110 likes | 204 Vues
Norms as negotiation resource. Summary Bürgin/Schimmelfennig (2007): Entrapped again: The Way to EU Membership Negotiations with Turkey; paper presented at University of Pittsburgh 25-27 January 2007. Scientific Controversy: How to explain the result of negotiations?.
E N D
Norms as negotiation resource Summary Bürgin/Schimmelfennig (2007): Entrapped again: The Way to EU Membership Negotiations with Turkey; paper presented at University of Pittsburgh 25-27 January 2007 Asst. Prof. Dr. Alexander Bürgin IUE
Scientific Controversy: How to explain the result of negotiations? • Liberal Intergovermentalism • Convergence of interests • Structural negotiation power • Constructivist Supranationalism • Socialisation processes • Rationalist Supranationalism • Influence of supranational actors • Norms as negotiation resource Asst. Prof. Dr. Alexander Bürgin IUE
Research question: Explaining the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey • Divergence of member state preferences in the late 1990s concerning membership of Turkey • How can the agreement on accession negotiations with Turkey be explained in the face of the widespread reluctance among governments? Asst. Prof. Dr. Alexander Bürgin IUE
Thesis: Impact of norms explains the decision • Interaction among gvts was constrained by the EU’s community norms rather than by the member states’ relative bargaining power • Arguments based on community norms mobilized normative pressure – leading to the acceptance of accession negotiations with Turkey Asst. Prof. Dr. Alexander Bürgin IUE
Arguments based on community norms • Promises of the past: Association agreement 1963, final goal of custom union • Standards of liberal democracy: EU obliged to consider all applications according to the same standards of liberal democracy; thus Turkey’s application cannot be dismissed by reference to socio-economic or cultural incompatibility • Credibility: Non-respect of agreements harmful for the image of the EU as reliable partner Asst. Prof. Dr. Alexander Bürgin IUE
Luxemburg 1997 • Context: • Decision to open negotiation with CEEC • Position and Arguments • Strong majority against EU-membership of Turkey • Consensus: close relationship with Turkey • Result • No candidate status, but: accession possible if Copenhagen criteria are fulfilled • Opponents did not achieve to break with membership perspective Asst. Prof. Dr. Alexander Bürgin IUE
Helsinki 1999 • Context • Bad relationship between Turkey and EU • Position and arguments • Consensus: need to ameliorate relationship • Government changed in Germany • Position change in Greece due to Cyprus • Result • Interest constellation explains candidate status • Widespread perception: Turkey will not achieve the standards and can be convinced of other option as membership Asst. Prof. Dr. Alexander Bürgin IUE
Explanation for Candidate Status • Impact of norms: Promises of the past forbid a break with membership perspective 1997 • Interest constellation: explained the conferring of candidate status 1999 • Candidate status as new norm: Strong commitment that only the fulfilment of Copenhagen Criteria decide about opening of accession negotiations – supporters of Turkey could now depoliticise the debate Asst. Prof. Dr. Alexander Bürgin IUE
Brussels 2004 • Context • Copenhagen 2002: decision about opening of negotiations based on Commission report • Positive Commission Report • Cyprus referendum failed because of Greek NO • Position and arguments • Opponents: Absorption capacity of the EU, recognition of Cyprus • Supporters: refer to agreement of 2002 (De-politicisation) • Result • Opening 2005 (custom union with Cyprus required) Asst. Prof. Dr. Alexander Bürgin IUE
Brussels 2005 • Context • Negative referendum in France and NL • Positions and arguments • Opponents: inclusion of privileged partnership in negotiation framework, Cyprus as criteria • Result • Negotiation framework: full membership as goal • Recognition of Cyprus not part of the negotiation Asst. Prof. Dr. Alexander Bürgin IUE
Explanation for Opening of accession negotiations • No convergence of preferences or socialization process among member states • Promises and Agreements of the EU raises the negotiation power of the supporters of Turkey’s accession to the EU • Outlook: As long as Turkey continue to comply with EU norms and keep its own promises the EU will not discard the membership perspective Asst. Prof. Dr. Alexander Bürgin IUE