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Aligning Local Incentives to Regional Goals: Water Conservation in the Upper Tigris-Euphrates River System

Aligning Local Incentives to Regional Goals: Water Conservation in the Upper Tigris-Euphrates River System. Dr. Hasan Tekgüç Economics Department Mardin Artuklu Universit y . Euphrates-Tigris Basin in South-eastern Turkey. Atatürk Dam. Harran.

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Aligning Local Incentives to Regional Goals: Water Conservation in the Upper Tigris-Euphrates River System

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  1. Aligning Local Incentives to Regional Goals: Water Conservation in the Upper Tigris-Euphrates River System Tekguc local incentives Dr. Hasan Tekgüç EconomicsDepartment Mardin Artuklu University

  2. Euphrates-Tigris Basin in South-eastern Turkey Atatürk Dam Tekguc local incentives Harran

  3. Simple Idea (inspiredbySaysel et al., 2002) • The most important insight of the simulation exercise bySaysel et al., (2002) is thatby rationing irrigation water in GAP project, the agricultural and hydropower performance can be improved. Rationing irrigation water will lead to careful use of this scarce resource and the negative externalities of excessive irrigation will be reduced. Tekguc local incentives

  4. Simple Idea (inspiredbySaysel et al., 2002) • Sharing water between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria need not to be a zero-sum game. • Farmers in Harran Plain in South-eastern Turkey suffer from problems related to over-irrigation: soil salinity, rising water tables, etc. • Improving water conservation in Harran Plain can simultaneously release more water to downstream countries. Tekguc local incentives

  5. Irrigation related problems will get worse if business as usual practices continues • Predictions (e.g. Kurnaz, 2010, WB) for the effects of CC for the region agree that • less winter rainfall, snow cover, etc. • Increase in mean temperatures and variability • All leading to water deficits for summer crops. • Moreover, irrigation canals from Atatürk Dam are expanded toward East. Tekguc local incentives

  6. Canals are laid out to bring water to Mardin Plain in the GAP region • Water use projections for Mardin Plain are again very optimistic, • Most likely farmers will plant water intensive crops forshort-term gain (groundwater is already employed for corn production). So • At the very least conserving water at the head of canal will release more water to farmers at the tail-end within GAP region. Tekguc local incentives

  7. How to improve water conservation in irrigated areas? • Farmer Training (lowhanging fruit): • On the ground, hands-on farmer training: Expert opinion, Adaman & Özertan (2007). • Volumetric Water Pricing: currently area and crop based. Water price is practicallyvery low (i.e. not discouragingwasteful habits). • ReformingWUAs: • WUA boards are inept but they keep water fees low and independent of volume. Tekguc local incentives Focus on item 3, since an effective WUA is also crucial for dissemination of new knowledge and can justify higher user fees.

  8. ReformingWUAs • WUAs are unable to ensure equitable distribution of water. • They fall short of adequate maintenance and repair. • Executive committee members and powerful farmers either evade fees or get significant reductions. • WUAs are dominated by local elites; they do not perform the necessary maintenance; and they are not effective in disseminating valuable information on irrigation to their members (Kadirbeyoğlu and Özertan, 2010). Tekguc local incentives

  9. ResearchExtension 1: How torefromWUAs? • Term Limits for board members. • More vigilant audit by central authority to weed out corruption and ensure adequate maintenance. • Create conditions to motivate ordinary members to seek board seats. • Are WUAs too large for effective local control? • Investigate the relationship btw land ownership and political power on WUA board. Tekguc local incentives

  10. ResearchExtension 2: Calculatingwater & poverty Tekguc local incentives MultipledimensionsOF Water& Poverty: WEILAI (EE, 2010)

  11. DİKA PovertyMap • RecentlyRegional Development Officesbecameoperational in Turkey. • Dicle Kalkınma Ajansı (DİKA) covering Mardin, Şırnak, Siirt Batman is preparingPovertyMapfortheRegion… • Can it be possibletoincorporatewaterrelatedissuestopovertymap? Tekguc local incentives

  12. Tekguc local incentives Measuresthatcan be obtainedfromnationalrecords (regionalvariables) Theaboveinformation can be obtainedfromregionalstateofficialsoncetheresearchareaselected.

  13. Tekguc local incentives Kadirbeyoğlu & Özertan (2011): Aydın & Urfa WUA’s Measuresthat can be obtainedfromsurveys (micro data)

  14. Tekguc local incentives Parladır & Uçan (2010): Isparta WUA’s Collect data on water and WUA effectiveness and performance

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