問題：以開車為例

1. 問題：以開車為例 經驗的本質為何？ 心和世界的關係？

2. 三種取徑 • 認知主義（Cognitivism) (Chap. 3) • Connectionism (Chap. 5) • Enaction:Embodied Cognition (Chap. 6)

3. 認知主義的品牌隱喻 …the idea of a cognitive agent that is parachuted into a pregiven world. This agent will survive only to the extent that it is endowed with a map and learns to act on the basis of this map.

4. 認知主義（Cognitivism) Q: What is cognition? A: Information processing as symbolic computation—rule-based manipulation of symbols Q: How does it work? A: Through any device that can support and manipulate functional elements—the symbols. The system interacts only with the form of the symbols (their physical attributes), not their meaning.

5. 認知主義（Cognitivism) Q: How do I know when a cognitive system is functioning adequately? (效度） A: When the symbols appropriately represent some aspects of the real world, and the information processing leads to a successful solution of the problem given to the system. (p. 42-3) Q: 研究什麼？ 　系統如何形成外在世界的表徵，如何處理表徵，解決問題。

6. 表徵(representation)的兩層意義 • 弱版: …construing or representing the world a certain way (e.g. a map; 我（導讀）這本書) • 強版: ..this feature of cognition is to be explained by the hypothesis that a system acts on the basic of internal representation (p. 134)

7. 強版的本體論和知識論前提 • …the world is pregiven, that its features can be specified prior to any cognitive activity. • Our cognition is of this world • The way in which we cognize this pregiven world is to represent its features and then act on the basis of these representations (p. 135)

8. Connectionism的起源：Cybernetics …in actual brains there seem to be no rules, no central logical processor, nor does information appear to be stored in precise addresses. Rather, brains can be seen to operate on the basis of massive interconnections in a distributed form. (p. 85)

9. Connectionism: 起因於對認知主義的不滿 • 資訊處理以sequential rule為主，難以處理現實生活中大量的資料 • 任何環節出了問題，可能導致整個系統的崩潰　（反之，分散式系統比較穩定） • 從嬰兒的能力（接近生物能力）反而看到智力深層和基本的面貌(p. 86) • 無法適當回答：這些符號如何獲取意義？（p. 99-100) ..meaning is not located in particular symbols; it is a function of the global state of the system…(p. 100)

10. Connectionist strategy Q: What is cognition? A: The emergence of a global state in a network of simple components (neuralike, simple, unintelligent components), which reach a mutually satisfactory state. Q: How does it work? A: Through local rules for individual operation and rules for changes in the connectivity among the elements.

11. Connectionist strategy Q: How do I know when a cognitive system is functioning adequately? (效度） A: When the emergent properties (and resulting structure) can be seen to correspond to a specific cognitive capacity—a successful solution to a required task. Q: 研究什麼？ 　次系統如何互動？認知、知覺如何浮現(emerge)？

12. Connectionism: 以視覺為例 （圖5.3, p. 95) ..the behavior of the whole system resembles a cocktail party conversation much more than a chain of command (p. 96) An individual neuron participates in many such global patterns and bears little significance when taken individually. In this sense, the basic mechanism of recognition of a visual object..could be said to be the emergence of a global state among resonating neruonal ensembles. (p. 96)

13. 對知識、心的再反省 • 表徵系統有時而窮: infinite regress • 追求基礎的迷思: Cartesian anxiety

14. 表徵的侷限：以開車為例（p. 147) ..unlike the world of chess playing, movement among objects is not a space that can be said to end neatly at some point…The driving world does not end at some point; it has the structure of ever-receding levels of details that blend into a nonspecific background. Indeed, successfully directed movement such as driving depends upon acquired motor skills and the continuous use of common sense or background know-how. (p. 147)

15. 表徵的侷限：以開車為例（p. 147) Such commonsense knowledge is difficult, perhaps impossible, to package into explicit, propositional knowledge—”knowledge that”…since it is largely a matter of readiness to hand or “knowledge how”…it is not clear that we can even specify what is to count as an object independent of the type of action that is being performed. The individuation of objects, properties, and events appears to vary according to the task at hand. (p. 148) 這個過去視為邊緣議題的知識應該成為研究的焦點

16. Why the idea of a world with pregiven features or ready-made information seems so unquestionable?(p. 140) Cartesian anxiety: ‘either we have a fixed and stable foundation for knowledge, a point where knowledge starts, is grounded, and rests, or we cannot escape some sort of darkness, chaos, and confusion”(p. 140) ….arises form the craving for an absolute ground(可以是客觀的世界或主觀）

17. 一、再訪Knowing-how, common sense …knowledge depends on being in a world that is inseparable from our bodies, our language, and our social history---in short, from our embodiment. (p. 149) …knowledge is the result of an ongoing interpretation that emerges from our capacities of understanding. These capacities are rooted in the structures of our biological embodiment but are lived and experienced within a domain of consensual action and cultural history. (p. 149)

18. 一、再訪Knowing-how, common sense ..common sense is none other than our bodily and social history, then the inevitable conclusion is that knower and known, mind and world, stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or dependent origination. (p. 150)

19. 二、再訪自我組織：引入structurual coupling • 每一系統發展出與環境連結的獨特方式，其歷史進一步影響後來互動的方式。 • 規則：並無表徵系統，只有closure的標準以及連結的方式。 • 詮釋：the enactment of a domain of distinctions out of a background (p. 156)

20. 以顏色為例 • 不同波長的光線和看到的顏色之間並無完全對應的關係。換句話說，對於顏色的感知並非由外界事物的屬性所決定。 • 許多次結構參與視覺。同時，對於顏色的知覺和對其形狀、質地、動作等的知覺難以分開。更進一步，視覺和其他感官又相互作用，最終對顏色的知覺是各種元素互動浮現的特質（emergent property)。可參考Mr. I的例子。(p. 164)

21. 以顏色為例 • 顏色的知覺是structural coupling的結果（p. 165-6)。“what counts as surface may in fact involve tacit reference to a type of perceiver” (p. 167) • 有些顏色的分類是culture-specific, 有些是species specific. 可見對顏色的認知並非「還原recover」客觀世界的特性而已。它們是經驗、共識和身體的產物。它們也受到我們生物、文化歷程中連結經驗的影響。（p. 171)

22. 以顏色為例 • 生物對顏色的認知不同，是與環境連結的長久經驗所造成，並非還原客觀世界的屬性。 　因此，our perceived world of color is, rather, a result of one possible and viable phylogenic pathway among many others realized in the evolutionary history of living beings (p. 183).

23. Enaction的主導隱喻 We are always constrained by the path we have laid down, but there is no ultimate ground to prescribe the steps that we take. It is precisely this lack of an ultimate ground that we have evoked at various points in this book by writing of groundlessness. (p. 214)

24. Enaction (p. 206-7) Q: What is cognition? A: Enaction: A history of structural coupling that brings forth a world (note: the difference between physical world and environment). Q: How does it work? A: Through a network consisting of multiple levels of interconnected, sensorimotor subnetworks.

25. Embodied • Cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities • These individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context

26. Action • Sensory and motor processes, perception and action, are fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition. Indeed, the two are not merely contingently linked in individuals; they have also evolved together. (p. 173)

27. Enaction 1. Perception consists in perceptually guided action (e.g., Held and Hein kitten experiment, p. 174-5) perception is not simply embedded within and constrained by the surrounding world; it also contributes to the enactment of this surrounding world.

28. Enaction 2. Cognitive structure emerges from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided (p. 173) (e.g., basic level category, for example, chair)

29. Basic level category • Are used, or interacted with, by similar motor actions • Have similar perceived shapes and can be imagined • Have identifiable humanly meaningful attributes • Are categorized by young children • Have linguistic primacy (p. 177)

30. 轉向無根基（groundlessness) 重新看世界： …the world is not an object, event, or process inside the world. Indeed the world is like a background—a setting of and field for all of our experience, but one that cannot be found apart from our structure, behavior, and cognition (p. 142)

31. 轉向無根基（groundlessness) 重新看心靈和系統： Cognitive systems are not to be understood “on the basis of their input and output relationships but by their operational closure”. A system that has operational closure is one in which the result of its processes are those processes themselves. The notion of operational closure is thus a way of specifying classes of processes that, in their very operation, turn back upon themselves to form autonomous networks. Such networks do not fall into the class of systems defined by external mechanisms of control (heteronomy) but rather into the class of systems defined by internal mechanisms of self-organization (autonomy)…Instead of representing an independent world, they enact a world as a domain of distinction that is inseparable from the structure embodied by the cognitivie system. (p. 139-40)

32. 轉向無根基（groundlessness) …groundlessness is the very condition for the richly textured and interdependent world of human experience...all of our activities depend on a background that can never be pinned down with any sense of ultimate solidity and finality…Indeed, groundlessness is revealed in cognition as ‘common sense,’ that is, in knowing how to negotiate our way through a world that is not fixed and pregiven but that is continually shaped by the types of action in which we engage. (p. 144)

33. 轉向無根基（groundlessness) The greatest ability of living cognition, however, consists in being able to pose, within broad constraints, the relevant issues that need to be addressed at each moment. These issues and concerns are not pregiven but are enacted from a background of action, where what counts as relevant is contextually determined by our common sense. (p. 145)

34. Enaction (pp. 206-7) Q: How do I know when a cognitive system is functioning adequately? (效度） A: When it becomes part of an ongoing existing world (as the young of every species do) or shapes a new one (as happens in evolutionary history). Q: 研究什麼？ 一、系統的結構(e.g. image schemata)為何？二、系統如何和環境連結？三、規則性如何產生？（p. 206)

35. 認知科學從進化論的反攻 • Cognition and perception is “largely a result of biological evolution and its mechanism of natural selection. Therefore our perception and cognition have survival value, and so they must provide us with some more or less optimal fit to the world. ”(p. 180)

36. 對於新達爾文主義的批評 • Linkage • Development • Random genetic drift:sampling error • Stasis • Units of selection “The constraints of survival and reproduction are far too weak to provide an account of how structures develop and change” (e.g., John’s new suit)

37. John’s new suit ..the very decision to buy a suit is not given from the outset as a problem but is constituted by the global situation of his life. His final choice has the form of satisfying some very loose constraints (e.g., being well dressed) but does not have the form of a fit---and even less of of an optimal fit—to nay of these constraints (p. 194).

38. 新觀點 • Prescriptive logic---> Proscriptive logic • Pirnciple of satisficing: bricolage, viablility • Mutual specification and codetermination of living beings and environments (e.g. Gibson’s concept of affordances)