive and how they will be evaluated.

  21. Thank you For further information, please do not hesitate to contact: Mr. Patrick Krauskopf:patrick.krauskopf@weko.admin.ch Ms.Katrin Emmenegger:katrin.emmenegger@weko.admin.ch

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