Strategic Management/ Business Policy

1. Strategic Management/Business Policy Power Point Set #3: Industry Analysis

2. Efficient Markets • The efficient market hypothesis, which Professor Eugene Fama of the University of Chicago has supported (e.g., in financial markets), is one in which prices reflect information instantaneously and one in which extra-ordinary profit opportunities are thus rapidly dissipated by the action of profit-seeking individuals in the market. • How well does the efficient market hypothesis for capital markets apply to product markets? • If the efficient market hypothesis applied fully to product markets then we should see over time equalization in risk-adjusted rates of return across industries. • What do the data support?

4. Some Industries Are More Profitable Than Others ROE & ROA - Selected Industries, 1989 30% 25% 20% ROE 15% ROA 10% 5% 0% Pharmaceuticals Tires / Rubber Home Appliances

5. Within Industries, Some Competitors Perform Better than Others. ROE - Pharmaceutical Industry 1989 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Amgen AMP Eli Lilly Merck Mylan Pfizer

9. Three Factors Determining Company Performance • Industry Context • e.g., during the last two decades, companies in the airlines industry have been less profitable than those in the pharmaceutical industry • National Context • e.g., world’s most successful consumer electronics firms are in Japan • Company Capabilities and Strategies • E.g., Wal-mart and Southwest Airlines

10. Opportunities& Threats Strengths &Weaknesses Strategy InternalFactors ExternalFactors Values OfStakeholders Values Of Management Industry Analysis Supports The Identification of Threats and Opportunities Industry Analysis • Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats- “SWOT” Analysis Drivers Objectives

13. Structure-Conduct-Performance • Market Structure: • Number of buyers and sellers (e.g., CR4) • Barriers to entry • Substitutes • Cost Structures • Regulation

14. Structure-Conduct-Performance • Industry concentration is measured by the four-firm sales concentration ration (CR4). • Problem: CR4 = .6 (.15, .15, .15, .15) or CR4 = .6 (.57. .01, .01, .01) • Which is more likely to exhibit monopoly power? • Alternative Measure: HHI index • 7 firms (15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 10) = 1450 • 44 firms (57, 1, 1, 1 …) = 3292 (3249 + 43) • Correlation between CR4 and HHI in 1982 was 0.954

15. Structure-Conduct-Performance • Defining the relevant market: • Even more important than choosing the proper index of concentration is ensuring that the market for which concentration is being measured is properly defined. • In the United States, the basic system is called the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Onto it, the Census Bureau has grafted an even more intricately subdivided system organized around a series of seven digit numbers, each successive digit reflecting a finer degree of classification.

16. Structure-Conduct-Performance • In 1982, the manufacturing sector was divided into 450 such four-digit industries. SIC Code CR4 # of firms HHI 3632 household refrigerators .94 39 2745 3511 turbines .84 71 2602 2082 beer .77 67 2089 3011 tires .66 108 1591 2834 pharmaceuticals .26 584 1306 3237 ready-mix concrete .06 4161 18

18. Barriers To Entry • The free entry and free exit assumption that works reasonably well for describing financial markets seems to be a premise that strays so far from our world of experience that the assumption impedes our understanding of real-world product competition. • Thus, empirical evidence suggests that(risk-adjusted) ROE does NOT equalize in the long run.

19. A Taxonomy of Barriers to Entry • (1) Economies of Scale • Product-specific economies of scale • Lower setup costs as a percentage of total costs • More specialized machinery and tooling (e.g., Honda) • Plant-specific economies of scale • Engineers’ 2/3 rule: Since the area of a sphere or cylinder varies as two-thirds power of volume, the cost of constructing process industry plants can be expected to rise as two thirds power of their output capacity. (This rule applies to petroleum refining, cement making, iron ore reduction and steel conversion). • Also “economies of massed reserves”

22. A Taxonomy of Barriers to Entry • Economies of Scale • Multi-product economies of scale (“economies of scope”) • Example: Cost (Iron, Steel) < Cost (Iron) + Cost (Steel) • Key idea: Shareable input (In this case, thermal economies in the production of iron and steel) • Modern examples: Aircraft, Automobiles, Consumer electronics, Household Appliances; Personal Computers, Software, Power Tools • Multi-plant economies of scale • Economies of multi-plant production, investment, and physical distribution.

23. Examples of Economies of Scope • Aircraft: Common wing, nose, and tail components allow several models to be leveraged using different numbers of fuselage modules to create aircraft of different lengths and passenger freight capacities by Boeing and Airbus Industries. • Automobiles:The Taurus platform is leveraged to provide the basis for Taurus and Mercury Sable sedans and wagons and the Ford Windstar.

24. Examples of Economies of Scope • Consumer Electronics:Over 160 variations of the Sony Walkman were leveraged by “mixing and matching” modular components in a few basic system designs. (“Legos”) • Personal Computers:Personal computers typically consist largely of modular components like hard drives, flat screen displays, and memory chips, coupled with some distinctive components like a micro-processor chip and enclosure.

25. Examples of Economies of Scope • Software • Software designers are creating modules of routineswhich can be combined to create customized applications programs. • (The term “modularity” gained wide currency by software designers in the 1960s.)

26. A Taxonomy of Barriers To Entry • (2) Experience Curve Advantages • Marvin Lieberman, a management professor at UCLA, found that in the chemical industry, on average, each doubling of plant scale over time was accomplished by an 11% reduction in unit costs. Thus, there is an “89% learning curve.” • (Note: The mere presence of an experience curve does not insure an entry barrier. Another critical prerequisite is that the experience be kept proprietary, and not be made available to competitors and potential entrants.)

27. Hours per unit, TN TN = (100)(N log.90/log2) 90% curve 80% curve Cumulative units, N

28. Aircraft Assembly (1925-57): 80% Calculator (1975-78): 74% © 1995 Corel Corp. Heart Transplants (1985-88): 79% © 1995 Corel Corp.

30. A Taxonomy of Barriers To Entry • Limits of “Learning Curve” Advantages: • Copying and reverse engineering of products; • Hiring a competitor’s employees; • Purchasing the know-how from consultants; • Obtaining the know-how from customers; and • Experience advantages are often nullified by innovations.

31. A Taxonomy of Barriers To Entry • (3) Intended Excess Capacity • Building extra capacity for the intended purpose of deterring entrants from entering the industry. (Note: potential free-rider problems) • Excess capacity deters entry by increasing the credibility of price cutting as an entry response by incumbents. • “Innocent” excess capacity: Demand is cyclical; Demand falls short of expectations; Demand is expected to grow.

32. A Taxonomy of Barriers To Entry • (4) Reputation • A history of incumbent firms reacting aggressively to entrants may play a role in current market interactions. • (5) Product Differentiation • Brand identification and customer loyalty to incumbent products may be a barrier to potential entrants (e.g. Coca-Cola). Product differentiation appears to be an important entry barrier in the market for over-the counter drugs and in the brewing industry

33. A Taxonomy of Barriers To Entry • (6) Capital Requirements • (7) High Switching Costs of Buyers • E.g., changing may require employee retraining (e.g., IV solutions, and computer software).

34. A Taxonomy of Barriers To Entry • (8) Access to Distribution Channels • The manufacturer of a new food product, for example, must persuade the retailer to give it space on the fiercely competitive supermarket shelf via promises of promotion, and intense selling efforts to retailers. • (9) Favorable Access to Raw Materials and to Markets • Alcoa --> bauxite • Exclusive dealing arrangements • Favorable geographic locations

35. A Taxonomy of Barriers To Entry • (10) Proprietary Technology • Product know how • Low cost product design • Patents (and other government restrictions) • (11) Exit barriers (of incumbents) can be entry barriers (to potential entrants)

36. A Taxonomy of Barriers To Entry • High exit costs: • High exogenous and endogenous sunk costs (not just high fixed costs!) • High asset specificity • Highly illiquid assets • Low salvage value if exit occurs • High switching costs • Low mobility of assets • Credible commitments • Irreversible investment e.g., Alaskan pipeline built in 1977 at a cost of $10 billion

37. Bargaining Power of Buyers • Buyers compete within the industry by forcing down prices, bargaining for higher quality or more services, and playing competitors against each other. • A buyer group is powerful when: • The buyer group is concentrated (potential collusion); • The buyer group purchases large volumes relative to seller sales (e.g., HMO power buying drugs); • The product is standard and undifferentiated; • Few switching costs on the part of the buyer; • High switching costs on the part of the seller; and • Buyers pose a credible threat of backward integration

38. Threat From Substitutes • Substitute products increase the industry’s overall elasticity of demand and limit the potential returns of the industry by placing a ceiling on the prices that firms in the industry can profitably charge. • Companies in the coffee industry compete indirectly in the tea and soft-drink industries (all three industries serve consumer needs for drinks).

39. Bargaining Power of Suppliers • Suppliers can be broadly defined as the supplier of any input: Labor, Management, Technology, Physical Materials • The bargaining power of suppliers is high when: • It is dominated by a few companies and is more concentrated than the industry it sells to; • It does not contend with substitute products; • The supplier’s product is an important input to the buyer’s business; and • Supplier’s products are differentiated (high switching costs for the buyer).

40. Degree Of Rivalry Increases When: • Industry Concentration is lower; • Industry Growth is slower; • Product Differentiation is lower; • Over-capacity is higher; and • Exit Barriers are higher • Price competition is highly unstable. Price cuts are quickly and easily matched by rivals, and once matched, they lower revenues for all firms (unless price elasticity of demand is high enough).

41. Degree Of Rivalry • Advertising battles, on the other hand, may well expand or enhance the level of product differentiation in the industry for the benefit for all firms. • In other words, advertising is not necessarily a “zero-sum” game.

42. The Uses of Industry Analysis • Static Analysis - • How Do We Explain Current Rivalry and Profitability? • Dynamic Analysis - • Where Is The Industry Headed In The Future?

43. demand time Industries Evolve Over Time As The Relationships Between The Five Forces Change • Dynamic 5-Forces Analysis

45. A Sixth Force - The Presence of “Complementors” • Complementors • Industry participants whose businesses enhance the value of yours • The opposite of Substitutes • The emergence of “Networks” of organizations • Examples • Computer manufacturers and software makers • Consumer electronics and entertainment companies • The Central Issue • How to get “complementors” to make strategic investments, which mutually benefit both companies?

46. A Sixth Force -The Presence of “Complementors” • The biggest benefit of considering complementors is that they add a cooperative dimension to Porter’s (1980) “competitive forces” model. • “Thinking [about] complements is a different way of thinking about business. It’s about finding ways to make the pie bigger rather than fighting with competitors over a fixed pie. To benefit from this insight, think about how to expand the pie by developing new complements or making existing complements more affordable” • Brandenburger & NalebuffCo-opetition

47. Empirical Testing of Structure-Conduct (Strategy)- Performance • ROE(j) = 14.7 + .050 CR4(j) + .119 [CAP/S](j) + (2.08) (1.98) 1.30 [A/S](j) +1.40 [R&D/S](j) +0.26 [GROW](j) (7.20) (2.95) (2.90) t-statistics in parentheses R-squared = .43 CR4 = 4-firm concentration ROE = return on equity R&D/S = R&D/Sales A/S = advertising/sales CAP/S = capital expenditures/Sales GROW = demand growth

48. Empirical Testing of Structure-Conduct (Strategy)- Performance • Model Specification • In practice, researchers estimate a statistical model of the following form where data are aggregated to the industry level: • Industry Profit Rates = f (Concentration, Barriers to Entry, Demand …)

49. Empirical Testing of Structure-Conduct (Strategy)- Performance • Model Specification • Multiple regression analysis seeks to evaluate the degrees to which deviations of the dependentvariable (and in this course our focus has been on profit rates as the dependent variable) from its mean are “explained by” or associated with variations in each of a set of independentor explanatory variables (e.g., concentration, barriers to entry, demand, etc.)

50. Empirical Testing of Structure-Conduct (Strategy)- Performance • Model Specification • The nature of this association is captured by regression coefficients relating the profit rates in the industry of each independent variable, allowing us to determine the effect, for example, of a 10% increase in seller concentration on profit rates, holding all other explanatory variables constant (i.e., “ceteris paribus”)