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OAuth Security

OAuth Security. Hannes Tschofenig Derek Atkins. State-of-the-Art. Design Team work late 2012/early 2013 Results documented in Appendix 3 (Requirements) and in Appendix 4 (Use Cases) of http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-05

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OAuth Security

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  1. OAuth Security Hannes Tschofenig Derek Atkins

  2. State-of-the-Art • Design Team work late 2012/early 2013 • Results documented in Appendix 3 (Requirements) and in Appendix 4 (Use Cases) of http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-05 • Two solution approaches documents available in the group: • MAC Token: draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-05 • HOTK: draft-tschofenig-oauth-hotk-03

  3. I Client Authorization Server III II Resource Server

  4. I Client Authorization Server III II Resource Server

  5. I: Key Distribution AS <-> Client • Variants: • Key Distribution at Token Issuance • Key Distribution at Registration • Approaches: • Server-provided key • Client-provided key • Joint key control / key agreement • Examples: • Section 3.1.2 of HOTK for asymmetric keys • Section 4.1 of MAC Token for symmetric keys

  6. Lifetime Hierarchy

  7. I Client Authorization Server III II Resource Server

  8. II: Client <-> RS Interaction • Components: • Proof of possession of client key • Message integrity / Channel Binding • Server-to-client authentication • As part of TLS • Custom application-layer solution • Examples: • Section 5 of MAC Token for symmetric keys (encoded as HTTP header) • Section 3.2.2 of HOTK for asymmetric keys • Section 3.2.1 of HOTK for symmetric keys (encoded as JSON structure)

  9. I Client Authorization Server III II Resource Server

  10. III: Key Distribution AS <-> RS • Variants: a) Embedded key b) Token introspection c) Out-of-band • Examples: Ad a) Section 4.2 of HOTK Ad b) draft-richer-oauth-introspection Ad c) PKI

  11. Next Steps: Document Restructuring • Use Cases, Requirements and Design Rational • Currently in the appendix of MAC Token • Update to reflect new use cases • Key Distribution AS <-> Client • Cover symmetric as well as asymmetric case • Client <-> RS Communication • Section 5 of MAC Token & Section 3.2 of HOTK. • Includes keyed message digest/signature calculation algorithm. • Includes binding to transport • Includes JSON structure. • Token introspection • Encoding of PoP in JWT (symmetric & asymmetric)

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