Tatyana Novossiolova Wellcome Trust Doctoral Researcher University of Bradford

1. Consolidating the Efforts for Implementing Biosecurity Education: Lessons Learnt from the Nuclear Security Education Experience Tatyana Novossiolova Wellcome Trust Doctoral Researcher University of Bradford

2. Outline: • Need for Biosecurity Education • Overview of Nuclear Security Education • Implications

3. A.1 Lack of Biosecurity Awareness analysis of the reasons for this lack of awareness include, inter alia, the lack of university courses covering aspects related to the BWC and related (bio-)security issues, either because the curriculum developers do not consider the topic to be important or have difficulty fitting teaching material on biosecurity into what they claim is an already overcrowded curriculum, or because of a lack of expertise and access to relevant teaching material.

4. A.2 Value of Biosecurity Education • The Conference notes the value of national implementation measures, as appropriate, in accordance with the constitutional process of each State Party, to: • (a) implement voluntary management standards on biosafety and biosecurity; • (b) encourage the consideration of development of appropriate arrangements to promote awareness among relevant professionals in the private and public sectors and throughout relevant scientific and administrative activities and; • (c) promote amongst those working in the biological sciences awareness of the obligations of States Parties under the Convention, as well as relevant national legislation and guidelines;

5. A.3 Biosecurity Education and the BTWC • Standing Agenda Items for the new Intersessional Process 2012-2015 • Under Standing Agenda Item Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology related to the Convention, the State Parties agreed to discuss education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and biotechnology.

6. A.4 Limits of Biosecurity Education • ‘[…] ethics is not a vaccine that can be administered in one doseand have long-lasting effects no matter how often, or in whatconditions, the subject is exposed the disease agent. Teachingindividual students and postdoctoral fellows good professionalpractices cannot be highly and widely efficacious until academicculture and society also model and reward ethical behaviour.’ ‘[…] responsibility cannot be discharged solely at the level of individual scientist’s projects and publications. It is necessary that a wider framework of understanding is developed so that dual use and bioterrorism are seen as only part of a much wider problem of protecting the life sciences from large-scale militarisation.’

7. A.5 Toward a Culture of Responsibility • Need for continuing professional development • Development: facilitating peaceful cooperation in biotechnology • Research: contributing to the development of research oversight • Compliance: supporting the implementation of biosafety and biosecurity measures at national level; • Institutional: contributing to the Intersessional Process of the BTWC

8. B.6 Nuclear Security Education IAEA Board of Governors: Nuclear Security Plans 2010-2013 • The Agency will integrate specific activities…to ensure sustainability of nuclear security improvements. Human resource development covering both training and academic educational programmes will be provided to address the range of national responsibilities. The Agency will also provide support to States who wish to develop nuclear security support centres.

9. B.7 Developing Nuclear Security Curriculum • IAEA Educational Guide in Nuclear Security • Goal: to facilitate the development of comprehensive nuclear security human resource development programme with the purpose of building up and maintaining relevant knowledge and skills, and sustaining qualified personnel dealing with future nuclear security challenges • M.Sc. in Nuclear Security • Certificate Programme in Nuclear Security

10. B.8 M.Sc. Nuclear Security (i) • Core Courses • International and National Legal Framework Regulating Nuclear Security; • Threat Assessment; • Detection of Criminal or Unauthorised Acts Involving Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control; • Interdiction of, and Response to, Criminal or Unauthorised Acts Involving Nuclear and other Radioactive Material.

11. B.9 M.Sc. Nuclear Security (ii) Elective Courses • Risk Assessment and Management of State Nuclear Security Measures; • Import/Export and Transit Control Mechanism and Regime; • Nuclear Security at Major Public Events; • Cooperation of Stakeholders at National and International Level; • IT/Cyber security.

12. B.10 INSEN • International Nuclear Security Education Network – established in March 2010 to foster collaboration between the IAEA and educational and research institutions, and competent authorities • Mission: ‘to enhance global nuclear security by developing, sharing, and promoting excellence in nuclear security education’ • Key areas of work: • Development of educational resources • Staff development and knowledge sharing; • Student exchange programmes; • Quality assurance and evaluation of effectiveness.

13. B.11 Structure of INSEN • Free membership • Working Groups • Exchange of information and development of materials for nuclear security education (WG I) • Faculty development and cooperation among educational institutions (WG II) • Promotion of nuclear security education (WG III)

14. B.12 CPD in Nuclear Security • World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) – established in September 2011 to ‘fill an urgent gap’ • Complements the work of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) which is preoccupied with nuclear safety • WINS ‘is particularly focused on ensuring that nuclear operating organisations take proper responsibility for security at all levels, up to and including the board of directors’

15. B.13 WINS Model of Operation • ‘Best practice’ workshops at international, regional and national level; • Publication of freely available practical guides based on the outcomes of the workshops; • Development of training materials and accredited short courses; • Establishment of accredited regional training centres of excellence • Budget (2009/10): $6.6 million + additional $3.5 million.

16. Launched in 2012 Aim: to make a significant contribution by establishing mechanism for promoting Professional Development (PD) in the nuclear security field and to create an environment that leads to the recognition of the Nuclear Security Manager as a recognised and regulated profession and to ensure that other key organisational professions (such asdeign engineers, safety management, Senior Management, off-site armed response agencies, etc.) have PD materials available to them. B.14 WINS Academy

17. C.15 Lesson One: State Commitment • Need for international collaboration and consensus regarding the implementation of biosecurity education • Need for synchronised action strategy and policy formulation • Combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches (e.g. Canada)

18. C.16 Lesson Two: Education for All • Development and implementation of biosecurity academic curricula both at undergraduate and post-graduate level (e.g. Bradford, Manchester) • Staff development programmes • Preparation of educational resources • Continuing professional development for practising life scientists

19. C.17 Lesson Three: All-Inclusive Approach • Need for engaging as many stakeholders as possible: life scientists, industry, funding agencies, biosafety boards, professional associations, publishers and editors of scientific journals • Complementary measures: competency standards, mechanisms for research oversight and institutional review, codes of conduct

20. C.18 Lesson Four: Long-Term Process • Fostering a culture of responsibility in the life sciences cannot happen overnight • Standards of Procedure  Standards of Behaviour • Biosecurity education is essential but per se insufficient