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Presenters

Janelle Burd , PE, LEED AP BD+C Sr. Mechanical Engineer/Fuel System Specialist 27 years of experience in fuel system design Pipeline Integrity Management Plans (IMP- POL) Engineering Project Planning Studies Hassan Sahudin , PE, LEED AP BD+C, ENV SP Sr. Structural Engineer/Project Manager

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Presenters

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  1. Janelle Burd, PE, LEED AP BD+C Sr. Mechanical Engineer/Fuel System Specialist 27 years of experience in fuel system design Pipeline Integrity Management Plans (IMP- POL) Engineering Project Planning Studies Hassan Sahudin, PE, LEED AP BD+C, ENV SP Sr. Structural Engineer/Project Manager 25 years of experience Specialized focus on fueling facilities Pipeline Integrity Management Plans (IMP-POL) Engineering Project Planning Studies Presenters 1

  2. PETRO Expo 2013 Pipeline Integrity Management Plan (IMP-POL) and Project Planning Studies (PPS) Common Deficiencies 18 November 2013

  3. Burns & McDonnell Overview IMP- POL’s & Planning Studies Assessment Objectives 3 Most Common Deficiencies Pipe Support Thermal Relief Containment Additional Deficiencies Conclusion Q &A Agenda 3

  4. Overview: Founded in 1898 100% Employee-Owned Over 4,300 Employees $2B in Revenues per year More than 30 Offices We deliver successful DOD projects worldwide 50+ years of experience in design, construction, inspection and operational assistance of POL facilities Partners include AFCEC, USACE, NAVFAC, National Guard, Reserves, DLA HQ, DLA-Energy Our Mission: “Make Our Clients Successful” Burns & McDonnell 4

  5. U.S. POL/Fueling Project Sites 5

  6. International Fueling Project Sites 6

  7. IMP-POL: 6 Regions total 57 sites completed 17 sites future Follow-On IMP: 1 site in US 2 sites in Japan Project Planning Study (PPS): 14 sites in US 1 each in Italy, Greece, Gitmo IMP-POL and PPS Sites 7

  8. What is an IMP-POL and Project Planning Study? Funded by Defense Logistic Agency – Energy (DLA-Energy) Two Parts of DLA-Energy’s Centrally Managed Program (CMP) Condition assessment programs IMP-POL and Project Planning Studies Automated Fuel Service Station Rail Maintenance Piers and Marine Loading Arms Terminal Automation Pressure Vessel Inspection (API 510) Pipeline Integrity Management Plan (IMP-POL) Project Planning Study (PPS) Automatic Tank Gauging Cathodic Protection System Integrity Management Hydrant System Tuning (upcoming) Tank Integrity Management (API 653 & STI) Pipeline Pressure Testing (API 570) 8

  9. Ultimate Goal for DLA-Energy and Installations: Provide site specific record for each facility Condition assessment Testing and inspection Intervals Responsible execution agency Plan and fund projects, improvements and repairs Risk management Ultimate Goal 9

  10. Local, State, and Federal Environment Governing Standards API and ASME NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code UFC 3-460-01, Petroleum Fuel Facilities UFC 3-460-03, Maintenance of Petroleum Systems UFGS-01 35 29, Safety and Occupational Health Requirements 33 CFR 156, Oil and Hazardous Material Transfer Operations 40 CFR 112, Oil Pollution Prevention 49 CFR 195, Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline DESC-P-12 - DLA-E / DESC Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM) Funding Policy for Fixed Petroleum Facilities Typical Codes and Standards 10

  11. Provide DLA-E and Base Fuels Personnel with: Assessment of facilities conditions and pipeline integrity Overview and understanding of existing POL infrastructure Record of the general integrity and condition of the piping systems A “road map” of integrity management and maintenance Identification of highest-risk elements Recommendations for further actions Assessment Objectives 11

  12. IMP-POL – Common Deficiencies 12

  13. Planning Studies – Issues 13

  14. Pipe Support Thermal Relief Secondary Containment 3 Most Common Deficiencies 14

  15. Issues: Lack of Isolation Pads Concrete Saddles Support failure Temporary Supports Inadequate Support No Lateral Restraint Spring Can Supports Disengaged Deficiency 1 - Pipe Support 15

  16. Lacks Isolation Pad Metal-metal contact Pipe Support 16

  17. Concrete Saddle Concrete-steel contact, moisture collection Pipe Support 17

  18. “Clamshell” anchors Moisture collection Pipe Support 18

  19. Metal Roller Supports Metal-metal contact Pipe Support 19

  20. “Spider” Supports Corrosion, displaced support Pipe Support 20

  21. Improper pipe supports Lacks Lateral Restraint Pipe Support 21

  22. Risks from Undetected/Unaddressed Issues: Excessive pipe movements Pipe or joint failure Equipment and Tank Damage Unintended release Environmental impact System shut down Impact to mission Risks: Pipe Support 22

  23. Risk Mitigation Recommendations: Metal to Metal contact – Teflon barriers, pads, pipe collars Concrete saddles – Replace with approved pipe support Support failure – Perform pipe stress analysis and replace Wood support – Replace with approved material Inadequate Support – Replace with appropriate style Owner Impact – Preventative maintenance is less costly than equipment repair/ replacement and potential environmental clean up Risk Mitigation: Pipe Support 23

  24. Issues: Insufficient Thermal Relief Cascading Issues Improper Setting Thermal Reliefs Not Tested Closed Isolation Valves The internal pipe pressure increase resulting from fluid thermal expansion can equal as much as 75 psi for every degree rise in the fuel temperature if not relieved! Deficiency 2 - Thermal Relief 24

  25. Risks from Undetected and Unaddressed Issues: Over pressurization of equipment and valves – Costly repairs and replacement Leaking Flanges and Joints – Increased maintenance costs Danger to operators due to high system pressures Potential for catastrophic failure of pipe or components Thermal Relief Risks 25

  26. Risk Mitigation Recommendations: Conduct a thermal relief study Change operating procedures – leave relief valve open Owner Impact – Preventative maintenance is less costly than equipment repair/ replacement and potential environmental clean up! Thermal Relief Risk Mitigation 26

  27. Regulations: 40 CFR Part 112, NFPA 30, and UFCs Issues: Absence of Secondary Containment Cracks in Containment Concrete Joints Sealant Failure Liner System Problems Lack of Containment Curbs Deficiency 3 – Secondary Containment 27

  28. Absence of Containment Over Water Risk contamination of waterways Secondary Containment 28

  29. Absence of Containment at Grade Risk ground contamination Secondary Containment 29

  30. Absence of Containment Below Grade Risk groundwater contamination Secondary Containment 30

  31. Cracks in Containment Concrete Breach in Containment Secondary Containment 31

  32. Joint Sealant Failure Breach in Containment Secondary Containment 32

  33. Liner System Problems Ineffective Containment Secondary Containment 33

  34. Lack of Curbing Ineffective Containment Secondary Containment 34

  35. Say What? Leak Detection Plant Secondary Containment 35

  36. Risks to unaddressed problems: Inability to detect small leaks Inability to contain fuel spills Environmental impact Non-compliance Containment Risks 36

  37. Risk Mitigation Recommendations: Repair cracks in concrete Seal joints with jet-fuel resistant sealant Provide adequately sized secondary containment or remote spill containment system Install perimeter curbs on equipment pads/pipe causeway Owner Impact – Preventative maintenance is less costly than equipment repair/ replacement and potential environmental clean up! Containment Risk Mitigation 37

  38. Additional Deficiencies: Brass/Bronze Bodied Valves Sight Flow Indicators Soil-Air / Concrete–Air Interfaces Product Labeling Lubricated Swivel Joints Fuel Lab Inadequate Ventilation Coating Failure Dissimilar Metals Inadequate Ground Clearance Additional Deficiencies 38

  39. Brass/Bronze Bodied Valves Issue: • Soft bodied valves and piping such as brass, bronze and copper present in fueling system. Risk: • NFPA 30 and 30A - Metals with lower melting point are not to be used in fueling systems. Recommended Mitigation: • Remove and replace with UFC compliant valves and piping. • UFC 3-460-01 - valves are to be CS or SS bodied. 39

  40. Sight Flow Indicators Issue: • Sight flow indicator in certain configurations are subject to tank head pressure or system pressure. Risks: • Sight glass failure may cause significant leak • UFC 3-460-01 - Sight flow indicators are not to be provided on thermal relief piping, filtration devices, or product recovery tanks. Recommendation: • Remove sight flow indicators in these configurations and repair the piping. 40

  41. Soil - Air Interface Issue: • Piping is not properly coated. Risks: • Deterioration of Extruded Polyethylene (UG pipe coating) coatings due to UV exposure Recommendation: • Expose the soil/air interface, prep and coat 12 inches below grade level and 6 inches above. • Heavy body, surface tolerant epoxy coating • Compatible with polyethylene and the existing aboveground pipe coating. 41

  42. Lubricated Swivel Joints Issues: • Lack of proper maintenance/lubrication may cause seized joints • Typically found at Truck Loading / Truck Offloading. (All Products) Risks: • Compromised fuel quality (Aviation Fuel) • UFC 3-460-01: Aluminum or SS non-lubricated swivel joints Recommendation: • Replace with non-lubricated type swivel joints 42

  43. Fuel Lab Inadequate Ventilation Issues: • Inadequate ventilation rate • Improper equipment Risks: • Air quality concern • Explosion hazard Recommendation: • Replace with proper fume hood 43

  44. Coating Failure Issue: • Coating failure causing pipe corrosion Risks: • Leaks in pipes • Failure at supports. Recommendation: • Clean and recoat • Piping - UFGS Spec Section 09 97 13.27. 44

  45. Dissimilar Metals Issues: • Galvanic corrosion Risks: • Failure of bolts • Maintenance issue Recommendation: • Provide isolation flange kit 45

  46. Inadequate Ground Clearance Issues: • Piping located too close to grade Risks: • Corrosion • Maintenance issue Recommendation: • Raise piping • 18” clearance min 46

  47. Conclusion How thorough assessments help Bases/Installations: • Identify items with higher risks of failure • Recommend Mitigation Plans • Reminder of items requiring maintenance and repairs • Awareness of funding mechanism A well-qualified consultant is a critical partner in your success ! 47

  48. Questions / Answers 48

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