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Administrivia

Administrivia. Final exam: Wed, May 12, 3:00-5:00, in this room Q&A on it today Playoffs: Fri, May 14, noon-2:00, FEC 141 Post-class survey (anonymous). The Java Security Model. Playing in the sandbox. Notions of security. What does it mean for a program to be “secure”?

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Administrivia

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  1. Administrivia • Final exam: Wed, May 12, 3:00-5:00, in this room • Q&A on it today • Playoffs: Fri, May 14, noon-2:00, FEC 141 • Post-class survey (anonymous)

  2. The Java Security Model Playing in the sandbox...

  3. Notions of security • What does it mean for a program to be “secure”? • Nobody can convince the program to do “evil things” • Corrupt data • Release private data • Elevate privileges • The program itself is not allowed to do evil things • Read files it shouldn’t • Talk to hosts it shouldn’t • Replicate

  4. The role of security in Java • Java security model is 2nd case • Theoretically: program can’t do evil  no user can make it do evil • In practice, not so clearcut • Hard to let program do “good” things w/o also making possible “bad” things • E.g., file accesses, etc.

  5. The sandbox mark I (Java 1.0) • Old security model: “Sandbox” • “Untrusted” code (e.g., downloaded from web) • Idea: code shouldn’t be allowed to do very risky things -- touch files, talk to network, etc. • Predetermined list of risky stuff • JVM denies (exception) those accesses • Good: all prog activities have to pass through JVM  all risky stuff is caught and blocked • Bad: Fixed “black list” • Not granular enough for general use

  6. Sandbox mark I Trusted Java Code Normal JVM Kernel/OS API

  7. Sandbox mark I Trusted Java Code Normal JVM Kernel/OS API

  8. Sandbox mark I Trusted Java Code Normal JVM Kernel/OS API

  9. Sandbox mark I Trusted Java Code Normal JVM Kernel/OS API

  10. Sandbox mark I Trusted Java Code Normal JVM Kernel/OS API

  11. Sandbox mark I Trusted Java Code Untrusted Java Code Normal JVM Secure JVM (appletviewer/ browser) Kernel/OS API

  12. Sandbox mark I Trusted Java Code Untrusted Java Code Normal JVM Secure JVM (appletviewer/ browser) Kernel/OS API

  13. Sandbox mark I Trusted Java Code Untrusted Java Code Normal JVM Secure JVM (appletviewer/ browser) Kernel/OS API

  14. Sandbox mark I Trusted Java Code Untrusted Java Code Normal JVM Secure JVM (appletviewer/ browser) Kernel/OS API

  15. Sandbox mark I Trusted Java Code Untrusted Java Code Normal JVM Secure JVM (appletviewer/ browser) Kernel/OS API

  16. Sandbox mark I Trusted Java Code Untrusted Java Code Normal JVM Secure JVM (appletviewer/ browser) Kernel/OS API

  17. Problems with mark I • Too coarse • Disallows all file accesses • Disallows all process spawning • Etc. • Can’t distinguish between different users • Can’t distinguish “trusted” from “untrusted” code • Can’t say “I trust code from site X, but nobody else” or “I don’t trust code from site Y”

  18. Sandbox revisited: security mark II • New model: security manager • General Java class that decides on per-operation basis what’s legal • Configurable by host program/host JVM • Can ID users & track their permissions • Also: support for “signed” applets/mobile code • Cryptographic signature attached to code • Use to verify sender of the code • Can attach permissions to code authors (sites) • Supported in Jar file format

  19. Sandbox mark II Permissions database (signed) Java Code Normal JVM Security manager object Kernel/OS API

  20. Sandbox mark II Permissions database (signed) Java Code Normal JVM Security manager object Kernel/OS API

  21. Sandbox mark II Permissions database (signed) Java Code Normal JVM Security manager object Kernel/OS API

  22. Sandbox mark II Permissions database (signed) Java Code Normal JVM Security manager object Kernel/OS API

  23. Sandbox mark II Permissions database (signed) Java Code Normal JVM Security manager object Kernel/OS API

  24. Sandbox mark II Permissions database (signed) Java Code Normal JVM Security manager object Kernel/OS API

  25. Sandbox mark II Permissions database (signed) Java Code Normal JVM Security manager object Kernel/OS API

  26. Customizable security • Security database • Which sites can send trusted code • Which operations are allowed to specific users • Security manager object • Defined by java.lang.SecurityManager • Can sub-class to modify behavior • Maybe add security checks?

  27. Other Java security tools • Crypto • Public & private key • Encryption, decryption, secure hash fns • Signing, certificates • PKI (limited support) • Pluggable crypto algorithms • Policies • Generalized permission objects • Access control lists • Security databases • Customizable policy objects

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