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Classics Of FPV. Erik Seligman CS 510, Lecture 10, January 2009. Goals. View examples of successful FPV cases Abstracted a bit from real life But concepts reusable for actual design See common patterns of FPV usage Begin building ‘cookbook’ for designers Use past successes as guide
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Classics Of FPV Erik Seligman CS 510, Lecture 10, January 2009
Goals • View examples of successful FPV cases • Abstracted a bit from real life • But concepts reusable for actual design • See common patterns of FPV usage • Begin building ‘cookbook’ for designers • Use past successes as guide • Recognize cases well-suited for FPV
What is this example? • From Ken McMillan’s thesis • Key example using BDDs for FPV • Major early-90’s PoC that FPV is viable • Basics of Gigamax Cache • Distributed multiprocessor system • Detailed prototcol for maintaining coherence • Multiple proc need consistent view of memory • Bus free between req & response, for other activity • Memory block may be invalid, shared, or owned state at each processor • One ‘master’ chosen on a bus at each cycle
Important Properties for Cache Coherence • Free from deadlock • Sequential Consistency • Various safety properties • Q: state ‘free from deadlock’ in SVA • Given variables readable and writable
Important Properties for Cache Coherence • Free from deadlock • Sequential Consistency • Various safety properties • Q: state ‘free from deadlock’ in SVA • Given variables readable and writable A1: assert property (##[0:$] readable && ##[0:$] writable)
FPV Found Deadlock • Based on abstract model of protocol • Found long sequence of events that would lead to deadlock • Owner of mem block sends write cmd • Remote block sends read to owner • Requests pass in transit • Another remote request for same block • Locks global bus, nobody unlocks • New find, unknown to makers of Gigamax!
Packet Assembly Example • Abstracted from PCI-Express verification • FPV done by Erik • Fixed-size packets (DWORDS) from link layer • Assembled into transactions • Start, end, type markers visible • Data errors detected & abort transaction • Transaction may have variable # of packets • Type info at transaction start • Transaction may commit or abort • “Garbage traffic” must be ignored • System guarantees no fake transaction-start
Link/Transaction Interface (abstract view) Addr Transaction Data DWORDS Assembly Misc commit abort
FPV Challenge • Model complete correctness? • Possible, but would require lots of code • Estimated to rival size of RTL • Insufficient ROI • Instead, create set of safety properties • Observe start, end, commit/abort, and types • Can you guess some properties?
FPV Safety Properties • Examples of implemented properties • If START seen, END seen at legal time • After END, see a COMMIT or ABORT in specified amount of time • Without END, see no COMMIT or ABORT • Required “shadow model” code • Limited modeling but not full packet checking • Kept track of various parts of state: • Inside or outside transaction • Transaction type
FPV Results • Basic method used for several chipsets • Found serious errors missed by sim • Simulation env omitted certain transactions • Garbage traffic created fake transaction • Could get into bad state & not commit or abort one packet • Unlucky data confusing the state machine
Transaction Queue • Another abstracted PCIE case • Also FPVed by Erik • FIFO stores incoming transactions New Transaction Misc Logic Backpressure Handle Transaction
Transaction Queue FPV • Designer was worried about overflow • Minimized size due to area/timing worries • But what if transactions arrive too fast? • Misc logic must create backpressure in time • Some transactions need to hold >1 cycle • FPV requirements • Assumption: backpressure works assume property (backpressure |=> !trans_valid); • Assertion: queue won’t overflow assert property (!(fifo_cur == FIFO_MAX));
FPV Results • First got bogus pass, needed coverage cover property (fifo_cur == FIFO_MAX-1); • Revealed some minor assumption errors Found real bug! • Queue needed to be 1 deeper • Or generate backpressure one cycle earlier • Due to backpressure latency in misc logic • Miscalculation by designer
DDR2 Memory Controller (MC) • Described in 2008 Datta/Singhal paper • Various safety requirements • Priority: refresh, CAS, scrub, read, write • Max # commands in interval
Issue: Complex Startup • Control registers • Set by system during boot • Take thousands of cycles • FPV would never get a good result! • Similar issues with software startup • Many command words needed to initialize Get simulation values for registers, use assumptions to set & hold constant
Opportunity: Design Symmetry • All bits of datapath basically identical • So reduce width to 1 for FPV • Code must be well-parameterized to enable • 8 Banks in design, all with identical logic • Just need to FPV 1 for good confidence
Issue: Large Counters • 13-bit refresh interval, 12-bit scrub interval • So potentially 2^13 cycles to see error • Worse if independent & need both at once! • Solution: abstract counters • Create cut points at counter outputs • Counters get arbitrary values for FPV • Potential problems?
Issue: Hazard Conditions • Important to check hazards like RAW • Read-after-write (RAW): Read from address with write pending • Requires 32-bit address compare • Complexity for FPV • Solution: free the RAW bit • At arbitrary time, FPV can assume hazard hit • Potential problems?
MC Property Example • No more than 4 ACTIVATE commands may be issued to the DDR2 SDRAM within a window of T_FAW clock cycles • Added verilog code for tfaw_counter • Property violated: bug found!
Reference Models i1 RTL o1 i2 o2 Abstract Model o1 o2 • assert property (rtl.o1 == abstract.o1) • assert property (rtl.o2 == abstract.o2)
Shadow Models i1 RTL o1 i2 o2 Shadow Model o1 • assert property (rtl.o1 == abstract.o1) • o2 not represented in model, no property
Arbiters • Classic, common case for useful FPV • Multiple requests come for a bus • Arbiter decides who owns bus each cycle • What are some important properties?
Arbiters • Classic, common case for useful FPV • Multiple requests come for a bus • Arbiter decides who owns bus each cycle • What are some important properties? • Fair req[i] |-> ##[1:`BOUND] owner[i] owner[i] |-> ##[1:`BOUND] !owner[i] • Conflict-free $onehot0(owner) • Efficiency • (|req) |=> (|owner)
State Machines • Another common case for FPV • Common state machine assertions?
State Machines • Another common case for FPV • Common state machine assertions? • Each SM state reachable cover property (state == STATE_VALS[i]); • System consistent with SM state assert property ((state == `WAITING) |-> (req==1)); • State machine will always return to idle assert property ((state == STATE_VAL[i]) |-> ##[1:`BOUND] (state == `IDLE));
General FIFO Assertions • Fifos are another common FPV case. • Fifo assertion ideas?
General FIFO Assertions • Fifos are another common FPV case. • Fifo assertion ideas? • Overflow/underflow assert property (fifo_cur==DEPTH |=> !write); assert property (fifo_cur==0 |=> !read); • Successful flush assert property (flush |=> (fifo_cur==0)); • Cover conditions of filling/emptying queue cover property (fifo_cur==DEPTH-1 ##1 fifo_cur==DEPTH); cover property (fifo_cur==1 ##1 fifo_cur=0);
FIFO: Tracking A Value • Common for FIFO: we saw value go in, make sure it comes out • “Local variable” feature of SVA property data_check; bit [`SIZE:0] lvar; (write, lvar = data_in) |-> ##[0:`BOUND] (read && (data_out == lvar)) ); • Watch for danger of sim performance hit • Many threads may be needed
Sets of Related Properties • Suppose we see many failures in module • Think about common causes • Some overall constraint on inputs missing? • Some conceptual issue missed? • Examples • Clocks/Reset: Are they correct? Are clock ratios legal? • Address/Command const for <n> cycles? • Legal commands supplied?
References / Further Reading • http://www.kenmcmil.com/pubs/thesis.pdf • http://oskitech.com/papers/datta-mc-vlsi08.pdf • http://oskitech.com/wiki/index.php?title=Main_Page • http://www.eetimes.com/news/design/showArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=FQOK0R2XZXMHOQSNDLRSKHSCJUNN2JVN?articleID=190301228&pgno=1 • http://ebook.dicder.com/verification/SystemVerilog%20Assertion%20Handbook.pdf • http://www.amazon.com/Assertion-Based-Design-Information-Technology-Transmission/dp/1402080271/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1233705569&sr=8-1 (especially ch.7)